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A bstract
Operationalising the conceptual framework o f the Polanyian double-movement, this study 
explores the dynamics o f economic liberalism and societal re-embedding in post­
communist Central Europe. Based on a case study o f enterprise restructuring in four 
automotive plants in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, institutional 
changes associated with economic liberalism and enterprise modernisation are divided into 
three categories: i) the expansion o f managerial authority, ii) the financialisation o f 
enterprise performance and, finally iii)  the de-contextualisation o f managerial knowledge 
and the increased standardisation o f work organisation. The study finds that in relation to 
these institutional changes, a number o f value rationalities have been mobilised by the 
stakeholders to make sure that the three dimensions o f enterprise activity - i) corporate 
governance and welfare provisions, ii) enterprise performance and, finally, iii)  work 
organisation and skills - are not fu lly subsumed by the cost-benefit utilitarian logic. These 
three non-economic organising logics - (i) welfare protection o f employees by the firm, (ii) 
valuation o f industrial capabilities expressed in a ‘productionist’ attitude and (iii) valuation 
o f skill autonomy and contextualised managerial knowledge - are translated into three 
mutual commitments between the firm and its employees, three value rationalities, whereby 
the firm  functions i) as an authoritarian paternalist, ii)  as a source o f competitive industrial 
capabilities and iii)  as a discretionary bureaucracy based on skill autonomy. The study finds 
that local stakeholders have not opposed new market-based institutions, yet they have 
displayed certain value rationalities that have constrained and moderated the expansion o f 
economic liberalism. As a consequence, economic liberalism in post-communist Central 
Europe has evolved to a more complex enterprise organising logic that combines both 
instrumental and value rationality and thus exemplifies the inherently contradictory nature 
o f modem capitalism.
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Introduction: Economic liberalism and societal re­
embedding
In 1989, with the fall o f the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disappearance o f the iron 
curtain, Central European societies embarked on a path o f political, economic and societal 
reforms. Introducing a modem market economy and building democracy were two major 
goals o f these reforms. The World Bank titled succinctly ‘From plan to market’ 
(Worldbank 1996): replacing central planning by a market mechanism was the key goal o f 
the economic policies. Price and trade liberalisation and the privatisation o f state-owned 
property were the major economic reforms o f the 1990s; they were expected to be the 
vehicles o f economic transformation. The price mechanism was established as the 
dominant mechanism o f resource allocation instead o f administrative coordination and 
price setting, while the privatisation o f state-owned enterprises intended to find ‘real’ 
owners for the productive resources.
Economic liberalisation transformed these societies into market economies but it also had 
highly disruptive consequences for the societies in question. Economic depression was one 
o f the characteristics o f the early phase o f transformation; its depth and length took both 
analysts and politicians by surprise. Industrial and economic decline was present 
everywhere in Central Europe in the early 1990s: industrial production decreased, 
investment plummeted, real wages fell, while inflation and unemployment were high 
(Lavigne 1995). The GDP in Russia and Ukraine, for example, fell by half, while the 
poverty rate increased from 2% to almost 50% (Stiglitz 2001: xii). In 1998, nine years after 
the collapse o f the communist regime, the Central and East European countries together 
were still 10% below their output level in 1989. The so-called ‘transformational recession’ 
(Komai 1994) o f the early 1990s further contributed to an unprecedented tightening o f the 
labour markets, while the implementation o f austerity measures for government finances 
led to further cuts in social protection (Standing 2002). Thus, economic liberalisation in 
Central Europe led - in the short- and medium-term - to considerable societal disruptions 
and high social cost.
The emergence o f the modem capitalist regime is a well-studied phenomenon. Giddens 
(1982: 27) argues that economic sociology developed as a science out o f the desire to 
understand the emergence o f modem industrial societies. Understanding the emergence and 
variety o f modem market economies has been the main preoccupation o f several academic
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disciplines, among which are economic sociology, political economy and neo­
institutionalism. Yet the emergence o f market economies in Central European countries 
after the fall o f state socialist regimes in 1989 is a topic worthy o f study in its own right. 
The introduction o f capitalist institutions at such a speed and on such a scale as witnessed 
in Central Europe is unprecedented in modem history -  it has been a true ‘capitalism by 
democratic design’ (Offe 2001).
The overarching interest o f this research study is to better understand the nature o f the 
emerging market institutions during the post-communist transition. It explores institutional 
and normative dynamics in business, employment and work. The main preoccupation o f 
this study is the expansion o f economic liberalism, on the one hand, and the potential 
societal re-embedding, on the other. The main research question that this study explores is: 
What are the specific forms that economic liberalism and societal re-embedding have taken 
during the ‘ Second Great Transformation’ (Burawoy and Verdery 1998: 1) that has taken 
place in Eastern and Central Europe since 1989? By emphasising the role o f value 
rationalitity and non-economic enterprise organising logics this study demonstrates that the 
role o f state socialist legacies in business, work and production need to be reconsidered. As 
a first step, some o f the key concepts used in this study - economic liberalism and societal 
embeddedness - are introduced.
I. Defining key concepts -  economic liberalism and societal 
embeddedness
Economic liberalism and social embeddedness are the key concepts o f this study. This 
Section sets out to define these concepts building on the political economy literature. The 
concept o f the economic liberalism and the concept o f social embeddedness associated with 
Polanyi’ s thinking were chosen as a recurring theme o f this study as they (i) presuppose an 
inherently contradictory nature o f economic activity in relation to fictitious commodities 
and (ii) take both institutional and ideational frameworks into account.
Economic liberalism is often associated with Adam Smith’s famous statement that the final 
aim o f individual activity is to maximise and to satisfy the narrow self-interest. Yet, what 
exactly does this mean? To better understand the concept o f economic liberalism it is useful 
to consider the writings that take a critical stance towards the market economy and the 
principles o f economic liberalism, such as those by Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi. For both
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authors, the commodification i.e. marketisation o f fictitious commodities -  such as labour 
power -  is a central pillar o f economic liberalism. By labour power Marx understood the 
accumulation o f mental and physical capabilities that are used to produce the commodity. 
The law o f value, another central concept o f Marx’s thinking about capitalist political 
economy, describes the general principle o f regulation o f economic exchange that is based 
on exchange values o f commodities that are the objectified expressions o f the social 
valuation o f the labour power used to produce them. Yet it is only with the marketisation of 
labour power that the capitalist production system is in place. Marx devotes a large part o f 
‘Capital’ (Marx, Fowkes et al. 1990), first published in 1867, to the discussion o f 
‘commodity fetishism’ . Commodification o f labour describes the process o f labour 
marketisation: the labourer offers his labour for its exchange value, while the employer 
buys it for its use value. Commodification means attributing a monetary value to a social 
entity and using the price mechanism in exchange relationships. For Marx, 
commodification o f labour power is a core founding pillar o f the capitalist system as only 
this feature allows the production o f surplus value. Similarly, for Polanyi, marketisation 
and thus commodification o f fictitious commodities is a core feature o f economic 
liberalism. In his study ‘The Great Transformation’(1957), Polanyi describes the 
emergence o f economic liberalism in the 18th and 19th century Western Europe. For him, 
economic liberalism is associated with the belief in the automatic steering power o f the 
gold standard and international trade, a belief based on the naturalistic laws o f equilibrium.
Both authors underline the potentially destructive features o f economic liberalism. For 
Marx, ‘commodity fetishism entails far more than the appearance o f wage labour per se’ 
(Lampland 1995: 9).
Marx’s crucial insight into the fetishism o f commodities was to suggest that in 
capitalism, a curious displacement occurred, in which social relations came to be 
seen as objects, and objects were accorded the qualities o f persons (Lampland 
1995:7-8).
While markets are seen as active players, workers are referred to as products. As a 
consequence, for Marx, the commodification o f labour and commodity fetishism causes 
alienation o f workers. Similarly, Polanyi believes that economic liberalism is a disruptive 
process that destroys the ‘ societal fabric’ o f societies. For Polanyi, a society that would 
completely be dominated by the principle o f economic liberalism would destroy itself 
(Streeck 2007). The destructive nature o f economic liberalism has its roots in the
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‘commodity fiction’ (Polanyi 1957: 72): labour, land and money are not real commodities 
but fictitious ones. They were made to commodities to assure the supply for production 
during the Industrial Revolution.
One o f the main features o f the economic liberalism is the separation o f politics and 
economics introduced through the economic theories. Economics describes the principles 
o f economic liberalism based on the idea o f self-regulating markets. Separating politics and 
economics therefore entails emancipation o f the economic rationale from the political and 
social rationales, or even its primacy. Building on Polanyi, Streeck put this argument thus: 
‘economic activity [..] not just can, but must be free o f moral considerations, i f  it is to have 
a desired impact not only for the individual but for the whole society’ (Streeck 2007: 9). In 
other words, economic liberalism in its extreme form is understood as an approach that 
treats economic activity ‘as a de-moralised social enclave, as a behavioural system suis 
generis in which material interests replace moral obligations1’ (Streeck 2007: 9).
Building on the political economy studies o f Marx’s and Polanyi’ s I define economic 
liberalism as the market-driven organising logic o f action based on the law o f value and 
thus on the principles o f cost-efficiency and scarcity. Economic liberalism - in its extreme 
form - negates other organising logics o f action.
Political economy literature also provides a definition o f the concept o f social 
embeddedness that is seen as a counter-logic to economic liberalism. By underlining the 
incomplete nature o f labour commodification, both authors, Marx and Polanyi, negate the 
primacy o f economic cost-efficiency rationale. For Marx, in capitalism, even i f  labour is 
subjected to the law o f value and thus objectified, at the same time it preserves its social 
character. This contradiction represents, according to Postone (1993:47), ‘ two moments o f 
labour in capitalism itse lf. He quotes Marx in saying that labour, when conceptualised as 
exchange-value, is related to the individual dimension, but when considered as an abstract 
generality it becomes social. This tension is also an interdependency: the individual and the 
abstract dimension o f labour complement each other; the abstract form o f labour only exists 
‘within the social framework marked by the existence’ o f the individual dimension 
(Postone 1993: 47). Thus, this dual character o f labour is preserved in a market economy.
1 Own translation
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Similarly, Polanyi negates the primacy o f the cost-efficiency rationale based on the law o f 
value as the dominant rationale o f economic activity. He argues that the separation between 
politics and economics is not complete because o f the self-protective forces o f society and 
because o f the inherent ‘double-movement’ o f dis-embedding o f societal relations, on the 
one hand, and o f social re-embedding driven by the forces o f social embeddedness, on the 
other. Polanyi explains how our societies have been characterised by a tension between 
market forces and social regulation in the field o f work and business. Social history has 
been characterised by a double-movement:
the extension o f the market organization in respect to genuine commodities was 
accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones. [...]. Society protected 
itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system [...] (Polanyi 
1957: 76).
Polanyi further underlines the social nature o f economic liberalism and the tension that 
inhibits the commodification o f fictitious commodities by pointing out that during the 
emergence o f the modem market economy, regulation and markets ‘grew up together’ : it is 
only through the active role o f the state that the price mechanism and the law o f value could 
become the dominant method o f social exchange and thus replace mercantilism. Thus, 
rather than being independent from social and political rationales, laisser-faire was 
dependent on them as it was a product o f deliberate state action.
Conceptualised as a counter-movement to economic liberalism, for Polanyi, the societal re­
embedding is a ‘collectivist’ spontaneous reaction to save the ‘social fabric’ o f society 
(Polanyi 1957: 150). In the case o f money management, national central banks were given 
the power to regulate the value o f the national currency. In the case o f labour issues, it took 
the form o f protective laws and unionism. This reaction was driven by those classes and 
groups who were most affected by economic liberalism. Modem market economies are in 
the constant dynamic o f a double-movement: economic liberalism and commodification 
driven by the law o f value, on the one hand, and the self-protection o f the society, on the 
other. The double-movement
can be personified as the action o f two organizing principles in society, each o f 
them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support o f definite social 
forces and using its own distinctive methods. The one was the principle o f 
economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment o f a self-regulating market, 
relying on the support o f the trading classes and using largely laisser-faire and free 
trade as its methods; the other was the principle o f social protection aiming at the
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conservation o f man and nature as well as productive organization, [...] and using 
protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments o f intervention 
as its methods (Polanyi 1957: 132),
To summarise Polanyi’ s argument, the drive towards societal re-embedding comes from 
within the society that tries to preserve its societal fabric. Polanyi’ s concept o f societal 
embeddedness used in this study is that o f societal self-protecting forces that try to lim it the 
commodification o f fictitious commodities and thus to lim it the dominance o f economic 
liberalism over other organising logics. The concept o f societal embeddedness that stands 
in the Polanyian tradition is seen as opposing the law o f value and cost-efficiency 
organising logic o f action.
A somewhat different tradition, also well-established in the neo-institutional literature and 
economic sociology, is one that considers societal re-embedding and societal 
embeddedness as something more general. An important contribution to it is the article by 
Grano vetter (1985) who argues that any activity, even i f  guided by economic self-interest, 
can only take place embedded into a system o f social relations and reciprocal obligations. 
In other words, Granovetter’s study recognises the social foundations o f all activities 
including the economic ones. Similarly, interpreting the notion o f ‘social foundations o f the 
economy’ , Bandelj argues that while for economic liberalism economic action is possible 
without the interference o f the social, ‘ social forces not only constrain efficiency-seeking 
economic agents, as most analysts emphasize, but they enable and empower social actors to 
construct and then execute economic strategies o f action’ (Bandelj 2008: 5). Also, Jacoby 
when discussing the features o f ‘ the embedded corporation’ argues that ‘ corporations are 
more than mechanisms for maximizing profits -  that is the textbook economic view -  but 
are also the terrain for conflict over whether and how to pursue that objective’ (Jacoby 
2005: 5). These studies o f embeddedness teach us is that there is not one common pattern 
but
varieties o f embeddedness [...] [that represent] specific configurations o f social 
structures, power distributions, and cultural understandings that congeal into 
distinct forms o f economic organization (Bandelj 2008: 13).
However, it is not this broader understanding o f societal embeddedness that is used in this 
study, but the narrower concept o f societal embeddedness associated with Karl Polanyi.
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Polanyi’ s work and his notion o f the double-movement have been criticised for an under- 
theoretisation o f the nature o f counter-movement (Silver 2003; Webster, Lambert et al. 
2008). His critics argue that while, on the one hand, the ideas, thinkers and the 
implementation o f self-regulating forces are given significant attention in his historical 
analysis, the concept o f self-protecting forces, on the other hand, is discussed insufficiently. 
Polanyi discards the working class as the driver o f change thus disagreeing with Marx, but 
does not elaborate in greater detail on alternatives. He mentions certain groups in society 
who are ‘ immediately affected by the deleterious action o f the market’ as potential forces 
o f counter-movement and societal re-embedding, but he remains vague about specific 
actors and mechanisms. He speaks only in very general terms about different societal 
institutions such as trade unions as driving forces o f self-protection. However, Polanyi’ s 
concepts o f double-movement and societal embeddedness have proven to be pertinent even 
several decades after the first publication o f ‘The great transformation’ in 1944: his work 
turned out to be the precursor o f the great de-commodification o f labour in the post-World 
War II period.
Polanyi’ s work is central for this research project due to two reasons. First, Polanyi wrote 
his historical work ‘Great Transformation’ having the destructive consequences o f the 
economic depression o f 1930s in mind (Burawoy 2003). He considered the potentially 
destructive impact o f economic liberalism and looked for the forms o f societal re­
embedding. Thus, Polanyi identified the organising logic o f self-regulating markets, on the 
one hand, and the organising logic o f self-protection o f society, on the other, as the two 
central but inherently conflicting organising principles o f the modem market economy. 
Second, Polanyi did not ignore the role o f the double-movement as an idea. He 
conceptualised economic liberalism and societal embeddedness at the institutional level -  
in the form o f protective labour legislation or collective trade union organisations, for 
example -  but also as an idea. Even i f  Polanyi himself never used this term, his detailed 
analysis o f the evolution o f economic thinking in the first part o f his book underlines his 
awareness o f the importance o f economic liberalism as an idea. In other words, both 
institutional and ideational dimensions o f the double-movement are important for Polanyi. 
I f  his concept o f societal embeddedness is used, the twentieth century has known a number 
o f moments o f societal re-embeddedness, all closely linked to certain ideational 
frameworks, from Keynesianism to fascism (Blyth 2003).
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To sum up, Polanyi’ s work is relevant for the current study o f post-communist 
transformation because (i) it sees economic liberalism as a force that can be potentially 
destructive i f  not complemented and counter-balanced by other organising logics and (ii) 
because it does not ignore the ideational dimension o f economic liberalism and societal 
embeddedness. The next Section argues that the Central European economic liberalism o f 
the post-communist era can be considered as a form o f Polanyi’s economic liberalism.
II. Applying the concept of economic liberalism to post­
communist Central Europe
This Section applies the Polanyian concepts o f economic liberalism and societal 
embeddedness to post-communist Central Europe. It argues that one possible way o f 
conceptualising the dynamics o f economic activity in Central European post-communist 
countries is to think about it as a double-movement of, on the one hand, economic 
liberalism i.e. the liberalisation o f business and work activities from societal constraints by 
putting them under the economic logic o f the law o f value and o f cost-efficiency and, on 
the other hand, o f their societal re-embedding based on other logics such as mutual 
commitment o f social actors. It elaborates how both dimensions o f Polanyian concept o f 
the double-movement that were discussed in the previous Section -  the emphasis on the 
inherent tension between the two organising principles o f economic activity and the 
awareness o f the ideational dimension-are very relevant for the post-communist ideational 
and institutional change. This argument is developed by showing how the establishment o f 
market economic institutions became a dominant organising principle in post-communist 
Central Europe.
Polanyi’ s concept o f economic liberalism can be directly applied to the Central European 
post-communist institutional change: the existing and the new organising logics were seen 
as conflictual and the role o f economic liberalism as the new ideology was pre-dominant. 
Trade and price liberalisation and state withdrawal from company ownership have been the 
major reforms o f economic liberalism. Freeing the individual from state oppression was the 
proclaimed goal o f the policy reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. As a consequence, 
the withdrawal o f any intervening social and political forces from the sphere o f business 
and work has been the central socio-economic project o f the 1990s and 2000s in post­
communist Central Europe. This liberation o f business and work from Party-state 
dominance went together with the introduction o f a market economic system o f production.
17
The reforms that were implemented with the explicit aim o f establishing a market economy 
followed the liberal blue-print designed in cooperation with international financial 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Previous trade arrangements in 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) were governed by a 
central plan, while product competition was practically absent. According to the logic o f 
the ‘Washington Consensus’ , the liberalisation o f prices was seen as 'freeing market forces' 
and was expected to bring efficiency gains, while liberalisation o f trade was expected to 
allow for an increased variety o f consumer goods and at the same time was believed to 
subject domestic producers to competition, thereby subordinating them to the law o f value.
Between 1989 and 1990, Central European trade links were interrupted and a trade re­
orientation to Western Europe took place. Overall, the original desire o f political reformers 
to ‘ take the state out o f the market’ went far and the post-communist transition in Central 
Europe has been a strong move towards economic liberalism. A t the company level, a 
similar quest for ‘market forces’ took place. Marketisation was associated with policies that 
aimed at turning ‘ soft budget constraints’ o f enterprises into hard ones and at replacing 
contractual supplier/buyer relationships based on plan by price mechanism. At the same 
time, the previously dominant non-economic organising logics o f production were put 
under pressure and marginalised: state bureaucracy links to enterprises atrophied, while 
employment guarantees for employees disappeared and labour ‘markets’ were introduced. 
The belief in the curing impact o f the market forces and the law o f value was strong and the 
vision for the new economic regime held by the stakeholders and their advisors has been 
fairly simplistic -  just think about Klaus' desire for 'capitalism without adjectives'. Thus, 
rather than seeing the organising logic o f cost-efficiency as complementary to the existing 
societal mutual commitments and to certain political goals, work and business institutions 
were transformed so that to explicitly replace the social commitments and political goals by 
the law o f value.
The perception o f a conflictual nature between the economic and non-economic organising 
logics o f economic activity becomes clear when we consider how state socialist legacies 
were treated in the aftermath o f regime change in the early 1990s. State socialist legacies 
have been perceived as profoundly inappropriate for the new modem market economies 
that the reforms o f 1989-1990 aimed at establishing. After the regime change, the general 
public and the majority o f social scientists were o f the opinion that there was nothing one 
could learn neither from state socialism nor from the 1989 revolutions and policy reforms
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that came after it. Similarly, the national political elites in Central Europe often did not see 
their traditions and their legacies as potential building blocks for the future development o f 
their societies and economies. The dominant view was that only overcoming state socialist 
legacies - ‘ curing the disease’ o f state socialism - would allow for a successful 
transformation. In other words, state socialist legacies have been perceived as something 
profoundly negative that has to be left behind as quickly as possible. In this context, a 
Polish scholar Sztompka speaks about ‘civilizational incompetence’ o f Central Europe 
(Sztompka 1996: 125) as in his view, post-communist societies lack the appropriate 
institutional framework for a successful functioning in the market economy. To sum up, 
economic liberalism that has become the dominant ideational framework in Central Europe 
sees itself as conflictual to the previously existing mutual social commitments and 
obligations.
The lacking awareness o f the importance o f the existing societal commitments and 
obligations is also exemplified in another crucial dimension o f emerging economic 
liberalism in Central Europe: its logic o f a ‘catching-up’ modernisation and 
‘normalisation’ . The catching-up nature o f Central European post-communist transition has 
been underlined by numerous scholars. Most famously, Habermas argued that 1989 was a 
catching-up or rectifying revolution (Habermas 1990a) as it did not introduce any new 
ideas about a better society - something all other major revolutions since the French 
revolution did before - but just wanted to catch-up with the main pattern o f Western 
modernity without violence. A characteristic o f this revolution was ‘ its total lack o f ideas 
that are either innovative or oriented towards the future’ (Habermas 1990b: 5). Similarly, 
Dahrendorf (1990) argued that the strange aspect o f the 1989 revolution was that there was 
no revolutionary idea behind. The goal o f political elites was to introduce a new 
modernisation project with the idea o f replacing the remnants o f the previous semi- 
totalitarian modernisation project with a new one. In this new modernisation project, the 
‘Western’ model o f market economy is seen as a tool to achieve convergence on the ‘main 
pattern’ o f history, a rectifying revolution - to put it in Habermas’ words. The dominance o f 
the catching-up modernisation logic is visible in the fact that overcoming state socialist 
legacies and ‘rejoining the main pattern’ o f liberal democracy and market economy are 
often considered by Central European stakeholders as central societal modernisation 
objectives. Metaphors such as ‘return to normality’ are common in post-communist Central 
Europe. The post-communist transition is presented as ‘a return to the evolutionary 
mainstream from which the socialist experiment had deviated’ (Amason 1993: 189).
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The importance o f economic liberalism as ideology that negates other societal organising 
logics should not be underestimated in the post-communist reform process. The commonly 
used term ‘ transition’ represents well the post-communist belief in societal progress. This 
term presupposes a clearly defined endpoint o f political and socio-economic 
transformation. The idea o f conversion to the main historic pattern o f market economy and 
democracy has been readily used to describe the post-communist transformation.
[... ] it is tempting to reduce the whole Soviet trajectory to a misdirected detour o f a 
failed leap forwards: from this points o f view, the Soviet model was structurally 
unsustainable because it lacked some essential ingredients o f the ‘main pattern’ and 
could not compete with the ‘ lead societies’ o f the West’ (Amason 1993: 180).
In the new ideational framework o f expanding economic liberalism, the state socialist 
experiences are thus rejected.
It is true that more radical reforms with greater cut-backs in living standards that were 
chosen in Poland and former Czechoslovakia can partially be explained with the power o f 
political momentum and the window o f opportunity that reform designers saw as they had 
an exceptional support o f the population. Yet market-oriented reforms in post-communism 
have been more than just a clever use o f a window o f opportunity by the previously 
suppressed opposition. Lavigne (1995) argues that along with a willingness to radically 
break away from the past, 'big bang' programs express an intellectual and political 
commitment to a monetarist, ‘Washington Consensus’ vision. The 'big bang' was an 
insurance against any temptation to look for a 'third way' (Lavigne 1995: 119). 
Furthermore, while in the early transition stages, ideological factors were intermingled and 
hard to dissociate from other explanatory factors such as the aforementioned ‘window o f 
opportunity’ , in the later stages o f transition, economic liberalism took hold more visibly as 
the dominant organising logic: it takes for granted marketisation o f fictitious commodities 
and the primacy o f the economy over society. The new dominant narrative inversed the 
previous organising logic o f production being dominated by political imperatives and 
replaced it with a new societal imperative -  ‘ the market’ i.e. the the law o f value regulated 
by the price mechanism. The tolerance for other, non-economic organising logics has been 
low: instead o f becoming a contested political viewpoint in a pluralist setting, economic 
liberalism covers all major political constituencies and has not been questioned even at
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societal margins. The new dominance o f economic liberalism makes it difficult for other 
organising logics to survive.
It is worth to briefly consider the reasons for this dominance in the field o f production and 
work. Ironically, the rapid expansion o f Polanyian economic liberalism in Central Europe 
is, at least partially, due to the pre-existing ideational state-socialist legacies. In comparison 
to the modernisation projects prevalent in liberal democracies, the Party-led state socialist 
modernisation was different in at least two dimensions: the totalitarian or semi-totalitarian 
nature o f the regime, on the one hand, and its belief in the evolution o f society to an 
idealised better future, on the other. Even i f  Soviet state socialism differed from the state 
socialist versions in Central European countries, the totalitarian state legacy matters for all 
post-communist societies. The modernisation project in liberal democracies o f Western 
Europe, for example, is characterised by the fact that it explicitly deals with society and its 
contradictions:
Its strength and significance consist, above all, in the ability to coordinate and at the 
same time contain the development o f autonomous socio-cultural spheres. The 
dynamic o f capitalist development is [..] counterbalanced by an institutionalized 
capacity to regulate the social conflict that is obverse economic rationality and to 
adapt the logic o f the market to other principles o f organization (Amason 1993:16).
In each societal sphere, capitalist regimes in the West have managed to accept and deal with 
the inherent societal tensions. Thus, ‘the development o f democracy has been contained 
within institutions that lim it the possibilities o f its radicalization’ (Amason 1993: 16). 
While in Western liberal democracies, economic liberalisation and modernisation are a 
group o f societal goals among the plurality o f societal goals, in state socialist system the 
modernisation project was not just a dimension o f society among others, it was the central 
and dominant societal imperative in the late state socialist semi-totalitarian regimes. 
Stalin’s rule o f terror, described as the ‘ second revolution’ (Tucker 1987), was the most 
decisive step to bring the Soviet model o f Marxism closer to the totalitarian state. Central 
European countries, once incorporated into the Soviet Union’s sphere o f influence after the
2
Arendt (1961 )Arendt, H. (1961). The origins of totalitarianism. London, Allen and Unwin, characterises totalitarian 
regimes by their double claim o f‘total domination and global rule’. She explains that, different from the autocratic rule 
that focuses on gaining absolute political power and makes opposition illegal, totalitarian regimes are characterised by the 
desire to dominate all aspects of life. For Arendt, Stalinist Soviet Union as well as Hitler’s Germany fell into the 
totalitarian category. Amason, on the other hand, relates the concept of totalitarian regime more to the power of ideology 
and perceptions. He distinguishes several types of totalitarian regimes mainly relating them to the concept of total control: 
The exercise of power may involve mass terror or selective repression combined with more regular forms of control, [,.] 
The official ideology can lose its quasi-religious character and shrink to a roulinised but non-contestable frame of 
reference; in more extreme cases, its aim is to control the individual mind from within, but its role can also be limited to 
determining the boundaries of legitimate public discourse Arnason, J. P. (1993). The future that failed : origins and 
destinies of the Soviet model. London ; New York, Routledge.
21
World War II, were part o f this totalitarian project. After Stalin’s death, the totalitarian 
modernisation project was replaced by a semi-totalitarian one. The attempt o f establishing 
fu ll control over the periphery was abandoned although the ideological fa9ade was 
preserved. Several variations o f the early Soviet style state socialism existed and some 
countries, such as Yugoslavia, broke away from it early on. The three countries - Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia - remained within the Soviet sphere o f influence but at the 
same time went through the most pronounced regime crisis in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
political crises o f the post-Stalin era put an end to the total control o f society by allowing 
for an informal societal pluralism but they did not abolish the idea o f a dominant 
modernisation project. Although, the totalitarian dimension o f Central European regimes 
was substantially weakened by the legitimation crises that took place between the 1950s 
and 1970s, its specificity in comparison to the Western version o f modernisation project did 
not disappear. The state socialist modernisation projects continued to officially ignore the 
existence o f societal pluralism and the inherent tensions within society. The weak 
understanding o f societal pluralism and the fast emergence o f a new dominant narrative 
during post-communist transition has thus been one o f the reasons for the fast emergence o f 
economic liberalism that presents itself as the dominant organising logic.
The second crucial legacy o f state socialism in the fast emergence o f economic liberalism 
has been the strength o f the utopian vision o f a better society and an uncritical belief in the 
better future. The emerging new ideational frame o f economic liberalism has many features 
o f the first modernity. Social theories o f liberal democracies distinguish between the early, 
first modernity, on the one hand, and the late, post-modernity, second modernity, 
‘ reflexive’ modernity (Giddens 1990; Beck, Giddens et al. 1994) or even liquid modernity 
(Bauman 2000), on the other3. While classical modernisation theories were part o f the first 
modernity tradition, they are rejected by the new, reflexive modernity tradition. Ironically, 
the post-communist modernisation project picked up the classical modernity tradition at the 
time when a big part o f the modern world had moved into a post-modern age. The revival 
o f the classical modernisation theory seems to have taken hold in the uncritical dealing with 
the new market economy order. The continuous adherence o f many Central European
3
While social theories of the first modernity represented by Durkheim. Weber and Marx were based on the logic of 
functional and structural determination, post-modern social theories reject these approaches as well as the progressive 
view of society and focus on self-constitution of society. In this reflexive post-modernist tradition, the classical 
modernisation theory has been extensively criticised. Corradi, for example, argues that: ‘Sociology of development 
was turned into a plethora of studies on ‘obstacles’ and ‘exceptions’ to a prefigured march of history’ Corradi, J. E. 
(1985). The fitful republic : economy, society, and politics in Argentina. Boulder, Westview Press..
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stakeholders to the classical modernity tradition is a paradox that has been well described 
by Sztompka:
A t the end o f the twentieth century, the era o f ‘ triumphant modernity’ , with its 
prosperity, optimism and expansionist drive seems to be over. The crisis rather than 
progress becomes the leitmotif o f social consciousness. Acute awareness o f the side 
effects and unintended ‘boomerang effects’ o f modernity produces disenchantment, 
disillusionment and outright rejection. [...] It seems as i f  western societies were 
ready to jump o ff the train o f modernity, bored with the journey, just at the moment 
when the post-communist east frantically is trying to get on board (Sztompka 
1993a: 140).
Marxism-Leninism’s view o f society was about an inevitable transition o f society from 
capitalism to communism. Even i f  the official ideology had stopped representing Marxism- 
Leninism early on, the totalitarian and post-totalitarian grip on society that state socialism 
represented was not devoid o f a clear goal: the evolution o f society to communism. Thus, 
state socialist regimes had strong features o f evolutive thinking based on the idea o f 
societal progress. Marxist historical materialism conceptualised evolution o f society in 
several stages: ancient society, feudal system, industrialised capitalism, socialism and 
communism. Furthermore, the countries o f the Eastern bloc were
distinguished by the pursuit o f the goal o f industrial development to the exclusion 
o f other competing goals. The mobilisation o f the population is closely linked to 
industrial growth: the ends which the elites seek to achieve are associated with the 
development o f an advanced industrial society (Lane 1976: 53).
Thus, the Soviet version o f Marxist thinking was part o f the first modernity that was based 
on the belief in industrialisation, technical progress and science. The constitutive principle 
was a ‘continuous and self-accelerating growth o f the productive forces’ (Amason 1993: 
17). The belief in progress o f social life can be traced back to Hegelian idealist philosophy 
that exercised strong influence on Marx. The Marxian interpretation o f history was strongly 
influenced by Hegel’s dialectic philosophy:
Hegel’ s work is a unique expression o f faith in progress. The final meaning o f 
progress is to be revealed and made real in the realm o f philosophy, o f mind. [..] 
World history is nothing other than the course o f development o f Spirit, or the 
striving o f Spirit o f self-realisation, for a knowledge o f itself (Evans 1993: 10).
Marx’s conviction was that human nature was profoundly good and that economic 
conditions alienated humans while radical social change could help this good nature to 
unfold. In Soviet times, the progress-based thinking remained dominant despite increasing
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ideological innovations and deviations from the original Marxism-Leninism. Although the 
‘ permanent revolution’ approach o f Trotsky that presupposed the international expansion o f 
revolutionary activities was replaced by Stalin’s dogma o f ‘ socialism in one country’ , the 
progressive vision o f social change was preserved.
A  marking feature o f economic liberalism in post-communist Central Europe has been its 
strong idealisation o f capitalism and lack o f critical stance towards commodification o f 
fictitious commodities. The state socialist legacy o f Communist Party-led modernisation 
has been crucial for the emergence o f a vastly exaggerated belief in the power o f self­
regulating markets, a phenomenon that Block (2007), describing American political 
landscape, calls ‘market fundamentalism’ . This term can easily be applied to post­
communist Central Europe is acknowledged by Sztompka: ‘A t least for the time being, we 
have become more capitalist then the capitalists, and more Western than the West. The 
pendulum has swung to another extreme’ (Sztompka 2004: 493). One o f the state socialist 
legacies that has contributed to the emerging ‘market fundamentalism’ is the outdated 
understanding o f the market economy in post-communism. Modernisation has been 
conceptualised as an inversion o f Marxism but it still used Marxist understanding o f 
capitalism: the idealised vision o f the Western capitalism dominated by 'market forces' was 
based on an anachronistic picture o f capitalism, as described by Marx over 100 years 
earlier. Thus, this vision has not incorporated changes that occurred within capitalist 
societies since the Marx’ s and Lenin’s writings; most notably the rise o f the welfare state 
and distributional politics. European economies and, to a certain extent even the USA, have 
been transformed under socialist values and left-wing politics. As Sztompka argues, in state 
socialism,
[t]he West was perceived as a kingdom o f freedom and prosperity, and its dominant 
rules were modelled after a vision o f 19th century capitalism, o f free markets, 
rampant individualism, ruthless competition, robber barons, and “ rags to riches” 
kind o f careers (Sztompka 2004: 491).
To sum up, post-communist economic reforms can be described as an expansion o f 
economic liberalism in the Polanyian sense. Economic reforms o f the post-communist era 
inherited two features o f late socialism: the lack o f pluralist understanding o f societal 
processes and an idealised, uncritical view concerning the marketisation o f fictitious 
commodities. As a consequence, economic liberalism very quickly acquired the status o f a 
dominant societal project that negates other organising logics o f action.
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Ill. Balancing theory and empirics -  methodological 
considerations
The goal o f this Section is to elaborate on the research methodology o f this study. It 
sketches out the main features o f qualitative research and elaborates on the intention o f this 
research project to combine empirical inquiry with consistent theoretisation. To do this, it 
attempts to take stock o f both the literature that deals with theory generation and the 
empirically-oriented case study literature. It identifies the multiple case study design as an 
appropriate methodology for early stages o f theory generation and first theory verification.
The interest o f the study is theoretical and empirical at the same time. On the theoretical 
level, its goal is to operationalise the concepts o f economic liberalism and societal re­
embedding in post-communist Central Europe. It thus aims at contributing to the existing 
literature on the nature o f modem capitalism, mostly to its neo-institutional strand, by 
introducing a neglected and under-defined normative dimension o f business and work into 
the study o f institutional change in modem capitalism. On the empirical level, the goal o f 
the study is to operationalise the Polanyian concepts o f societal dis-embedding and re­
embedding in the context o f post-communist production and work.
Methodologically and epistemologically this research sees itself embedded in two research 
traditions: the constructivist and positivist/empiricist traditions. The epistemological origins 
o f these two traditions are discussed here only briefly. Positivism or empiricism are 
philosophical approaches popularised by the founding father o f British empiricism John 
Locke (1959) who argued that our sense-based experiences represent the only true sources 
o f knowledge. In modern social sciences, this approach emphasises the importance o f 
empirical evidence and champions the inductive scientific method already elaborated by 
John Stuart M ill (1950). By emphasising the importance o f observing ‘the real world’ the 
first empiricists were crucial facilitators o f the birth o f modem social sciences, setting it 
aside from theology and philosophy where deductive methods dominated. The empiricist 
revolution advanced what contemporary social sciences describe as ‘scientific method’ , a 
method o f reasoning that is strongly influenced by the positivist assumptions o f Popper’s 
(1959) falsifiability theory.
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The constructivist turn in social sciences that negates the positivist assumptions has been 
pioneered by Berger and Luckmann (1967) who, in their work ‘The social construction o f 
reality’ , powerfully assert that social order is a human product. They uncover the paradox 
‘that man is capable o f producing a world that he then experiences as something other than 
a human product’ (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 7). The authors explain how the world is 
‘objectified’ -  it is experienced as objective rather than as a constructed reality: certain 
cognitive and normative schema are so profoundly embedded that they are taken for 
granted. Kuhn (1962), another important critic o f positivism, famously argued that science 
consists o f scientific paradigms; their validity is not necessarily always linked to their 
falsifiability.
Leaning on the constructivist literature, Hyman explains that the articulation between 
theory and practice, between abstract and general statements and the ‘ real facts’ is present 
in any research: we are just not always aware o f it: ‘The researcher, whether or not 
methodologically self-conscious, is guided by distinctive ontological and epistemological 
beliefs. [..]. Theory is everywhere’ (Hyman 1994: 167). In other words, any - even a very 
limited - generalisation and abstraction from the fact involves theory building:
Strict empiricism insists that we can believe only the evidence o f our own senses. 
Yet only by interpreting a myriad o f shapes, colours, sounds, smells, textures and 
flavours does this evidence become meaningful (Hyman 1994: 170).
To give the fact a meaning we thus have to use abstractions and generalisations; in other 
words, ‘no account o f empirical phenomena, however supposedly “ objective” , can be 
theoretically innocent’ (Hyman 1994: 172).
At this stage, it is important to consider more closely what a theory is. Different levels o f 
generalisation and abstraction lead to different outcomes. One usually distinguishes 
between three categories o f theories: at the low abstraction level one finds simple empirical 
generalisations or categorisations o f phenomena that have explanatory power; at the highest 
and the most comprehensive level o f generalisation there are complex grand theories; 
between these two extremes we find middle-range theories. These are theories
that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in 
abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to 
develop a unified theory that w ill explain all the observed uniformities o f social 
behaviour (Merton 1968: 39).
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The claim to theoretical generalisation o f this research is modest and lies somewhere 
between a consistent categorisation that has some explanatory power and a middle-range 
theory. My theoretical research interest is not to establish generally valid rules or laws but 
rather to transfer the concept o f societal re-embedding to a different context and to uncover 
the extent to which enterprise organising logics can represent forces o f movement and 
counter-movement. Thus, I identify and categorise the forces o f the Polanyian double­
movement in the post-communist socio-economic context at a different level o f analysis: 
instead o f exploring macro-level variables, micro-level social behaviour at the enterprise 
level is identified as a site o f the expansion o f economic liberalism, on the one hand, and o f 
societal re-embedding, on the other.
Describing the organising logics as economic and non-economic across three different 
enterprise subfields represents an exercise in categorisation that according to Weick is a 
useful exercise: ‘A  strong classification system, one in which an event clearly falls into one 
and only one category, is especially helpful when solutions are expected to be nonrandomly 
distributed’ (Weick 1989: 522). In other words, the use o f dichotomy o f economic/non­
economic logics in three different subfields o f enterprise activity allows me to show that 
such different processes o f social interaction and enterprise activity as firm  governance, 
firm performance evaluation, work organisation and skill formation can be seen through the 
same prism and conceptualised in same categories despite their different nature.
But is theory generation - however modest - not too ambitious o f an endeavour for a young 
researcher with limited academic experience and resources? By providing a historical 
perspective on theory generation Glaser and Strauss (1999) argue that it is not: theory 
generation is not only feasible but also a highly necessary activity. The authors describe 
how theory verification became a dominant occupation in sociology, but a similar argument 
can be made for a broader, multi-institutional field o f political economy and neo­
institutionalism in which this research is situated. A genuine shift away from theory 
generation to theory testing can be explained by several factors among which are high 
respect for the forefathers o f the discipline and the belief that there were many theories but 
few confirmations o f them as well as the emergence o f numerous sophisticated tools o f 
quantitative methods after the World War II. But even in cases in which theory generation 
continued to be pursued, the language o f theory verification became so dominant that the
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process o f theory generation has become less and less explicit in methodological 
descriptions. Also Weick sees this development as highly problematic. He argues that:
Theory cannot be improved until we improve the theorising process, and we cannot 
improve the theorizing process until we describe it more explicitly, operate it more 
self-consciously, and decouple it from validation more deliberately (Weick 1989: 
516).
This study is embedded into the current academic practices; it does not have an explicit 
narrative discussing a detailed process o f how the theoretical contribution was generated. 
Only indirectly, by discussing different strands o f literature - from corporatist to firm level 
theories to moral philosophy and theories o f rationality - does this study follow up at least a 
part o f the theory generating process. Yet still on paper this process appears to be quite 
linear, consisting o f a number o f logical steps as there is no easy way to demonstrate the 
back-and-fourth between theoretical and conceptual literature, on the one hand, and 
conducting field work research, on the other. However, it is this circular pattern o f 
theorising and observing that was at the heart o f my research process.
The aim o f this research project is to be both theoretically and empirically grounded. The 
alternative way o f theorising is creating a logically deduced theory that is developed away 
from empirical reality, the so-called ‘armchair theorising’ . Yet there is no reason to 
privilege abstraction and generalisation over empirical inquiry: ‘ the relationship between 
abstract and concrete is interactive and dialectical, not linear and hierarchical’ (Hyman 
1994: 172). Furthermore, the interaction between theory and empirical data - what Glaser 
and Strauss (1999) call ‘grounded theory’ - is especially important during the early stage o f 
theory discovery than during the later stages o f theory verification and testing. Yet the 
grounded theory has a strong empiricist undertone that I do not share due to the reasons 
outlined in the first paragraph o f this Section. However, Glaser and Strauss point out that 
there is also a middle way between grounded theory, on the one hand, and logico-deductive 
theorising, on the other. In this middle way, the researcher ‘ chooses examples 
systematically and then allows them to feed back to give theoretical control over his 
formulations’ (Glaser and Strauss 1999: 5). I f  one uses theorising as a starting point o f 
research and i f  neither the empirical nor the theoretical side is privileged, the theorisation o f 
empirical material is an example o f disciplined imagination (Weick 1989). Alvesson and 
Karreman use this metaphor and elaborate that:
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[EJmpirical material can facilitate theorization because it provides resources for 
both imagination and discipline. Breakdowns create spaces where imagination can 
be put to work. And although empirical material never exists outside perspectives 
and interpretative repertoires, it nevertheless creates a relative boundary for 
imagination. Some constructions make more sense than others. Empirical material 
anchors the process o f theorization in specific claims about the object under study, 
thus prohibiting arbitrary ideas from being put into play (Alvesson and Karreman 
2007: 1266).
Building on these reflections, this research project chose a case study method as its 
empirical method o f investigation. Case study methodology is considered to be the most 
useful way o f dealing with theory building when no causal relationship is at stake. A 
comparative study, a survey or an experiment are useful research methodologies when 
rigorous hypothesis testing is at the centre o f a researcher’s attention, but for the early 
stages o f theory building and first verification, a case study is an appropriate research 
method. It is based on theoretical sampling as - in contrast to a quantitative inquiry where 
the goal is to generalise from a randomly selected and unbiased sample to a larger 
population - the goal in case study research is not to generalise to a larger population but to 
derive theoretical generalisations that would refute, confirm or extend a theoretical 
proposition. One rationale for a case study that is not concerned with making causal claims 
can be finding a critical or revelatory case that helps to redirect a researcher’ s attention to 
an entirely new field or to a new phenomenon that was previously under-researched or 
neglected (Yin 2003). Precisely this kind o f a critical/ revelatory case study has been used 
in this empirical inquiry.
A case study research, as any social science investigation, has to conform to a number o f 
research criteria in order to be taken seriously by the academic community. Among various 
criteria, construct validity, external validity and reliability are the ones that are relevant to 
the case study research (Yin 2003). The criterion o f parsimony is often added as a further 
qualifier for theory development. The criterion o f construct validity refers to the fact that 
empirical measures need to correspond to theoretical concepts. In my case, this criterion 
had proven to be the trickiest one as the main goal o f the empirical investigation has been 
to demonstrate the existence o f non-economic enterprise organising logics. It is inherently 
d ifficu lt to demonstrate the existence o f organising logics; this can only be done indirectly. 
The criterion o f external validity refers to the requirement that a study’s findings should be 
generalisable beyond the immediate case study. This criterion is sometimes also referred to 
as the generalisability condition: ‘ the wider the range o f contexts a theory encompasses, the 
greater is its contribution to conceptualization and explanation’ (Hyman 1994: 172-173).
29
This research brings together the normative dimension o f social behaviour and Polanyi’s 
concept o f the double-movement. It would be interesting to test its validity in environments 
that are not part o f the post-communist Central Europe but have a strong legacy o f non­
economic organising logics and weak collective and encompassing socio-economic actors. 
The third condition often used in academic research and closely linked to generalisability is 
the reliability or replicability criterion: would another researcher come to similar empirical 
findings using similar methodology? This criterion is the most empiricist one and probably 
the most controversial as some qualitative researchers doubt its importance and point out 
that what one finds largely depends on the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings o f the 
investigation and replication o f findings is not a necessary condition for research:
The goal is not to produce a standardized set o f results that any other careful 
researcher in the same situation or studying the same issue would have produced. 
Rather it is to produce a coherent and illuminating description o f and perspective on 
a situation that is based on and consistent with detailed study o f that situation 
(Schofield 2002: 71).
While I partially agree with this opinion, I nevertheless believe that the empirical inquiry 
should be as transparent and accessible as possible to other researchers. For that purpose, a 
short description o f the empirical research methodology follows. This study uses empirical 
evidence collected during the field research that I undertook in 2006-2008. Four 
subsidiaries o f the VW  Group in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
constitute a case study o f post-communist legacies o f non-economic enterprise organising 
logics. The empirical evidence was collected during fieldwork trips; it includes around 65 
semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders in the four VW  Group subsidiaries 
and in the automotive industry in the respective countries more generally; with government 
officials working in state agencies such as investment agencies and, finally, with local 
researchers. The list o f the interviewees has been compiled and is presented in the 
Appendix o f the study.
Finally, the criterion o f parsimony is also fulfilled: by distinguishing between just two 
types o f enterprise organising logics: the economic and the non-economic, and between 
three subfields in which these logics can be applied -  enterprise governance, enterprise 
performance measures and work organisation and skills -  one can consider this theoretical 
generalisation as sufficiently parsimonious.
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IV. Organisation of the study
The study is organised as follows. As an interactive and dialectic relation between the 
theoretical and empirical inquiry has been the explicit goal o f this study, the theoretical Part 
1 and the empirical Part 2 are given equal space and attention. Part 1 identifies the 
conceptual tools for studying forces and mechanisms o f societal re-embedding. For this 
purpose, Chapter I explores the existing neo-institutional literature that deals with 
economic liberalism and societal embeddedness. It surveys neo-institutional and corporatist 
literature applied to industrial societies for which it was originally developed. It discusses 
conceptual frameworks that were developed to describe the emergence o f the modem 
capitalism and the forces o f societal re-embedding. Its main finding is that corporatist post­
war literature prominently identified certain collective actors and institutions as the drivers 
o f societal re-embedding. Yet when I turn to the emergence o f the modem market economy 
in post-communist countries o f Central Europe, I do not find similar collective actors and 
institutions: the classic ‘class divide’ and the strong collective actors are missing in post­
communist societies. To be able to identify the forces and mechanisms o f societal re­
embedding, Chapter II looks at alternative theories.
The early theories o f institutional economics see the firm  as a site o f institutions and 
contracts thus going beyond the micro-economic understanding o f the firm  as a profit or 
utility maximizing entity, while the later theories o f the firm  identify the firm as an arena o f 
complex societal interactions o f structural and dynamic factors. Yet to identify the forces of 
societal re-embedding, a further step in the operationalisation o f Polanyi’ s argument is 
needed. To f ill this conceptual gap, the second Section in Chapter II introduces organising 
logics o f local actors in business and work as a further dimension o f the neo-institutional 
literature. I elaborate on two schools o f moral philosophy that constitute the foundations for 
different types o f moral ethics and organising logics. This argument can be summarized as 
the normative dimension o f business and work.
The role o f Chapter III is to ‘embed’ the argument o f different normative logics into the 
historic and societal context o f post-communist Central Europe. The Chapter discusses 
certain legacies o f state socialism that help to explain the post-communist evolution o f 
enterprise institutions and organising logics in subsequent Chapters. It argues that state 
socialist legacies have been important for the societal re-embedding. After providing an
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overview o f the stylised state socialist system o f production and work, three non-economic 
features o f state socialist production are introduced. State socialist enterprises functioned as 
authoritarian paternalists; they were sources o f competitive industrial capabilities; finally, 
they also were discretionary bureaucracies. Taking into account different non-economic 
state socialist legacies, Part 1 concludes by elaborating the core theoretical argument o f the 
study: non-economic enterprise organising logics embedded in the state socialist 
experiences allow us to identify the Polanyian societal re-embedding in business and work 
in post-communism. While new dominant modernisation pattern - economic liberalism - 
represents the ‘classical’ movement o f dis-embedding, certain enterprise organising logics 
have taken the function o f re-embedding o f social relations in business and work in Central 
Europe.
Part 2 operationalises this argument empirically by using the case study o f three spheres of 
enterprise activity in Central European enterprises. Chapter IV  elaborates on the rationale 
for selecting the four Central European automotive subsidiaries o f the Volkswagen Group 
for the case study. Emphasising the unique industrial upgrading that the studied companies 
underwent during the post-communist period, Chapter IV sets up the empirical inquiry as a 
revelatory (multiple) case study. The rest o f Part 2 presents the empirical evidence 
collected during field work. The task o f Chapters V, V I and V II is to exemplify the 
existence o f the three non-economic organising logics with the empirical evidence collected 
during the field work. The three spheres o f enterprise activity considered are: (i) enterprise 
governance and welfare provisions; (ii) firm performance, and (iii) organisation o f work 
and skills (See Table 1).




Enterprise institutions of economic 
liberalism
Societal re-em bedding of 
enterprise
Firm governance and 
welfare provisions
Expansion of managerial authority Authoritarian paternalist
Firm perform ance Financialisation of firm performance Source of competitive industrial 
capabilities
W ork organisation 
and skills
Standardisation o f work and de- 
contextualised management
Discretionary bureaucracy
It is the better understanding o f organising logics governing business and work that allow 
me to identify Polanyian societal re-embedding in post-communism: despite the radical 
institutional break and increased role o f economic liberalism in economic policy and firm
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restructuring, certain parts o f business, production and employment relations are still not 
under the dictate o f economic rationale and efficiency as they have been stron gly 
influenced by non-economic enterprise organising logics. In the empirical case study that 
this research carried out, the societal re-embedding has provided limitations to the 
originally pre-conceived understanding o f ‘market economy’ practices in different spheres 
o f enterprise activity. Thus, although economic liberalism has expanded and became 
dominant, it has transformed itself from a simplistic and idealised version to a more 
complex understanding that incorporates the inherent tensions among different enterprise 
organising logics. Every time an enterprise logic related to economic liberalism became 
more dominant, it was at least partially counter-balanced, constrained and moderated by 
non-economic organising logics o f firm stakeholders.
The societal re-embedding that this study identifies is the adjustment o f actors’ organising 
logics related to business and work. This re-embedding has not been strong but it has re­
shaped the original form o f economic liberalism. A societal re-embedding has taken place 
when idealised concepts about the economy and society around the idea o f all-powerful 
market forces and retraction o f social regulation - expressed in the logic o f cost efficiency 
and the law o f value, expanding managerial authority, financialisation o f firm performance 
and standardisation o f work - gave way to a more complex understanding o f business and 
work. Thus, one o f the main findings o f this study is that the enterprise organising logics 
that emerged have combined economic liberalism with non-economic organising logics o f 
managers and employees. The three enterprise organising logics that combine these 
conflictual rationales are: (i) authoritarian paternalist, (ii) a source o f competitive industrial 
capabilities, and (iii) discretionary bureaucracy.
The final Chapter discusses the contribution o f this study to Polanyi’ s concept o f the 
double-movement and to neo-institutionalist literature. Although Polanyi’ s societal re­
embedding is usually conceptualised at the macro-societial level, this study uses it as 
conceptual framework to evaluate dynamics o f institutions and organising logics at the 
enterprise level. Concerning the broader role o f state socialist legacies, I attempt - without 
any desire to glorify state socialism - to reconsider the role o f state socialist legacies for 
Central European contemporary political economy. The non-economic enterprise 
organising logics that represent the normative dimension o f business and work indicate that 
certain state socialist legacies, rather than being completely outdated, have been important
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building blocks o f post-communist political economy. The existence o f non-economic 
enterprise organising logics calls us to re-consider the role o f state socialist legacies.
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Part 1: Exploring conceptual frameworks for the study 
of post-communist transition
I. Neo-institutionalism as a blueprint for
understanding the dynamics of societal re­
embedding?
To operationalise the concept o f Polanyian societal re-embedding in the post-communist 
socio-economic context, this Chapter w ill consider conceptual frameworks that identify 
societal forces which lim it or constrain the expansion o f economic liberalism. Section I 
presents the neo-institutionalist literature on social concertation and collective interest 
formation that are often conceptualised as forces o f societal re-embedding. This literature 
underlines the crucial role o f organised interests in the construction o f ‘high road’ 
production regimes that are characterised by limited commodification o f fictitious 
commodities. Yet as this Chapter unfolds, I demonstrate that the West European experience 
o f collective interests being the form o f societal re-embedding in the Polanyian sense is 
only o f little relevance to the post-communist societies in Central Europe. Section II 
reviews the literature on industrial relations in Central Europe showing that neo- 
institutional theories o f organised capitalism in Western Europe can inform our 
understanding o f societal re-embedding but are insufficient to identify the forces and 
dynamics o f societal re-embedding in the post-communist space.
/. Post-war varieties of capitalism: neo-institutional theories 
and organised interests
Early sociological studies have been criticized for being ‘structurally deterministic' and 
weak on the role o f agency. Granovetter (1985) points out that economics under-socializes 
social action underlying individualistic nature o f decision-making, but sociology over­
socializes the human action since decisions are seen to be determined by structural factors, 
not allowing for dynamics in social relations. The neo-institutionalist studies discussed in 
this Section are useful as they address the criticism o f over-socialisation o f earlier 
sociological works on commodification and attempt to overcome it by dealing explicitly 
with the role o f agency. Actor-based institutionalism focuses on different levels o f agency,
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on stickiness o f institutions as well as on the power dimension in the context o f post-war 
capitalism. It presents the West European experiences o f constructing a non-liberal variety 
o f capitalism. This Section argues that neo-corporatism and organised capitalism can be 
understood as systems where the power o f market forces is counterbalanced by the power 
o f social and political regulation and organisation. As an actor-based approach, the concept 
o f non-liberal capitalism provides analytical tools for conceptualising the forces o f societal 
re-embedding.
The concepts o f labour commodification and societal embeddedness have survived into the 
second half o f the 20th century and have become the cornerstone for the analysis o f 
‘developed’ capitalist systems. In the UK, the discussion o f de-commodification or low 
commodification goes back to the Webbs (1897) and their notion o f a ‘common rule’ and 
‘ rate for the job ’ , linked to standardisation o f pay setting mechanisms and developing pay 
scales for jobs and occupations (Metcalf, Hansen et al. 2001). The concept o f 
commodification remains widely used in social sciences. Thus, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
uses this concept in relation to welfare state provisions and labour market regulation. 
Among the authors who develop Polanyi’s thinking further are Streeck and Yamamura 
(2001) and Albert (1993). They conceptualise ‘ labour commodification’ more generally, 
closer to the Polanyian understanding. In his seminal work ‘Capitalism against capitalism’ , 
Albert underlines the commonalities o f continental European socio-economic regimes. He 
sets aside the ‘Rhineland capitalism’ from the UK and the US capitalism. He describes its 
capacity to mobilise non-competitive relations between economic agents, limited 
marketisation o f some spheres o f public life, as well as ‘ collective obligations, and moral 
commitments in support o f economic efficiency’ (Streeck and Yamamura 2001: 2). 
Albert’ s main message is that Rhineland capitalism managed to keep the market system 
under social control preserving the moral and institutional fabrics o f society and at the same 
time providing economically efficient and socially acceptable outcomes. In a similar vein, 
Streeck and Yamamura use the concept o f embeddedness to describe the principle o f social 
control over market forces. They write:
An economy is socially embedded insofar as the transactions by which it is made 
up either are supposed to serve other than economic purposes (in other words, are 
constrained by non-economic objectives [...]) or are supported by noneconomic 
social ties (that is, are facilitated by particularistic relations [...] or by enforceable 
social obligations that engender trust among economic actors). Social constraints 
and opportunities in this sense, typically enforced by social institutions, define the 
legitimate place and the possible range o f market transactions and markets in the
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economy-cum-society in which they take place. By circumscribing and thereby 
lim iting the role o f markets, they typically ‘distort’ them, for example by shielding 
desirable social conditions from market fluctuations or ensuring that such 
conditions result even i f  free markets would produce different outcomes (Streeck 
and Yamamura 2001: 2).
I acknowledge the fact that political economy and sociology managed to withstand the 
radical individualism o f the orthodox economics and preserved the notion o f collective 
dimension o f human identity and action. Their main interest is in identifying and in 
understanding the role o f collective actors in modern market economies. The study o f 
organised interests in its neo-corporatist form is a European tradition that in the late 1970s 
replaced the - until then - prevalent study o f lobby and special interests groups that 
originated in the American political science tradition. Since then, the study o f interest 
formation and interest representation differs substantially between the US and European 
scholars. In the US, interest groups were studied in the framework o f industrial relations 
literature i.e. with strong focus on collective bargaining o f the New Deal (Dunlop 1958) or 
as pressure and lobby groups (Olson 1965). The crucial word for American scholars was 
‘pluralism’ . Yet in the 1970s, a different perspective, a different ‘scheme o f representation’ 
(Streeck 2006), emerged among European scholars. In his seminal work, Schmitter (1974: 
86) describes corporatism as a system o f ‘ interest and/or attitude representation, an [...] 
institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interest o f c iv il society 
with the decisional structures o f the state’ . When comparing pluralism and corporatism, 
Schmitter argues that the former type presupposes
spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension and 
competitive interaction; the latter [is about] controlled emergence, quantitative 
limitation, vertical stratification and complementary interdependence (Schmitter 
1974: 97).
Schmitter picks up the idea already discussed by John Maynard Keynes that ‘ the ideal size 
for the unit o f control and organization lies somewhere between the individual and the 
modern state’ (Keynes 1952: 313-314). He argues that:
the more the modem state comes to serve as the indispensable and authoritative 
guarantor o f capitalism by expanding its regulative and integrative tasks, the more it 
finds that it needs the professional expertise, specialized information, prior 
aggregation o f opinion, contractual capability and deferred participatory legitimacy 
which only singular, hierarchically ordered, consensually led representative 
monopolies can provide. To obtain these, the state w ill agree to devolve upon or
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share with these associations much o f its newly acquired decisional authority [ . . . ] ’ 
(Schmitter 1974: 111).
The contribution o f Schmitter’ s work is in bringing together interests o f society and o f 
organised interests. He linked ‘the study o f interest groups to fundamental issues 
concerning the constitution o f state and societies, the role and the capacities o f politics in 
society, and the sources o f social cohesion’ (Streeck 2006: 9). What is new about 
Schmitter’s approach is that ‘research on interest groups was made to speak to one o f the 
most important issues in the construction o f political communities, namely how national 
societies chose to accommodate the collectivism (the particularistic identities and the 
collective action capacities) o f the social groups o f which they were composed’(Streeck 
2006: 9).
It is this work o f Schmitter - an American scholar studying Latin American countries - that 
resonated among the European scholars and gave rise to the study o f neo-corporatism in 
Europe. It is not surprising that Schmitter’s research became more popular in Europe than 
in the US. It allowed thinkers and politicians to justify the desirability o f organised interests 
and institutionalize them in the public sphere and thus, as Streeck (2006: 10) puts it, to 
‘ reconcile social collectivism with liberal democracy’ . The dichotomy emerging is that o f 
two understandings o f collective interest groups. While in the American tradition, trade 
unions and employer associations are seen as lobby groups co-regulating employment 
related issues in the Dunlopian tradition; for European authors, representatives o f organised 
interests have broader societal functions. In other words, using Flanders’ (1965) distinction 
between trade unions as ‘vested interests’ and as ‘ swords o f justice’ one can say that while 
for American scholars the ‘vested interests’-dimension is more important, Europeans rather 
focus on the role o f organised interests as ‘ swords o f justice’ .
The ‘post-Schmitter’ literature on neo-corporatism in post-war Europe continues the 
tradition o f identifying social forces that lim it the free play o f markets - the modem forces 
o f Polanyi’ s societal re-embedding. This field o f study has known several trends and 
fashions that can be summarised under three strands o f research. One area o f research 
focuses on the relation between institutions and low commodification in socio-economic 
outcomes; the second type o f studies o f neo-corporatism deals with dynamics specific to 
national contexts; focussing on different institutional dimensions, the third field o f studies 
deals with typologies o f institutional arrangements. I w ill discuss these three research fields 
in turn.
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The first field o f studies deals explicitly with the low commodification in socio-economic 
outcomes o f neo-corporatist arrangements showing that for many European scholars this 
institutional configuration was not just about narrowly defined interests o f special interest 
groups but about large, encompassing organisations. Concertation, coordination and socio­
economic outcomes associated with them stand for limiting the ‘free play’ o f market forces. 
This strand o f literature that grew in the 1990s due to the increasing popularity o f social 
pacts explicitly links institutional neo-corporatist arrangements to de-commodified socio­
economic outcomes. Neo-corporatism is seen as a vehicle to achieve socio-economic 
outcomes that serve as self-protection o f the market economy: curbing inflation, 
moderating wage inequalities and developing ‘high road’ production regime. Calmfors and 
D riffil (1988) stipulate that upward wage pressures are smaller in highly centralised or 
highly decentralised bargaining arrangements, while the intermediary path leads to higher 
wage pressures. Soskice (1990) enlarges this analysis showing that it is not the 
centralisation but rather the coordination o f wage regulation that mattered for economic 
outcomes. Traxler and Kittel (2000) develop a typology o f coordination that explains wage 
moderation. Hancke and Hermann (2007) find important differences between coordinated 
and non-coordinated wage bargaining settings as to wage distribution, wage increases and 
product strategies. Dolvik (2000) most explicitly links neo-corporatist arrangements o f the 
post-war era to the broad organisational principles o f the market economy. He finds 
coordination in wage bargaining associated with more equal distribution o f employment 
and welfare opportunities, rather than with levels o f growth. Finally, Schulten (2004) 
describes corporatism as a mechanism that allows to ‘ take wages out o f competition’ or, in 
other words to ‘de-commodify’ wages to a certain extent. Such a ‘solidaristic wage policy’, 
he argues, has been at the heart o f the neo-corporatist post-war arrangements in Western 
Europe. This de-commodification process has been led by normative views about 
distributive justice. Thus, this first group o f studies focuses on different socio-economic 
functions o f corporatism - wage moderation, macroeconomic stability and reduction o f 
wage inequalities - showing that although the relationship between coordination o f social 
partners and self-protecting mechanisms is not linear, in general a higher coordination 
among social partners in collective bargaining is associated with better socio-economic 
outcomes in inflation, employment, welfare and ‘high road’ product strategies and with 
more equal wage distribution.
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The second group o f studies focuses on the role o f actors in the emergence and the 
evolution o f neo-corporatist institutions. Streeck demonstrates how the neo-corporatist 
accord was at the heart o f the post-war German political economy. The representatives o f 
both social partners, employers and employees, despite the obvious differences in interests, 
were ready to negotiate with each other with mutual respect to achieve long-term economic 
growth and prosperity (Streeck 2005). Social partnership at branch level and co­
determination at the company level were the two central milestones. The branch-level 
collective wage bargaining allowed for a compressed wage structure. Like Streeck’s 
German case, W indolf (1989) describes the rise o f corporatism in Western Europe in the 
1960s-1970s more generally: ‘business corporations, unions, employers’ associations, and 
the state coalesced into a large regulatory complex’ . Marin (1990) introduces the concept of 
‘generalized political exchange’ to describe the idea o f mutual trust among social partners 
that early concessions w ill be balanced by later compensations. Generalized exchange 
among employers, the state, and unions and centralized collective bargaining are identified 
as key features o f this neo-corporatist system.
The crucial role o f organised labour in the emergence o f neo-corporatist arrangements has 
been well documented. It is the interplay between various state institutions and organised 
labour that, according to Bohle and Greskovits, made a difference:
strong unions, multi-class political parties, and autonomous and capable state 
bureaucracies had been the actors that transformed the structural potential for 
compromise to the language o f politics and policies (Bohle and Greskovits 2004: 
9).
In countries like Italy, where unions have been politically and ideologically divided - rather 
than strong and unified - a number o f ‘ functional equivalents’ (Regini 1984) emerged to 
allow for stable concertation. Yet although macro-concertation and coordinated wage 
bargaining have been crucial components o f the social accord, unions faced a double­
challenge to preserve their legitimacy. They bargained with employers as representational 
non-competing monopolies, and at the same time, at the company level, they needed to 
channel members’ expectations to be able to speak with one voice. Certain features o f 
union organisation were especially important to achieve this class cooperation. Thus, as 
W indolf (1989) argues, it was the shift from craft unionism o f skilled workers to mass 
unionism that included unskilled assembly line workers, that allowed union leaders to take 
control o f the shop floor. Another feature was union ability to control and channel the shop
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floor and sectional (and works council) interests that allowed the institutional stability to 
emerge. In the Fordist mode o f production dominated by the standardised and repetitive 
skills, trade unions were crucial for moderating employees, minimising their conflicts with 
management and focusing their demands on ‘wages, job security and production’ (Bohle 
and Greskovits 2004: 9).
However, the evaluation o f neo-corporatist arrangements o f the 1990s has not been entirely 
positive. Hyman distinguishes between two faces o f macro-corporatism: that o f the post­
war period and the re-emerging neo-corporatist arrangements o f the 1990s. While, he 
argues, the first generation o f social pacts -  the ‘post-war compromise’ - had a clear ‘gain- 
sharing rationale: the regulated distribution o f economic growth in the context o f (more or 
less) fu ll employment and an expanding welfare state’ (Hyman 1999: 95); the second wave 
o f social concertation that emerged in the 1990s, on the other hand, is a ‘pain-sharing’ 
arrangement. Employee representatives found themselves under increased pressure from 
employers and from the state: public deficits needed to be reduced and national economic 
competitiveness increased. Furthermore, a large number o f studies appeared on what has 
been described as ‘micro corporatism’ : this research deals with company level agreements 
between unions and management. The term micro-corporatism has been especially often 
evoqued in the German context where a large number o f such agreements were reached 
since the mid-1990s. Although organised labour tried to lim it the effects o f vertical 
disintegration and restructuring (Doellgast and Greer 2007), it was pushed more and more 
into defensive with ‘concession bargaining’ becoming the norm (Rehder 2003; Jurgens and 
Krzywdzinski 2006). Although one could imagine that these pacts for production are a 
transitory phenomenon linked to the weakness o f labour during an economic downturn, 
W indolf shows otherwise. Looking at the early experiences o f the Italian and German 
‘production coalitions’ , he argues that decentralisation o f collective bargaining and the 
alliances between employees and management and some other new human resource 
management (HRM) practices - rather than being o f transitory or cyclical nature - represent 
a structural break with the neo-corporatist European tradition (W indolf 1989: 3). To sum 
up, from its emergence in the post-war period, its strengthening in the 1970s and its debated 
revival in the 1990s and the early 2000s, neo-corporatism - the institution and the academic 
concept - has been a European version o f non-liberal capitalism. Even i f  it evolved in most 
West European countries from a macro-corporatism o f ‘gain-sharing’ to a concessionary 
corporatism o f ‘pain-sharing’ - in countries like Germany the debates about the erosion and 
stability o f these arrangements have been very lively (Hassel 1999; Hassel 2002; Klikauer
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2002) - its foundations, as originally described by Schmitter, have been crucial variables o f 
the European post-war institutional order and o f post-war economic modernisation.
Like labour and trade union studies, West European literature on employer interests and 
their formation and representation has also been very rich. Studies that focus on capital and 
firm interests deal extensively with the question o f what types o f institutional 
configurations lead to ‘high road’ socio-economic regimes and what these ‘high road’ 
regimes are. The classical neo-corporatist literature discusses the formation and change in 
the role o f employer associations in parallel to and together with trade union literature. 
Most prominently, Streeck (1991) conceptualises the crucial role o f employer and labour 
representatives in the post-war German political economy by popularising the concept o f 
German ‘high road’ production regime that he calls ‘diversified quality production’ . The 
main characteristics o f this strategy are a diversified product range, highly skilled labour 
and quality rather than price competition. The system o f corporate governance allowed 
mutual ownership o f large companies while stable relations with the ‘house banks’ made 
firms adopt long-term business strategies rather than concentrating on the short-term 
windfall profits (Streeck 2005). Yet this institutional architecture conducive to long- 
termism and cooperation could only flourish due to the changing mindset o f its core 
collective actors -  employers and union representatives: the German neo-corporatist system 
was a new and unique phenomenon that emerged in the post-war period, the previous two- 
class societal system ‘ turned at 90 degrees and institutionalised at the horizontal axis' 
(Streeck 2005: 2). Bohle and Greskovits also underline the role o f organised interests o f 
capital for the construction o f a ‘high road’ although their perception is more functionalist. 
When discussing West European post-war political economy Bohle and Greskovits explain 
how capital intensive consumer goods could succeed ‘ in imposing their logic o f higher 
wages, better work conditions, negotiated management-labour relations, and generous 
welfare regimes on the rest o f the economy [.. ,] ’ (Bohle and Greskovits 2004).
Neo-corporatist post-war compromise is an example o f embedded capitalism but within the 
field writers have been debating the terms and the relative importance o f different 
institutions thus arriving at different labels and typologies. The notion o f embeddedness has 
been challenged by other notions such as non-liberal, coordinated or organised capitalism. 
Thus, Streeck and Yamamura (2001) introduce the notion o f non-liberal capitalism to 
describe the German and Japanese post-war socio-economic regimes. They prefer the 
concept o f non-liberal economy rather than that o f embedded, institutionalised or organised
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capitalism because - they argue - any socio-economic system is to a certain degree 
embedded and institutionalised in respective societies around them and so liberal regimes 
such as UK or US ‘are not unregulated or devoid o f institutions’ (Streeck and Yamamura 
2001: 6) or o f state intervention. When conceptualising regimes that have a stronger social 
control over self-regulating market forces, Streeck and Yamamura call them ‘non-liberal’ , 
also in order to underline the contrast to the liberal alternative. They write:
I f  [...] we refer to German and Japanese political economies as ‘nonliberal’ , we 
emphasise the fact that in both countries, regimes o f economic governance emerged 
that up to this day place relatively little trust in free-market laisser-faire. Instead 
they rely on various forms o f hierarchical and organizational coordination that 
sometimes require heavy injections o f public authority, with vertical control or 
horizontal collective bargaining often overriding contractual exchanges as entered 
into by private agents on their own volition, discretion, and calculation (Streeck and 
Yamamura 2001: 6).
The authors also restate Polanyi’s point about the deliberate construction - rather than a 
natural birth - o f market institutions; they therefore reject the often used over-simplified 
contrast o f ‘ strong state’ in non-liberal economies vs. ‘no state’ in liberal economies. For 
them, state is strong in both liberal and non-liberal capitalisms, only that ‘ the strong state of 
liberalism, like the British state under Margaret Thatcher, is fundamentally different from 
the strong state o f nonliberalism in that the former serves to liberate markets and contracts 
from social constraints and collective obligations whereas the latter tries to do the opposite 
(Streeck and Yamamura 2001: 7).
A number o f further studies present arguments about diversity o f capitalist institutions and 
alternatives to liberal capitalism. To such studies belongs Boyer’s work on modes o f 
regulation. Boyer’s implicit point o f reference is the political economy o f post-war France 
and thus it is not surprising that although the objective is to provide a generalisable 
typology, this school o f thought presents modes o f regulation and regimes o f accumulation 
as its two central concepts (Boyer and Durand 1997). The ‘varieties o f capitalism’ approach 
by Hall and Soskice (2001) is another important contribution to the neo-institutional debate 
about alternatives to liberal capitalism. Its main contribution is in the construction o f a 
dichotomous view o f political economies dividing the industrialised countries in liberal and 
coordinated market economies. It explains institutional stability and survival o f coordinated 
market economies through the concept o f institutional complementarily. Although the 
explanatory power o f these studies is somewhat limited due to their static and a-historical 
narratives, the typologies that they construct give a useful overview o f stylised institutional
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differences among industrialised countries. Thus, this literature is strong in explaining the 
institutional stability and economic success o f coordinated/ regulated market economies.
This Section identified organised interests o f capital and labour as crucial forces o f self- 
protective societal re-embedding. The next Section follows up the evolution o f organised 
interests in Central Europe after 1989. It makes clear that the institutional underpinnings 
have been very different from the West European experience. When the West European 
‘ institutional template’ is used, it is d ifficu lt to identify the societal re-embedding in post­
communism.
II. Dis-organised interests in post-communism: why corporatist 
concepts fail in post-communism
The overwhelming majority o f studies in industrial relations and collective interest 
representation o f capital and labour do not find any evidence o f societal re-embedding in 
post-communist Central Europe, neither at the macro nor at the micro-level. Tripartite 
social pacts were a popular focus o f industrial relations scholars in the early 1990s. Some 
observers saw their emergence in the East as evidence for union revival. Iankova (1998) 
speaks in this context about ‘ transformative corporatism’ , while Mailand and Due (2004) 
believe that tripartite social dialogues have been useful in helping create a mutual 
acknowledgement between the parties and raising their level o f information. However, soon 
more critical assessments emerged emphasising the mismatch between the institutional 
form and the content, between the assumptions o f west European industrial relations 
scholars and the Central European reality. Ost (2000) describes tripartite agreements as 
‘ illusory corporatism’ expressing his non-satisfaction with the weak institutions which he 
sees merely as a corporatist facade. Pollert (1999b) calls the system ‘paternalistic’ implying 
the lacking autonomy o f collective actors vis-a-vis the state. Similarly, Aguilera and Dabu 
point out that during the 1990s the three social partners ‘were not “ actors”  in the real sense 
o f the term, but in fact, bundles o f dynamic processes. Their functioning structure was still 
far from being stabilised [ . . . ] ’ (Aguilera and Dabu 2005: 28).
Similar findings emerge in studies that deal with post-communist industrial relations more 
generally. Although Silver (2003) expects to find a weakening position o f labour in home 
countries o f the multinational companies (MNCs), but a strengthened labour in host
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countries, Bohle and Greskovits (2006) find only limited evidence o f the latter. They argue 
that:
[T]he recovery phase o f neoliberal restructuring has not led to the recovery o f 
unions and negotiated industrial relations. Social improvements mostly occurred 
without labour empowerment even in the Visegrad4 cases. No strong labour 
organizations -  no need for employer organizations, negotiated industrial relations 
[...] -  seems to be the rule o f capital-labour interaction in the former socialist 
countries (Bohle and Greskovits 2006b: 22).
Dabu and Aguiera explain the lack o f strong labour organisations with the legacy o f ‘ the 
weak management-labour divide’ during the era o f central planning. Furthermore, they 
argue that the dominant role o f the state in the tripartite process and thus the dependence o f 
collective actors on the state persist, even i f  the self-understanding o f labour and 
management started to converge on a Western understanding o f union activities. 
Enforcement o f collective agreements and tripartite bodies remain ‘ contingent on the 
political orientation o f the parties alternating in power’ (Aguilera and Dabu 2005: 28). 
Meardi (2002) pushes the argument further. In his explanation o f marginalization o f social 
dialogue, he argues that in the Polish case one finds strong support for the market ideology 
among union representatives expressed in a strong ‘market fundamentalist’ rhetoric. Meardi 
argues that a more complex process o f re-socialisation -  ‘alternation’ - o f ideological 
settings has taken place in the post-communist space: the self-awareness o f the unions is 
not just rooted in the past but it is interwoven with the idea o f radical change and inverted 
reference values
Studies o f Ost (2005) and Clarke (2005) emphasise another reason for weakness o f union 
representation: too much focus on politics at the expense o f building a backing amongst 
employees during the early transition. Clarke argues:
Trade unions have concentrated on seeking to represent their members in the 
political sphere, while making little progress in developing the representation o f 
their members as employees, while employer associations see themselves as trade 
associations, while both parties consider the government and not each other as their 
principal counterpart (Clarke 2005: 600).
The research by Crowley and Ost (2001) provides yet another insightful argument about the 
labour identity in transition. The authors see in labour weakness the legitimacy crisis o f the 
previous communist regime and resulting unclear union and working class identity. 
Accordingly, Crowley and Ost argue that labour was ‘created as a weak actor’ (Crowley
4 The Visegrad countries are Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.
45
and Ost 2001: 228) and, therefore, ideological and organisational strength o f unions are 
weak from the very early stages o f transition. Ost and Crowley see insufficient adaptation 
o f unions to the systemic change and the new capitalist reality as the major explanatory 
factor behind union weakness. Like Aguilera and Dabu, they argue that unions still have 
not made a shift from fu lfilling  the social benefits functions to defending workers’ rights. 
They argue that ‘ labour is unwilling or incapable to think in terms o f class differences’ 
(Crowley and Ost 2001: 230). Thus, although authors’ opinions differ in their evaluation of 
the reasons behind the weakness o f organised labour, the predominant judgement sees 
tripartite institutions and other above-firm-level arrangements not as real vehicles of 
collective interest representation in post-communism. The classical division between 
employer and trade union representatives - in which unions are the organised and united 
force that limits and moderates economic liberalism - does not seem to apply in the post­
communist setting. While the class conflict has been at the core o f West European post-war 
social compromise, this divide does not seem to matter so much in the post-communist 
context.
Similar to the macro-level studies discussed above, company-level studies o f industrial 
relations in post-communism also do not identify unions as potential forces o f self­
protection. Studies that discuss the role o f MNCs in post-communist countries underline the 
weakness o f collective actors and their inability to develop own agendas and defend their 
distinctive interests. Company-level studies o f employment relations do not find substantial 
forces o f societal re-embedding. The majority agrees that where unions exist, their role in 
company level decision making is very limited. These studies emphasise - as in the 
tripartite literature - the mismatch between the institutional form and the content, between 
the assumptions o f west European scholars and the reality o f Central European industrial 
relations. Thus, Frege (2001) brings out the missing understanding o f pluralism at the 
company level when she reports survey results o f Hungarian union leaders who do not see 
their and management interests as conflicting. Most union leaders consider themselves as a 
‘bridge between management and workers’ (Frege 2001: 34). Frege concludes that no 
independent union identity has developed. In another contribution, Frege (2000) argues that 
although cooperation between management and unions formally exists, it is an illusion. She 
distinguishes four types o f union-management relationships at the company level: 
cooperation and trust-based relationships (German style), conflict (UK), incorporation o f 
unions in management’s strategy (Japanese style) and marginalisation o f unions by 
management. Frege situates Central European unions in the last category - despite the
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existence o f formal cooperative arrangements. She argues that ‘postcommunist unions seem 
to provide a historical case where institutional structures exist before the emergence o f 
ideological foundation o f the labour movement’ (Frege 2000: 660).
Further studies underline the convoluted nature o f interest formation where workers habits 
and learned behaviours show a predisposition against collective solutions. Thus, referring 
to the phenomenon o f ‘ one-enterprise politics’ Ashwin describes an ‘unusual’ union- 
management cooperation in Russian companies (Ashwin 2004: 31): unions back 
managerial position and support ‘enterprise paternalism’ . The central function o f unions is 
still to administer social benefits rather than represent the interests o f union members in 
negotiations with management. In another study, Ashwin (1999a) underlines the workers’ 
preference for clientilistic, rather than collective, solutions. Thus, the legacy o f 
personalised, rather than rule-bound relations between workers and managers persists, with 
social benefits and wages are still administered in a particularistic, discretionary fashion. In 
a similar vein, studies by Meardi (2006) provide evidence o f individualistic, rather than 
collective, strategies o f the workforce, such as organisational disloyalty and high turnover. 
Nevertheless, even i f  some authors believe that Central Europe is not a ‘ social wasteland’ 
and ‘ MNCs domination is an aspiration, not a tangible reality’(Meardi 2006: 1376), most o f 
employee strategies are individualistic and the collective dimension o f interest formulation 
is ignored by the actors. Thus, collective organisation and collective action o f employees 
mediated by trade unions is not strong in the post-communist context.
But it is not just the weakness o f trade unions and a different labour identity that make 
industrial relations an unlikely sphere o f societal re-embedding; it is also the stronger 
position o f today’s global capital. What gives companies a strong leverage against labour 
and the state is arguably the inherent structural asymmetry between capital and labour: 
unions are secondary organisers as their members are members o f other organizations such 
as companies first, capital being a primary organiser (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980). 
Furthermore, since the 1990s, the position o f capital has strengthened in comparison to the 
post-war class compromise. Pontusson (1992) underlines the ‘ systemic power’ o f MNCs 
given their ‘exit option’ . Today, MNCs are argued to be looking to escape the regulatory 
web o f nation states by means o f ‘regime arbitrage’ (Streeck 1997). The cross-border 
extension o f production chains by MNCs is extensively discussed in the literature. 
Although some authors underline that European economies had already strongly integrated 
trade relations a hundred years ago (Hirst and Thompson 1996) and that many MNCs have
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a strong regional or homc-country dimension (Ruigrok and Tulder 1995), the emerged 
consensus is that cross-national integration o f production within multinational companies is 
a new phenomenon that leads to increased relocation threats and a ‘ race to the bottom’ in 
social and work standards (Gray 1998). In this context, MNCs are described as ‘ footless’ 
companies and national governments as powerless: ‘globalization was a one-way bet for 
the business community: governments were needed to create the space within which 
business could expand and integrate, but they were not otherwise welcome’ (Ruggie 2003: 
116).
In a similar vein, Bohle and Greskovits (2005) argue that what matters for capital-labour 
compromise is business’ willingness to accommodate workers’ demands. This willingness 
to achieve a capital-labour compromise is more or less likely depending on the structural 
factors o f the economy and types o f skills and technology that certain industries use. In the 
case o f Central Europe, international capital mobility has substantially increased the power 
o f business over labour and over governments. Thus, the construction o f the European 
Social model in Central Europe is improbable as the main foundations o f a capital-labour 
compromise have not been transferred to the East (Bohle and Greskovits 2005). The self- 
protecting forces o f capital are not activated because its sectoral distribution and increased 
mobility do not make it necessary for capital to negotiate with labour. According to Bohle 
and Greskovits, in the post-communist context, MNCs have even more power than in 
Western Europe because capital is scarce in the region and because MNCs have systemic 
power even before entering these economies that comes ‘ from the option to refuse to enter 
and invest’ (Bohle and Greskovits 2007a: 456).
Despite the near-unanimity about the weakness o f collective labour representation, only 
few post-communist studies explore other collective ways in which the potential societal 
re-embedding can express itself. Recourse to illiberal and nationalist politics is one possible 
mechanism. Ost (2005) convincingly argues that political instability and right-wing politics 
are a real threat for post-communist societies because o f the failure to canalise the 
‘passions’ and the anger along the lines o f class identity. Authoritarian-paternalist 
tendencies are also described by Ashwin (1999b) who shows in an ethnographic study that, 
faced with privatisation o f their company and seeing their social benefits taken away, 
workers - as a form o f collective salvation - had a tendency to look for a strong leader. The 
desire for a benevolent paternalist is extended to the regional and national level o f political 
decision making. The argument o f nationalism being an alternative form o f collective
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mobilisation fits well into the Polanyi’ s double-movement thesis: exclusive, illiberal 
politics can be a possible self-protective mechanism o f the society. Yet are there any other 
forms o f ‘ self-protection’ - apart from the nationalist or illiberal - emerging?
Conclusion
The aim o f this Chapter was to operationalise the theory o f Polanyian societal re­
embedding in post-communist Central Europe using neo-corporatist and neo-institutionalist 
paradigms. To identify possible analytical tools the Chapter discussed a number o f neo- 
institutional contributions: drawing on the West European post-war experience, Section I 
elaborated on the literature o f neo-corporatist and non-liberal capitalism, showing the 
important role o f organised interests as forces o f societal re-embedding. The experience o f 
post-war Western European countries helped us understand the nature and dynamics o f 
self-protective forces underlining the importance o f organised interests. Although since the 
early 1990s, the nature o f neo-corporatist arrangements has been changing, the post-war 
experience o f capital-labour compromise - underpinned by collective interest organisations 
o f capital and labour - has been at the heart o f west-European national political economies. 
This experience showed that it is important to understand the role o f organised interests.
This literature on neo-corporatism and non-liberal capitalism was supposed to provide 
analytical tools for identifying the forces o f the Polanyian societal re-embedding in Central 
Europe. Using this blueprint o f West European post-war experience, Section II assessed the 
emergence and the role o f organised interests in Central Europe. Its main finding was that 
the nature o f collective actors and interest representatives o f labour and capital are very 
different in post-communist countries and thus the neo-corporatist literature that 
emphasises the role o f organised interests as forces o f societal re-embedding is d ifficu lt to 
use in the context o f systemic change in post-communist Central Europe. Capital interests 
in Central Europe are not organised in the classical neo-corporatist sense, while collective 
labour identity differs substantially from the experience o f neo-corporatism - class divisions 
and collective mobilisation are not pronounced. When neo-institutional and neo-corporatist 
templates are applied, I find that self-protective forces o f societal re-embedding are missing 
- or are very limited - in post-communist Central Europe.
Another classical field o f institutional analysis on commodification and de­
commodification o f work is the literature that deals with the role o f the state in provision o f
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labor legislation and welfare benefits. The neo-institutionalist literature exemplified by the 
influential work o f Esping-Andersen studies the crucial role o f the state and public 
intervention in ‘de-commodified’ socio-economic outcomes such as substantial 
unemployment benefits and protective employment legislation. Exploring the dynamics of 
labour commodification by explicitly considering the role o f state institutions and the 
internal dynamics within them would have been a possible and probably very interesting 
path to take in order to theoretically and empirically operationalise the expansion of 
economic liberalism and societial re-embedding in post-communist Central Europe. Yet 
this path was not chosen due to two reasons. First, the role o f state is not exogenous but 
influenced by a number o f factors; the organisation o f collective actors in the society 
around the topics o f redistributive justice is among them. The welfare state became most 
encompassing and generous in countries where collective labour was the strongest (Korpi 
1983). In other words, i f  studying the role o f the state and public intervention in the 
dynamics o f commodification, collective actors would have be a part o f the research 
agenda, even more so as the short time span studied forces the researcher to have an actor- 
based approach rather than focussing on the long-term factors. Second, the study o f public 
intervention in the evolution o f labour code or welfare state provisions would have required 
a detailed study o f respective national political, administrative and legal institutions, before 
any generalisations about the common post-communist societal re-embedding -  i f  at all -  
could be reached. Yet the research objective o f the present study was to identify a common 
post-communist Central European trend in the dynamics o f commodification and de- 
commodification o f fictitious commodities that is expected to exist despite national 
differences5.
5 A more detailed justification of the empirical case study is provided in Chapter IV.
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II. Theory of the firm and moral philosophy: introducing 
the normative dimension
Chapter I applied neo-institutional and neo-corporatist paradigms but could not clearly 
identify any significant societal re-embedding. It made clear that using the blueprint 
provided by the post-war corporatist Western European literature in post-communism 
would not allow us to identify any evidence o f societal re-embedding through collective 
actor representation. In order to identity the societal re-embedding o f economic liberalism 
in post-communist Central Europe, a different conceptual framework was used instead. The 
two relevant strands o f literature are introduced in this Chapter. First, literature on business 
systems and literature on MNCs provide a part o f the answer as they address certain 
dimensions that the neo-corporatist and neo-institutional strands o f literature both neglect. 
These dimensions, crucial for the post-communist context, are power, structural features of 
different business systems, and micro-political conflicts that result from diverging interests 
between different parts o f the enterprise. Most importantly, the business systems and MNC 
literature helps us to identify the firm as a platform o f societal re-embedding. Second, a 
short excurse into the Kantian moral philosophy and Weber’s concepts o f rationality 
introduces the normative dimension o f action and elaborates on the different types o f norms 
and ethical motives. This step, neglected in the neo-corporatist literature and institutionalist 
literature o f the firm, allows for an important fine-tuning o f the normative dimension which 
then provides the tools to identify the societal re-embedding o f expanded economic 
liberalism.
Belanger and Edwards (2006) distinguish three realms o f power relations in MNCs : macro, 
meso and micro levels. While the macro level describes MNC relations with government, 
state agencies and interest groups, meso refers to the internal company arena o f interaction 
o f different corporate actors. Finally, micro level refers to industrial relations, also known 
as ‘politics o f production’ (Burawoy 1985). The previous Chapter concluded that industrial 
relations in MNCs could not be identified as a potential field o f societal re-embedding. As 
class-based ‘politics o f production’ does not seem to show diverging interests or frames o f 
interpretation, it is at the macro and meso-level where we could expect to find societal 
counter-forces. In this Section, the meso-level o f headquarters-subsidiary interaction is 
explored as a potential source o f societal re-embedding.
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This Chapter is organised as follows. Management and business studies literature that 
explore ‘ the meso-politics’ o f MNCs are introduced in Section I o f this Chapter. Using 
concepts o f rationality derived from moral philosophy as well as the writings o f Max 
Weber, Section II introduces the concept o f value rationality and non-economic organising 
logics o f action. This inter-disciplinary approach that combines different strands o f 
literature allows me to formulate the theoretical research hypothesis o f this study: the 
existence o f the normative dimension o f business and work that comes to represent the 
Polanyian societal re-embedding.
/. Theories of the firm: institutions, power and contestation
Institutional foundations o f firms have been a long standing topic o f research. Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1975) point out to the rationale o f the firm to avoid transaction costs and 
to constrain opportunism by using contract rather than price mechanism as a coordination 
tool. The authors underline factors such as bounded rationality o f economic agents, 
incomplete information and incomplete contracts as important factors that explain why 
coordination within the firm  emerges and why not all coordination is left to the market. 
This early institutional theory o f the firm laid the foundations for institutionalist economics 
that put the firm  back in the centre o f attention. Yet the early institutional theory o f the firm 
has also been widely criticised for ignoring such dimensions as firm capabilities and 
resources, power structures and social embeddedness more broadly (Foss and Klein 2005). 
The four approaches presented below all try to overcome the limitations o f the early 
institutional theory o f the firm. They refer to the following strands o f the neo-institutional 
firm analysis: institutional and societal context, power relations and actor-based dynamics.
One important contribution to the theory o f the firm  has been the concept o f the firm  as a 
context dependent institution. Whitley’s (1999) national business systems approach is a 
major contribution to it. His approach is different from institutional economics as it tries to 
overcome the under-socialization o f human action. Functionalists perceive activities within 
the firm and the firm ’s interactions with the outside world as rational agents that maximise 
efficiency by resolving coordination and other problems they face. For Whitley (1999), on 
the other hand, other factors such as culture and organizational complexity matter in 
explaining firm  behaviour. For him, it is the internal structures o f the company, its 
corporate governance system, the system o f internal hierarchies and the degree o f vertical 
integration that determine the decision-making process and the formulation o f the
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company’s interests and preferences. The main ■ dichotomy emerges between 
compartmentalised business systems in the US, on the one hand, and cooperative business 
systems o f continental Europe, on the other. The former is dominated by large companies 
that are described as ‘ isolated hierarchies’ , while the latter is inhabited by ‘coordinated 
hierarchies’ . In isolated hierarchies, a large share o f know-how is concentrated in the top 
management. In cooperative hierarchies, on the other hand, decision making and know-how 
are more horizontally distributed. The core concept o f Whitley’s analysis is ‘ institutional 
cohesion’ . Business systems differ according to the degree o f social and cultural cohesion 
among its constitutive elements: corporate governance, market organisation, employment 
relations etc. The US business system is characterised as being loose and heterogeneous, 
while business systems in Japan and in continental Europe are described as homogenous. 
These differences in production regimes allow distinguishing between different types o f 
MNCs in terms o f authority sharing and capability building across national borders. That is, 
while certain systems are based on arm’s length relationships, others show a higher level o f 
commitment (Whitley 2005a). In other words, according to Whitley, MNC activities can 
take the form o f high involvement and high commitment towards the subsidiary. However, 
the literature suggests that even the MNCs that practice high commitment in their 
headquarters do not necessarily transfer the high commitment dimension to their 
subsidiaries (Bluhm 2001; Dorrenbacher 2002).
Power has been another field o f study in the neo-institutional analysis o f the firm  that was 
neglected in the early institutional theories o f the firm. The power perspective o f the 
institutional analysis teaches us that pressures for isomorphism and institutional change 
more generally, do not take place in neutral but in hierarchically-structured organizational 
fields. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduce the concept o f ‘ institutional isomorphism’ . 
One o f the main distinctions the authors make is between coercive, mimetic and cognitive 
sources o f pressures that are generated by ‘ institutional isomorphism’ . Their study is 
especially relevant for understanding the micro-politics within MNCs as it provides a better 
conceptualization o f how the institutional traditions o f the host country, the home country 
as well as the ‘ third party’ interact. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) conceptualise this 
interaction as conflicting pressures for isomorphism across normative, cognitive and 
regulatory frameworks. Similarly, Femer and Tempel (2006) consider power as an 
important dimension o f institutional analysis. They argue that Gramsci’ s argument o f 
‘hegemony’ and structural power can also be made at the level o f the individual company. 
In other words, they argue that power is not distributed equally. Their concept o f power
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contains two dimensions: the structural dimension embodied in the systematic imbalances 
in the availability o f resources, on the one hand, and the dynamic dimension that takes into 
consideration the scope o f manoeuvre o f actors within the structurally predetermined 
frame, on the other. The structural imbalances o f power take the form o f dominance and 
hierarchy among the national business systems where ‘dominant NBSs [national business 
systems] invite emulation from those that are on a weaker position’ (Femer and Tempel 
2006: 25). The authors also point out that ‘dominance relations depend not only on raw 
power but also on hegemonic control o f ideas and cognitive schema’ (Femer and Tempel 
2006: 25). They further differentiate between ‘those whose interests are bound up with the 
propagation o f a given set o f institutional rules, and those whose interests are shaped and 
constrained by such rules’ (Femer and Tempel 2006: 26). Based on this power analysis, the 
way to conceptualise a MNC subsidiary would be as a ‘community o f rule takers’ . 
However, studies o f subsidiaries in Central Europe indicate that subsidiaries o f MNC can 
also become 'rule makers'. Rather than a fu ll transfer o f practices from MNC headquarters 
to the subsidiary, what mostly takes place is a ‘hybridization’ o f home and host country 
traditions. Sometimes subsidiary practices are even implemented back in the headquarters 
(Meardi and Toth 2006). These findings are similar to the late findings o f the ‘Japanisation’ 
debate that assesses the extent o f the diffusion o f institutional practices o f Japanese 
companies to their subsidiaries abroad and finds selective appropriation o f Japanese 
production practices (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992; Eiger and Smith 1994).
After having introduced a number o f more structural approaches, I now introduce a further 
conceptual approach that deals with the internationalisation o f value chains within MNCs. 
The actor-driven approach does not negate the previous approaches but rather builds on 
them and develops them further to include another analytical dimension. It conceptualises 
multinational companies as arenas o f interest formation and exchange between stakeholders 
and thereby focuses on power relations in MNCs. These concepts are also referred to as 
micro-contestation. Femer et al. argue that MNCs ‘are not unitary, monolithic structures 
but shifting coalitions o f interests subject to complex micropolitical dynamics’ (Femer, 
Quintanilla et al. 2006: 7). This idea goes in parallel to Amoore’s notion o f the contested 
nature o f the firm. She argues that internationalisation should lead to increased tensions 
between the ‘competing social forces’ (Amoore 2000). Similarly, Kristensen and Zetlin 
(2005: 11) conceptualise MNCs as ‘ongoing political struggles over the allocation o f 
resources’ . Institutional transfer is described as ‘a political and contested process [...] and
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cannot be understood simply as a rational response to efficiency considerations by senior 
corporate decision-makers’ (Femer and Tempel 2006: 28).
This third strand o f business literature takes into account the constructivist turn in social 
sciences. It is the contestation that takes place among opposing normative and cognitive 
frames and interests that is at the heart o f the argument:
[o]ne o f the defining characteristics o f cognitive systems is that they shape taken- 
for-granted ways o f thinking that are not necessarily accessible to organizational 
actors. But at the junction o f two different institutional domains, previously 
‘ invisible’ cognitive schemas may be revealed through juxtaposition (Femer and 
Tempel 2006: 26).
Thus, it is necessary ‘ to take seriously the subsidiary’s scope for intentional ‘strategizing’ 
and pursuit o f its specific interests’ (Femer and Tempel 2006: 24).
According to this actor-based approach, the communal reaction to the expansion o f 
economic logic in work and employment can come from collective unity against the 
increased competition. It is argued that ‘ [a] subsidiary, while itself composed o f competing 
interest groups, may in some respects define itself as a collective interest group vis-a-vis 
another subsidiary o f corporate headquarter’ (Fernerand Tempel 2006: 24). This literature 
goes further than the two previous strands in identifying the role o f local actors in the 
subsidiaries as a source o f institutional innovation. In a similar vein, studying European 
Works Councils and the coalition building across plants within a MNC, Fetzer (2008a) 
identifies MNCs as a ‘ risk community in global competition’ . Bemaciak’s study on Poland 
(2008) supports this hypothesis. She argues that, more often than not, Eastern European 
unions choose to defend company interests on behalf o f their subsidiaries rather than to 
follow the road o f international labour cooperation. This actor-based approach that 
underlines the role o f local actors in MNC subsidiaries is a valuable contribution that this 
study builds upon; however it strongly under-theorises normative frameworks, as interests 
and normative frames o f local actors are assumed to be given. Interests and normative 
frames seem to be automatic expressions o f the institutional roles that actors represent. This 
analytical short-cut is maybe applicable to stable institutional environments where 
institutional change is slow and incremental, but for post-communist Central European 
production locations this approach has only limited explanatory power. This is because the 
change in the political regime brought about a dramatic institutional shift that profoundly
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altered the institutional set-ups. Since then, institutional roles o f collective actors have 
remained fluid and vague.
Another theory o f the firm  that underlines the social construction o f the enterprise has been 
the contribution by Maurice et al. (1986) who developed an ‘approche societale’ -  a 
societal approach. Comparing work hierarchies between German and French firms, the 
authors discovered a ‘ societal effect’ , i.e. they found that concepts such as skill acquisition, 
promotion, wage differentials, etc. are different between similar types o f firms implying 
that other - rather than pure market - forces have been at play. The authors identify a 
number o f organisational and socialisation effects that explain these differences: ‘German 
society gives prominence to what we have called the professional domain or domain o f 
qualification, whereas French society emphasizes the organizational domain’ (Maurice, 
Sellier et al. 1986: 168). While in French firms, stratification o f labour force takes place 
through criteria and procedures o f hierarchy established by individual firms, in German 
firms, workforce stratification ‘ is determined by a unique standard external to each 
individual firm; the level o f occupational training received’ (Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986: 
168). This distinction has become a crucial dimension o f analysis in the work o f Marsden 
(1999) who distinguishes between ‘production’ and ‘ training’ approaches.
The understanding o f societal embeddedness by Maurice, Sellier et al. (1986) is quite close 
to the one adopted in this study as the authors incorporate organising logics that go beyond 
calculative rationales. They explain that the role that occupational training plays in 
Germany is not purely instrumental. The goal o f training is not only to build up the skills to 
match certain job profiles, but a broader one that presupposes other organising logics. The 
system o f vocational training is described as a ‘ system o f qualifications based on social and 
professional norms largely independent o f any particular firm ’ (Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986: 
162). A  set o f professional norms is also used to explain what rational-calculative 
behaviour would not allow: German firm set up costly training programmes, but then allow 
their apprentices to work elsewhere.
A recurring theme o f the societal approach is ‘how to compare the uncomparable’ . In their 
understanding o f societal processes, Maurice, Sellier et al. (1986) reject the universalist 
premise that some cross-country studies take but still look for certain generalisable 
phenomena beyond the specificity o f a national culture (Korsnes 2000). Rather than 
comparing institutions that can mean different things in different contexts, such as job or
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qualification, they attempt to identify common points o f reference at a more abstract level, 
e.g. by using notions such as ‘domain’ that was elaborated above. These common points of 
reference can be translated from one society to another and thus make the uncomparable 
comparable. It is important to point out that the work o f Maurice, Sellier et al. (1986) is 
based on a complex understanding o f business and work environment. Rather than seeing 
the environment influencing the firm, they see the relationship between the firm  and the 
environment as interdependent and reciprocal rather than structurally deterministic 
(Maurice and Sorge 2000). When established rules are under pressure and alternative 
criteria for workforce stratification, such as, for example, seniority or general work 
experience are advanced, the lack o f legitimacy is expected to cause resistance among 
German workers (Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986: 170). In other words, the respective domains 
are constantly reconstructed. Overall, the ‘approche societale’ underlines the crucial role o f 
societal embeddedness and socialisation but in the analysis o f Maurice et al. (1986), 
professional norms and work-related norms remain a black box, a concept that is self- 
evident and does not need further elaboration.
To sum up, the four strands o f neo-institutional literature discussed above underline 
different institutional features o f firm governance: structural features o f homogeneity vs. 
heterogeneity, the role o f power, societal effect as well as more dynamic forms o f 
institutional analysis such as actor-based approach The presented approaches do not 
necessarily conflict with each other. More often than not they are combined and developed 
simultaneously. Thus, for example, Bluhm (2007) takes on board the structural power 
dimension but still believes that company actors have room to manoeuvre. Yet similar to 
the whole field o f neo-institutionalism o f which these strands o f literature are sub-sections, 
even i f  they take on board the constructivist understanding o f reality, they under-theorise 
the complexity o f social norms and the normative dimension o f action.
//. Introducing deontological ethics and value rationality
In the institutionalist literature o f the firm reviewed in Section I, power, the different nature 
o f MNC headquarters, companies’ interests and the societal approach have been the four 
conceptual frameworks discussed. This literature has underlined the importance o f the firm 
as a unit o f analysis but its take on norms governing human behaviour has been criticised as 
simplistic or under-theorised. Actors’ cognitive and normative schemes need to be more 
clearly defined especially during periods o f rapid institutional change when institutional
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roles are fluid and changing, as it has been the case in post-communist Central Europe. 
Thus, we need to take the ‘ invisible’ collective cognitive and normative schemes more 
seriously. It is by identifying forces o f societal self-protection and by fine-tuning the 
analysis o f collective norms and organising logics in work and business that I hope to 
prepare the theoretical grounds for the empirical inquiry on societal re-embedding that is 
carried out in Part II. In this Section, this study attempts to provide a more detailed 
theoretical understanding o f norms and values that, as I just argued, are under-theorised in 
the neo-institutional literature in general and in the business literature in particular.
Polanyi’ s concept o f societal embeddedness provides us with a good foundation for the 
analysis o f normative frameworks. Polanyi denies the prerogative o f economic rationale 
and argues that the economic system is run by non-economic motives. He refers to concepts 
such as ‘ social fabric’ and ‘social ties’ and more specifically to ‘code o f honour’ , 
‘ reciprocal social obligations’ and ‘social prestige’ :
[M jan’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relations. He does not act so 
as to safeguard his individual interests in the possession o f material goods; he acts 
so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values 
material goods only in so far as they serve this end. Neither the process o f 
production nor that o f distribution is linked to specific economic interests attached 
to the possession o f goods; but every single step in that process is geared to a 
number o f social interests which eventually ensure that the required step be taken. 
These interests w ill be very different in a small hunting or fishing community from 
those in a vast despotic society, but in either case the economic system w ill be run 
on noneconomic motives (Polanyi 1957: 46).
Thus, the dichotomy between economic and non-economic rationales is underlined and the 
existence and the context-dependency o f ‘non-economic motives’ is acknowledged. 
However, one finds only a schematic understanding o f the interaction between economic 
and non-economic rationales in Polanyi’ s work. One o f the distinctions that needs to be 
made to better understand the interaction between different types o f organising logics is the 
distinction between different normative underpinnings o f behavioural motives. One o f the 
main distinctions within the different schools o f moral philosophy is that between 
utilitarian and deontological ethics. This important distinction is elaborated below in 
greater detail. The introduction o f concepts from moral philosophy into the study o f socio­
economic and institutional change should enrich our understanding o f organising logics and 
thus possibly contribute to a new perspective on Polanyi’s double-movement.
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Utilitarianism refers to the fact that what is considered o f value are those perceptions, 
beliefs and attitudes that have a consequence. In other words, utilitarian philosophy argues 
that the worth o f an action is determined by its outcome. In philosophy, the tradition goes 
back to David Hume, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart M ill who were interested in the 
question o f how the highest level o f happiness and pleasure can be achieved. Thus, 
Bentham was interested to identify behaviour that leads to the greatest happiness o f the 
greatest number o f people. Similarly, M ill in his essay ‘U tilitarism ’ published in 1863 sets 
out that an action is ethically right in proportion as it promotes the greatest amount o f 
happiness. Yet while Bentham considers all forms o f happiness and pleasure as equal, M ill 
differentiates between superior and inferior types o f pleasures. Utilitarian ethics has 
become a cornerstone o f orthodox economics, especially micro-economics, which also uses 
the concept o f utility. Yet just a short excursion in the study o f philosophy and ethics 
allows me to demonstrate how simplistic and limited such a conceptualisation o f human 
agency is.
An alternative school o f thought that has shown to be fruitful for this study is the school o f 
deontological philosophy that has its roots in the German philosophical tradition o f 
idealism. Immanuel Kant, the founder o f this school o f philosophy, searches in the 
‘Groundwork o f the Metaphysic o f Morals’ from 1785, for a categorical imperative, the 
supreme principle o f morality. He finds that the moral worth o f an action does not lie in its 
purpose or consequences but rather in the principle that underlies the action. In other 
words, the highest moral postulate says that the morality o f decisions is not based on their 
consequences but on their intentions. This understanding came from Kant’s conviction that 
human beings are autonomous and free and thus are not law takers but also makers o f laws. 
The second distinction made by Kant is that between relative and absolute ends. While the 
concept o f relative ends refers to ends that serve to achieve some other ends, the concept o f 
absolute ends refers to ends that are ends in themselves. Price is an example o f a relative 
end, while human dignity is an absolute end, an end in itself. For Kant, to qualify as a 
moral action, the subject needs to be treated as an end and not as a means to an end 
(Rutgers and Schreurs 2006: 412). With this approach, Kant explicitly discloses his anti­
utilitarian stance; he opposes the utilitarian position that the moral worth o f an action is 
mirrored in its outcome or utility.
The contemporary debate between economics and other rational choice disciplines, on the 
one hand, and other social sciences, on the other, is a continuation o f this moral philosophy
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debate led more than 200 years ago between different schools o f philosophy. Orthodox 
economics that embodies economic liberalism adopts the utilitarian notion o f ‘u tility ’ that 
needs to be maximised. Yet not only orthodox economics but also some other schools o f 
social sciences stand in this tradition. Institutional economics and rational choice neo­
institutionalism use the concept o f institutions but they are still confined to the utilitarian 
logic: they only consider utilitarian ethics when explaining behavioural motives. Thus, for 
Coase (1937), firms as institutions exist because transaction costs such as acquiring costly 
information and negotiation costs make price mechanism less effective for certain 
exchanges. For Williamson (1975), firms as institutions exist so that opportunism o f human 
action can be controlled and held at bay. Similarly, for North (1990), institutions matter 
because they have a purpose: they reduce the level o f uncertainty, solve coordination 
problems and encourage cooperation among opportunistic economic agents.
The institutional economics literature has also developed concepts such as social capital 
and trust but they remain ill-defined and fuzzy. Stiglitz points out that:
We now talk, for instance, about social capital. [...] We recognise that the manner 
in which and the speed with which reforms were put into place in Russia eroded 
social relations, destroyed social capital, and led to the creation and perhaps the 
dominance o f the Russian Mafia (Stiglitz 2001: x).
For many institutional economists, the missing variable is the neglected state capacity: 
‘rapid transformation destroys old coping mechanism, old safety nets, while it creates a 
new set o f demands, before new coping mechanism are developed’ (Stiglitz 2001: xi). I f  
only the Russian government had the time to put in place necessary legal and institutional 
infrastructure, Stiglitz (2001: xii) argues, the economic catastrophe could have been 
avoided. But even i f  these concepts o f social capital and role o f government have certain 
explanatory power, something is missing: Why did economic liberalism have these 
disruptive effects rather than contributing to a freer and more competitive society? Was it 
really just the speed and sequencing that went wrong in post-communist transition?
The rational choice school o f institutionalism sees organising logics o f action as equivalent 
to utilitarian ethics. In the definitions adopted by neo-institutionalists such as Hall and 
Soskice (2001) institutions always have a clear function, either to reduce uncertainty, or to 
exchange information, or to sanction the defection from cooperation. Thus, these schools o f 
thought show a clearly utilitarian understanding o f institutions as they relate the motives 
explicitly to outcomes o f actions. In non-orthodox economics, on the other hand, but much
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more prominently in sociology as well as historical and sociological neo-institutionalism, 
the utilitarian understanding o f institutions is dropped. Some neo-institutionalists, such as 
Aoki, go beyond the rational choice and attempt to identify common features o f 
institutions. Thus, for example, Aoki (2001) describes institutions as self-sustaining 
systems o f shared beliefs that shape agents’ incentives and strategies during periods o f 
institutional stability, while during periods o f institutional change, when economic agents 
become rule-makers rather than rule-takers, new institutions would emerge as equilibrium 
strategies o f actors (Aoki 2001). Amable who is also interested in institutional change 
distinguishes between ‘ tight f it ’ and ‘ loose coupling’ o f institutions as crucial explanatory 
variables o f institutional complementarity that can explain the path o f institutional change 
(Amable 2003). Yet these authors still have problems explaining institutional change and 
their conceptual contribution to the institutional theory remains somewhat de- 
contextualised. Overall, similar to the Varieties o f Capitalism literature, the institutional 
complementarity literature remains, despite its popularity, an under-defined concept.
Only rarely have social science scholars attempted to shift the attention to the question o f 
ethics and normative frameworks. An important contribution in non-orthodox economics 
has been the book ‘The moral dimension’ by Etzioni who argues that behavioural motives 
are morally right ‘when they confirm to a relevant principle o f duty’ (Etzioni 1988: 12). 
Etzioni proposed deontological social sciences that would give a more explicit place to 
Kantian deontological ethics. Yet his book is highly a-historical as it manages to underline 
the theoretical importance o f deontological ethics but does not provide any historically and 
culturally bound evidence to operationalise the argument. The clearest example o f the 
philosophical divide that I just discussed being translated in social sciences has been the 
sociological thinking o f Max Weber. Weber’s work has been preoccupied with the motives 
o f social action and the foundations o f social authority. In his work ‘Economy and Society’ 
(1978), first published in 1922, that is mostly known for its conceptualialisation o f the state 
and political power, Weber also discusses the concept o f social action. He defines social 
action as a meaningful action that relates to the behaviour o f other people. He distinguishes 
between four types o f social action: instrumentally rational, value rational, affectual i.e. 
motivated by feelings and traditional i.e. motivated by habit. Thus, among four different 
motivations o f social action, Weber distinguishes between two types o f rationality: 
instrumental and value rationality ( ‘Zweck-‘ versus ‘Wertrationalitat’ ). The former 
presupposes that the ends are given and what needs to be decided upon are the appropriate 
means to reach them. In other words, the meaning o f the action is its outcome or
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consequence. The value rationality, on the other hand, describes motivation that arises out 
o f adherence to a higher -  religious, ethical or aesthetic -  value, independent o f the costs a 
related action might impose. Thus, these two types o f rationality that Weber identifies 
correspond very closely to utilitarian ethics, on the one hand, and Kantian deontological or 
sometimes called ‘ idealistic’ ethics, on the other.
However, Weber’s thinking as a social scientist has been different from Kant’s moral 
philosophy. Weber did not share Kant’s idea o f hierarchy o f values and rejected the 
postulate o f autonomous origins o f moral laws that people can give to themselves (Rutgers 
and Schreurs 2006: 417). Weber considered instrumental rationality i f  not superior, then at 
least a more exciting subject to study. Instrumental rationality interpreted as a ‘degree o f 
control o f life by conscious ideas’ (Swidler 1973: 39) was the ‘real’ rationality for Weber. 
His study ‘The protestant ethics and the spirit o f capitalism’ , originally published in 1905 
and recognised as one o f the central milestones o f economic sociology, elaborates on the 
role o f the Protestant religion in the strengthening o f instrumental rationality and thus 
fostering capitalist development. Weber argued that the religious system o f Protestantism 
fostered this type o f rationality more than any other system thus establishing the 
foundations for a capitalist society (Weber 2002).
Even i f  his main contribution was to exemplify the role o f instrumental rationality in the 
construction o f the legal-rational authority that has been the basis o f modem capitalist 
societies (Weber 2002), Weber has not completely ignored the role o f value rationality. 
Weber points out that in most cases the social action is a mixture o f several types o f 
motives and rationalities. He thus sees deontological values and organising logics, on the 
one hand, and instrumental rationality, on the other, as two parts o f one whole that depend 
on each other. He believes that ‘there is always a sphere o f social life which is non- 
[instrumentally] rational, and it is on the preservation o f this sphere that the [instrumental] 
rationality o f the rest o f the system depends’ (Swidler 1973: 41). In his book ‘Science as a 
vocation’ (Weber 1930), originally given as a lecture in 1918, Weber underlines that values 
are essential preconditions for scientific objectivity, yet science cannot justify why it is 
worth holding a certain position. In other words, science itself does not answer the 
questions o f final aims but only those o f tools. Thus, science is not based on pragmatic 
motives alone. Using the example o f science, Weber demonstrates his thesis that utilitarian 
and deontological ethics are two separate and sometimes competing, but also 
interdependent parts o f human action.
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Weber’s concepts o f instrumental and value rationality allow translating the philosophical 
concepts o f Kantian idealistic philosophy and English and Scottish tradition o f 
utilitarianism into the terms o f social sciences. When following utilitarian ethics or 
Weberian instrumental rationality, agents engage in cost-benefit analysis o f their actions, 
while deontological ethics describes social action that arises out o f a moral commitment 
where certain untouchable values rather than cost-benefit rationales guide the way. Thus, 
the importance o f value rationality and the normative dimension for social sciences have 
been established and the philosophical dichotomy between deontological and utilitarian 
ethics has been translated into the language o f social sciences. However, let me recapitulate 
what value and instrumental rationality mean in social sciences. Two issues seem 
important. First, the concepts o f social sciences are not based on value judgements, i.e. it is 
not possible or desirable to see different rationalities and organising logics in a hierarchical 
order. This is the first difference to the Kantian approach. Second, the two logics are not 
seen as self-exclusive but as complementary.
But how does this discussion o f different schools o f ethics and their interpretation by 
Weber as a social scientist relate to Polanyian double-movement in post-communism? The 
link from Weber to post-communist transition is a quite direct one. The underlying logic o f 
economic liberalism is the utilitarian understanding o f social action. To illustrate this point 
I refer to the study o f Michel Albert. I already mentioned Albert’s book ‘Capitalism against 
capitalism’ (1993) that underlines the role o f non-economic factors in the social 
organisation o f economic life. Yet his contribution goes one step further as the author 
attempts to differentiate among various shades o f non-economic logics, something only 
very few scholars in this field have done. Thus, he develops a taxonomy o f three types o f 
assets: negotiable, mixed and non-negotiable. Negotiable assets are those with a higher 
degree o f commodification, while non-negotiable assets have a low degree o f 
commodification. Most interestingly, this taxonomy is explicitly based on organising logics 
and values and their differences between the neo-American and the Rhine model o f 
capitalism.
Some assets, by definition, cannot be transferred from one owner to the other. They 
may be personal (love and friendship, generosity and honour, for example) or 
collective (democracy, public freedoms, human rights, justice etc.). They are what 
may be termed non-negotiable (or non-exchangeable) goods (Albert 1993: 101).
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Thus, utilitarian ethics dominates when housing, education or health are partially treated as 
a market commodity, according to cost-benefit analysis o f inputs and outputs. 
Deontological ethics dominates when the same ‘assets’ are treated as non-negotiable, i.e. 
when other organising logics and values dominate and do not allow cost efficiency to take 
over. In his study, Albert describes a substantial difference between the two socio­
economic systems. While the majority o f fields are in the category o f negotiable assets in 
the neo-American model, in the Rhine model these goods are considered and treated as 
mixed goods. The presence o f the high number o f mixed goods in the Rhine model is 
explained by two ‘sets o f values’ : egalitarianism and collective solidarity (Albert 1993: 
124). The principles o f economic liberalism that have been dominant in the neo-American 
model, on the other hand, correspond to the stronger dominance o f utilitarian ethics than it 
would be the case in the Rhine model. Thus, while the majority o f authors writing about 
non-liberal capitalism underlined the role o f structural factors that cause ‘ institutional 
complementarity’ , ‘ institutional interdependence’ , or ‘ institutional interlock’ , Albert is one 
o f the rare few who talk explicitly about values and non-economic organising logics. This 
is an important contribution in which the dichotomy o f different sets o f organising logics 
clearly comes out, even i f  Albert’s share o f theorising is low and he does not develop a 
fully-fledged theory o f norms and organising logics.
Other disciplines rarely make the distinction between deontological and instrumental 
organising logics or between value and instrumental rationality when studying organising 
logics as underlying motives o f group, enterprise, or government behaviour. One o f the rare 
exceptions are the writings by political scientists March and Olsen. The authors first 
introduced their thinking on behavioural logics in the book ‘Rediscovering institutions' 
(1989) and developed it further in the subsequent writings. March and Olsen distinguish 
between the logic o f consequence and the logic o f appropriateness. The former takes place 
when actions are driven by a logic o f anticipated future consequences and prior 
preferences, while the latter is closely related to actors’ norms and identity. The authors 
argue that:
humans maintain a repertoire o f roles and identities, each providing rules o f 
appropriate behaviour in situations for which they are relevant. Following rules o f a 
role or identity is a relatively complicated cognitive process involving thoughtful, 
reasoning behaviour; but the processes o f reasoning are not primarily connected to 
the anticipation o f future consequences as they are in most contemporary 
conceptions o f rationality. [...] To act appropriately is to proceed according to the 
institutionalized practices o f a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit,
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understandings o f what is true, reasonable, natural, right and good (March and 
Olsen 2004: 4).
Economic sociology also made an important contribution o f re-introducing organising 
logics and values into the study o f societies and distinguishing between economic and non­
economic rationales. An important study is that by Boltanski and Thevenot. Their book ‘On 
justification: economies o f worth’ (2006), first published in 1991, is relatively close to the 
French school o f heterodox economics known as Teconomie des conventions’ . The 
authors’ argument is that a social order contains multiple principles o f valuation, multiple 
‘orders o f worth’ . They distinguish between six orders o f worth: market logic, industrial 
logic, civic logic, principles o f fame, loyalty, and inspiration. What makes this French 
school different from many other sociological works is that the authors do not consider 
values as separate from calculative rationality but as a constitutive part o f it. Thus, the 
moral judgement is not seen as opposing rationality, but rather rationality only becomes a 
useful concept as long as it is embedded into the boundaries o f one or another order o f 
worth.
The contribution o f Boltanski and Thevenot on the ‘economies o f worth’ can be seen as 
complementary to the contribution o f March and Olson. The strength o f the March and 
Olson approach is in the simple dichotomy between the two types o f organising logics. The 
two logics can be translated to represent the movement and the counter-movement in the 
Polanyian conceptual framework. To operationalise the dichotomy between deontological 
and utilitarian organising logics, the present study assumes that choosing the means o f 
action under a pure efficiency rationale or engaging in cost-benefit analysis is a form o f 
Weberian instrumental rationality, a form o f utilitarian ethics and an example o f the logic 
o f consequence. On the other hand, when deontological ethics or Weberian value 
rationality prevails, the non-economic moral commitments imply a rejection o f calculative 
approaches (Etzioni 1988) and put values at the centre-stage. The strength o f the 
‘economies o f worth’ by Boltanski and Thevenot approach, on the other hand, is in its 
explicit dealing with different forms o f the logic o f appropriateness that are, by definition, 
context specific.
III. Theorising the normative dimension of business and work
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The present study builds on writings discussed in the last Section. The Kantian and 
Weberian concepts o f social action and the o f underlying organising logics as well as more 
recent contributions o f March and Olson (2004) and Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) are 
translated in the reality o f post-communist transition and the world o f work. The study 
insists, in the spirit o f Weberian distinction between instrumental and value rationality and 
in line with the dichotomy o f March and Olson’s logics, on an inherent tension between the 
instrumentally driven organising logic and the value driven organising logic. A t the same 
time, in the spirit o f ‘orders o f worth’ , as developed by Boltanski and Thevenot, the study 
provides a more detailed analysis o f the different forms o f value rationality and o f the 
logics o f appropriateness.
I f  we consider the normative foundations o f policy reforms o f economic liberalisation and 
introduction o f markets in Central Europe, the picture that emerges is that o f strong 
utilitarian ethics being the driving force behind the economic reforms in the field o f 
enterprise restructuring, work and employment. In other words, economic liberalism that 
came to dominate policy reforms in Central Europe can be understood as an expansion o f 
the instrumental rationality and o f the logic o f consequence, in relation to questions o f the 
law o f value. The arguments used to justify privatisation and restructuring o f state owned 
enterprises were all made with reference to cost-efficiency and the law o f value. This is 
what this study refers to as ‘economic organising logic’ . The non-economic organising 
logics refer, on the other hand, to all non-market ‘orders o f value’ , all logics o f 
appropriateness and value rationality. It is only when dealing with the transformation 
process and with the daily choices o f economic and enterprise policy that political and 
economic decision makers slowly abandoned the simplistic understanding o f ‘ the 
imperative o f the market forces’ in favour o f more complex and multi-faceted 
understanding o f firm functioning. Non-economic enterprise organising logics, embedded 
in the state socialist legacies, functioned as constraints or limitations to the newly emerged 
dominant logic o f economic liberalism. Thus, they represented a form o f Polanyian societal 
re-embedding.
An important caveat that needs to be mentioned is that a part o f the post-communist 
reforms that were associated with an idealised form o f economic liberalism mirrored the 
intrinsic values o f policy makers that economic freedom is better than state intrusion and 
Communist Party control: especially as market economy and democracy have been closely 
associated with each other, the value o f liberty was associated with both o f them. Thus,
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economic liberalism has originally been, to a certain extent, an intrinsic value, a logic o f 
appropriateness. Economic liberalism was thus originally driven by the belief that price 
mechanism and the law o f value are the natural principles o f social order that should not be 
constrained by other principles. In these discourses, markets are thought o f as naturally 
emerging and liberating, while social constraints as artificial and confining. The following 
quote by a Hungarian academic captures this way o f thinking:
Free market capitalism and socialism are not two symmetrical socioeconomic 
alternatives, equally analysable and debateable. One is spontaneous and self­
organizing social order, an unintended result o f the free and unencumbered human 
action. [Capitalism] emerges spontaneously, over and over again, whenever 
economic agents become free and autonomous decision-makers. The other never 
emerges spontaneously and must always be designed, implemented and redesigned 
by social engineers (Zeleny 1993: 46-47).
Thus, any social regulation was considered as artificial and man-designed feature o f social 
engineering while ‘markets’ were expected to be left to their devices. In this discourse, 
economic efficiency is perceived to be a goal in itself, not as means to something else. In a 
similar vein, Bryant and Mokrzycki argue that:
‘ [s]ocialist society’ was treated as the temporary result [..], with little integrity o f its 
own and little ability to sustain itself under normal conditions. It seemed to be 
composed o f individuals and primary groups who would be willing, i f  not happy, to 
abandon whatever macro-sociological categories they found themselves in under 
socialism in order to pursue their interests in a rational way and to regroup 
spontaneously in a ‘natural’ order with the middle class to the fore. It was this view 
o f an amorphous and plastic society, distorted by the heavy hand o f the Communist 
Party-state that the Eastern European reformers had in mind as they worked out the 
details o f their plans for reform. They took for granted that what was needed was to 
set people free by removing the economic and political impediments to the natural 
expression and articulation o f individual interests. Accordingly, the core o f the 
reform plans was liberalization, one might almost say liberation (Bryant and 
Mokrzycki 1994: 7-8).
Thus, economic liberalism, understood as economic freedom, has originally been an 
intrinsic value, a logic o f appropriateness for many policy makers, especially during the 
early transformation, when economic liberalism was an idealised, rather than experienced, 
concept standing for more individual freedom. This liberating side o f economic liberalism 
has been crucial in the early stages o f economic and enterprise reforms, when it provided a 
justification for liberating the economy from the grip o f the Communist Party.
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However, this political goal was relatively quickly achieved and the instrumental side, the 
logic o f consequence related to the law o f value embodying economic liberalism has 
become more visible: it started to dominate and negate other final ends, such as other 
societal organising logics and values. Once economic reforms advanced and conflicts 
between the organising logic o f economic liberalism and other organising logics became 
more pronounced, the instrumental and utilitarian nature o f economic liberalism became 
more visible. This made the distinction between value rationality and instrumental 
rationality easy to trace: instrumentality in relation to cost efficiency and market viability 
has increasingly become the pre-dominant organising logic o f economic and political 
decision makers, with no reference to other organising logics being made. It is only with 
time that decision makers learned to balance their original idealised understanding o f 
‘market forces’ with other societal imperatives, norms and organising logics. The non­
economic enterprise organising logics thus became constraints or limitations o f the newly 
emerged dominant logic o f economic liberalism.
Conclusion
Section I o f this Chapter reviewed the institutional literature o f the firm and underlined the 
importance o f the enterprise as a unit o f analysis. Yet its conceptualisation o f organising 
logics governing human behaviour has been criticised as simplistic. I acknowledged that 
actors’ cognitive and normative schema needed to be more clearly defined, especially when 
studying a period o f a rapid institutional change. Section II attempted to provide a more 
detailed conceptual understanding o f organising logics and values. It introduced the 
dichotomy between deontological and utilitarian organising logics, elaborating that when 
actions are seen as means to achieve some other goal they correspond to Weberian 
instrumental rationality and to utilitarian ethics, while, on the other hand, deontological 
ethics and Weberian value rationality prevail when actions are seen as valuable, as ends in 
themselves, rather than means to some higher ends. Later studies o f political sciences and 
economic sociology, in particular the studies on the logic and appropriateness and logic o f 
consequence by March and Olson and the studies on the ‘orders o f worth’ by Boltanski and 
Thevenot were introduced. Section III provided the first idea about how to operationalise 
the concept o f the non-economic organising logics in the post-communist context. The non­
economic organising logic o f the firm, the logic o f appropriateness in work and production, 
is conceptualised as setting limits and constrains to the expansion o f economic liberalism.
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The legacy o f state socialism as a system rich in non-economic institutions has played an 
important role in this process. By identifying the three non-economic organising logics that 
existed during state socialism, Chapter III prepares the ground for Chapters V, V I and V II 
that operationalise the Polanyian double-movement o f dis-embedding and re-embedding in 
the context o f post-communist production and work.
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III. Embedding the normative: legacies of state 
socialism
The aim o f this Chapter is to combine Polanyi’ s argument o f societal embeddedness with 
Weber’s concept o f value rationality introduced in the previous Chapter. I f  one takes these 
two strands o f literature seriously, it is important to know which rationalities and ‘ logics of 
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 2004) have been important during the post-communist 
transition. In other words, it is important to embed the study into a specific historical socio­
economic context. To do that this Chapter explores certain state socialist organising logics 
that existed in Central Europe. I elaborate on the three state socialist non-economic 
organising logics o f production and work. However, there is no automatism in the evolution 
o f non-economic state socialist legacies: while certain non-economic organising logics 
could be partially preserved and re-configured, others represented the building blocks o f 
economic liberalism and the law o f value. In other words, societal embeddedness is not 
equal to causality; however, it reduces the number o f available behavioural and normative 
options in the repertoire o f stakeholders and makes certain choices more probable than 
others. To recapitulate, enterprise organising logics are defined as different types o f 
rationality (value or instrumental), principles o f valuation, logics o f appropriateness or 
consequence and as different orders o f worth that structure social reality (Albert 1993; 
March and Olsen 2004; Boltanski and Thevenot 2006).
The Chapter is organised as follows: Section I sets out the main features o f state socialism 
system o f production and work; it elaborates on the non-economic nature o f state socialist 
firms and explains how the state socialist firm fitted into the specific context o f state 
socialist production regime. Section II introduces the typology o f three non-economic work 
and employment practices in state socialist firms.
/. State socialist system of production and national differences
During state socialism, the official ideology o f the Communist Party-led states dominated 
employment and production in Central European countries. But what exactly was the nature 
o f surplus extraction and utilisation in relation to labour? Despite certain differences that 
existed within the state socialist bloc that are discussed later in this Chapter, some features 
o f production regimes have been similar across countries. Although the late state socialism
70
was characterised by a much weaker ideological doctrine than often presumed by common 
understanding, the control o f the Communist Party over the economic sphere o f production 
was significant. The Party grip on economic and enterprise life remained strong. A ll 
countries had a mono-party governing elite at the top that was responsible for the 
production sphere. It was the Party's function to make all high-level appointments in 
political and economic spheres (Soulsby and Clark 1996). These appointees, also known as 
the ‘nomenklatura’ , were entitled to political power, economic responsibility and a number 
o f privileges, yet they still had to comply with the hierarchical structure o f the Party that 
was the authority o f the last resort on any public issue (Ashwin and Clarke 2003: 17).
The ideology in everyday life consisted o f a code o f rules o f conduct from which 
divergences were not allowed. Ironically, while formally Marxist-Leninist ideology was the 
main pillar from which the state bureaucracy derived its legitimacy, it was not by the power 
o f principles and ideals that this ideology worked, but by a coercive adherence to the 
behavioural rules once identified by the Communist Party.
While 'socialism' was still an ideal for the Western left, nobody believed in the 
ideology of'real socialism' in the East; moreover, nobody was supposed to believe, 
as the long as official behaviour conformed to the party standard (Lavigne 1995:4).
Thus, for Lavigne, the gap between intrinsically held norms and social rules at work is 
large. Similarly, Lampland also sees a substantial gap between the official Party discourse 
and social reality. She describes ’rampant individualism and utilitarianism o f everyday life ’ 
in Hungarian rural communities in the early 1980s (Lampland 1995:1). Codagnone, on the 
other hand, does not completely discard the inter-dependency o f official, state imposed 
rules and social norms. He argues that:
I f  the ideology is allegedly based on the intention o f leading society towards a telos 
-  a higher goal -  then we may talk o f a ‘ teleological’ ethos. Such an ethos was 
created in the Soviet Union by a party that considered itself the charismatic agent o f 
social development (Codagnone 1995: 68).
The true picture probably lies somewhere in between the two opinions: certain organising 
logics o f the system became internalised and became ends in themselves, while other 
organising logics were means to certain ends such as the construction o f communism or 
just career advancement.
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The official ideology in Central Europe was dominated by the goals set by the Communist 
party that were other than the law o f value and thus enterprise institutions can be described 
as mainly non-economic. Despite certain differences in political regimes across the state 
socialist block that are discussed later in this Chapter, a number o f non-economic features 
o f production system was shared by most state socialist firms, especially those in the 
manufacturing sector. One o f the main institutional differences in comparison to firms in 
capitalist societies was that firms were in public ownership. Furthermore, management 
capacities were low, especially in comparison to oversized bureaucracy, while marketing 
functions hardly existed. But also the nature and the logic o f state socialist firm was 
profoundly different from capitalist firms. The main stylised fact is that rather than the 
extraction o f surplus, plan fulfilment was the dominant pressure for company management. 
This has, however, been interpreted differently. Arnot, on the one hand, sees state socialist 
production regime as fundamentally similar to the capitalist production regime. He argues 
that the orientation towards plan fulfillment was also extraction o f surplus, it just took a 
different form and could be described as politicised extraction o f surplus (Arnot 1988:30). 
Clark, on the other hand, sees plan targets and administrative control as fundamentally 
different to the capitalist firm. According to him, the final goal o f firm ’s existence is 
different between a state socialist and a capitalist firm. Plan targets, mostly expressed in 
units rather than productivity measures, were the central orientation point for enterprise 
managers. Thus, he argues, creation o f surplus value was not a priority in the state socialist 
mode o f production. This implies that as the production system was not ruled by the law o f 
value, production inputs such as capital, labour and environment did not have market 
valuation. ‘ [...] Soviet enterprises most certainly were not subjected to the law o f value, 
and so to the production and appropriation o f surplus value’ (Clarke 1993: 10). Despite 
their disagreement on the extent o f non-economic factors, both authors agree that state 
socialist production regime and its transactions had a strongly non-economic nature.
In state socialist production system, relationships between producing firms and customers 
were quite different from those in market economies. Production inputs, such as raw or 
intermediate materials, energy, as well as labour, were determined by technical and 
administrative or outright political organising logics. Thus, Lavigne finds command 
economies comparable to 'a pervasive state bureaucracy' (Lavigne 1995: 5). Similarly, 
Komai (1992) speaks about 'bureaucratic coordination'. In inter-firm relations, there was 
practically no direct interaction between firms, and links between producers, suppliers and 
clients were virtually non-existent as central planning authorities were the intermediaries.
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Firms functioned as highly vertically integrated networks and there was practically no 
replacement for any given supplier or customer. The relationship between central planners 
and enterprises was characterized by enterprises being controlled by industrial ministries 
(Clarke 2004). Goods were mostly distributed through a central planner without an 
intermediary o f wholesalers. The central administration consisted o f a great number o f 
sectoral and functional agencies. Functional agencies such as the Planning Office, the 
Investment Bank or the Labour Office all had coordinating functions, while the Office o f 
Prices fixed wholesale and retail prices. The Agencies 'facilitated' production and 
distribution processes by linking material and technical resources o f buyer and seller firms. 
In the financial sector, a similar bureaucratic hierarchy existed. Credits were allocated 
through the Central Banks, called monobanks, the only institutions allowed to provide 
credits.
In contrast to the capitalist production system where prices have to stand ‘ the test o f 
markets’ , in command economies price mechanism played a very limited regulatory role in 
the production process. Prices for a large number o f products were set administratively. 
What mattered for price setting were political priorities rather than economic efficiency. 
Furthermore, the system o f pricing was set up in a way that each enterprise would achieve 
economic balance at the end o f a year. This accounting system led to imbalances in the real 
sector: between consumers and producers, for example (Clarke 1993). Thus, prices had a 
merely nominal significance in the production process. The situation was only slightly 
different with regard to consumption: wages implied a transfer o f purchasing power but 
consumption was restricted by the access to and availability o f goods.
This industrial state policy led to a very low level o f firm  turnover that allowed realising 
the promises o f employment stability. However, command economies with their 
administrative price and production output setting have been extensively criticised and held 
responsible for the breakdown o f the state socialist economic system. Thus, Pollert believes 
that this mode o f production contributed to distortions, hoarding o f labour and material and 
to production o f goods for nominal plan fulfillment (Pollert 1999a: 53). Komai (1980), one 
o f the most prominent critics o f planned economies, argued that the system o f 
administrative control led to a 'shortage economy'. He also coined the expression o f state 
socialist enterprises having ‘soft budget constraints’ as that they were 'bailed out 
persistently by state agencies when revenues did not cover costs' (Komai 1998: 12). A ll 
these criticisms have been mobilized to explain the breakdown o f state socialism but i f
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taking them at face value, what emerges is an obvious presence o f numerous non-economic 
firm organising logics. Thus, administrative controls and state financial instead o f market 
competition support were used for managing the production process. This contributed to 
firms being ‘ taken out o f market competition’ ; practically all pressures and constraints 
imposed on firms came from state administration.
What emerges is a unique nature o f the state socialist firm  in comparison to the capitalist 
firm: state socialist production system was dominated by non-economic organising logics. 
Central plan was not just about five-year production plans. It was an alternative way o f 
managing supply and demand, a way that did not use scarcity and efficiency as main 
motivations o f resource allocation but was to a larger extent driven by ideological 
reasoning, I showed the pervasive role o f political and administrative planning which 
ignored price mechanism as mechanism o f resource allocation. But what exactly does this 
mean at the enterprise level that production inputs, such as capital, labour or environment 
did not have market valuation? As far as capital is concerned, Clarke explains that even i f  
enterprises made profits and produced surplus, these profits had a purely formal 
significance. The residual profits were appropriated by the state. ‘The enterprise has user- 
rights over its means o f production, but the means o f production did not function as capital' 
(Clarke 1993: 12). Innovation practices were similarly dominated by non-economic 
rationale. They were ‘driven by process innovation, embodied in the installation o f new 
production facilities or the modernisation o f existing plant and equipment, based on the 
technical rather than the economic evaluation o f innovations’ (Kabalina and Clarke 2001: 
24-25).
The main purpose o f this Chapter is to underline non-economic enterprise organising logics 
that were common during the late state socialism. The Chapter elaborates on three non­
economic organising logics o f the state socialist enterprise. Enterprise in state socialism 
functioned as:
(i) An authoritarian paternalist;
(ii) A  source o f competitive industrial capabilities; and
(iii) A discretionary bureaucracy.
These three non-economic enterprise organising logics are discussed in this Chapter. An
important caveat needs to be taken into account. The state socialist firm, as described in
Section II, is close to an ideal-type state socialist firm. In order to underline the similarities
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that existed within the state socialist bloc this picture o f state socialist firm downplays 
certain national specificities. Yet, for the reasons o f completeness it is important to be 
aware o f national differences in production and work organisation across the three 
countries studied. The following paragraphs provide a short overview o f main national 
differences in work organisation and production system.
The semi-totalitarian nature o f state socialist production system was the result o f a crisis of 
the system and its subsequent restoration. In former Czechoslovakia, a certain liberalisation 
o f the political regime took place in the mid-1960s. The most important proposals o f 
reforms were made in the economic sphere. In 1964, new principles o f industrial 
management and price setting that would make the use o f productive resources more cost- 
efficient were actively discsused. Decentralisation o f the decision making and introduction 
o f market mechanism in resource allocation and price and wage setting were at the core o f 
the reforms introduced in 1966, The number o f regulatory measures was reduced from 1 
200 to 67, output targets were no longer set, while the factors o f production could be 
combined according to the priorities o f individual enterprise (Lane 1976). Wages were 
calculated according to the turnover o f individual enterprise rather than on the basis o f plan 
fulfilment. Yet while enterprise level decision making was largely decentralised, the macro- 
economic policies remained the priority o f the state. Thus, regional development priorities, 
trade and capital markets, distribution o f national income between consumption and 
investment, and price and wage setting remained in the hands o f the central planners (Lane 
1976).
The economic reforms were closely linked to the demands o f greater societal pluralism and 
even democratic elections o f the parliamentary representatives which threatened the 
Czechoslovak official doctrine o f democratic centralism. After the ‘Prague spring’ o f 1968, 
enterprise reforms were brought under a stronger Party control. The revived stricter 
political order, known as ‘normalisation’, ‘re-established the political and economic regime 
as hierarchical, centralised and autocratic’ (Soulsby and Clark 1996: 231). Yet a part o f 
system’s legitimacy was for ever gone.
The process o f ‘normalisation’ thoroughly undermined the relationship between the 
political elites and the citizens. The ensuing crisis o f legitimacy was reflected in 
enterprise activities and employment relations, as the association o f key enterprise 
managers as nomenklatura with the unpopular regime. This legacy o f illegitimacy 
and mistrust was a special feature o f Czech enterprise relations, even to the extent
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that working hard was seen to be an act o f support for the regime (Soulsby and 
Clark 1996: 232).
However, among the three countries considered, the Czechoslovak production system 
remained the closest to the original Soviet production model.
Poland and Hungary both had political systems that had undergone a more profound 
liberalisation significantly affecting production and work. The introductions o f workers’ 
self-management in Poland in the early 1980s and o f the New Economic Mechanism in 
Hungary in 1966-1968 were important milestones that limited the role o f the central 
planning and the power o f the Communist Party. In Poland, economic reforms put in place 
in the early 1980s were expected to bring a greater managerial autonomy and a greater role 
o f self-financing and o f self-management in state enterprises. The compromise on 
enterprise reforms between the independent Solidarity trade union and state officials o f the 
Jaruzelski regime was reached in September 1981. This compromise set out to transform 
the traditional command system o f production into a new system that would combine 
market and planning elements. It restricted the role o f the political and administrative 
centre to the long-term, macro-economic planning, while enterprises were expected to 
operate according to their own production plans (Bielasiak 1989). Furthermore, the 
compromise made an explicit reference to fiscal discipline, while profitability became the 
main goal o f enterprise activity. The new legislation on enterprise governance included an 
extensive participative element as enterprises were to be governed by the enterprise 
manager together with a self-constituted employee body, such as general worker assembly 
or employee council. These self-management bodies were to enjoy significant competences 
such as the right to undertake initiatives and evaluations in all enterprise affairs. The 
enterprise manager was to be selected by the workers’ council in an open competition in all 
but most strategic companies o f ‘national importance’ (Bielasiak 1989). However, while 
enterprise reforms o f increased self-financing and greater enterprise autonomy were 
implemented from January 1982, the reforms related to self-management were severely 
curtailed after the imposition o f martial law in December 1981. In the process o f 
‘normalisation’ , the state control over enterprises was re-established while participatory 
institutions and independent organisations were banned.
Formally, Polish government continued to show commitment to greater enterprise 
autonomy and decentralisation o f central planning but the introduction o f the law o f value 
has been limited:
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Autonomy for these firms meant only a parody o f the behaviour o f independent, 
profit-oriented, risk-taking enterprises. Unlike their counterparts in the market- 
dominated economy, they were operating within an environment in which the 
overwhelming majority o f rewards and dangers came from central administrators. 
Enterprise management might have the authority to make many decisions about 
output and prices, but it would not base these decisions on market signals, since in a 
seller’ s market the problem o f unsold goods almost did not exist. Self-financing 
meant that the old bargaining game that firms had previously played with central 
planners would now be played for credits, tax breaks, and subsidies with a 
multitude o f state agencies. [...] [Tjhese firms could not turn into efficiency- 
maximizing, market-responsive production units, since they faced neither tight 
budget constraints nor a competitive market. The preservation o f paternalistic links 
between state bureaucracies and enterprises ruled out any possibility o f a tight 
budget constraint since, in the end, no state agency could refuse the necessary tax 
break or subsidy to an enterprise in its care (Castle 1996: 216-217).
Some observers even believed that the command economy features were reinforced rather 
than weakened. Over 300 laws and 12 000 decrees were passed to regulate economic 
activity. Originally presented as temporary measures during the martial law, many o f these 
laws became permanent (Bielasiak 1989). Furthermore, operational practices o f the state 
bureaucracy in relation to production targets, the use o f resources and price setting 
effectively annulled the formal enterprise autonomy.
The Hungarian reformist project in the spheres o f economy and production was certainly 
the most far-reaching. Initiated under the Kadar leadership in 1968 it had three objectives: 
‘ (1) to decentralise [...] Hungary’s economy; (2) to harness private economic activities 
without their threatening the primacy o f the state; and (3) to depoliticize societal affairs’ 
(Volgyes 1989: 26). The reforms were characterised by an abolition o f the imperative 
planning in state-owned firms and by a greater reliance on the price mechanism in the 
allocation o f productive resources. This led to a ‘dual dependence’ o f companies: on the 
state bureaucracy, on the one hand, and suppliers and customers, on the other (Komai 
1986). In addition, firms were allowed to keep some o f their profits and firms’ discretion in 
terms o f investment decision-making increased. Also, while before the economic reform, 
company performance and the wage fund were defined by the central planner so that 
‘profits were not considered as income-regulating factors’ (Ferge 1979: 177), after the 
reform, profit orientation became one o f the major factors in the wage setting process.
Some argue that even before the reforms, the law o f value was highly predominant in the 
Hungarian enterprises as blue-collar work was dominated by a wage setting system based
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on piece-rate production. Individual wages could even be cut by decreasing the piece-rates 
or by decreasing wages per unit o f output (Hethy and Mako 1974). Yet, despite its apparent 
economic rationale, the cost-efficiency logic expressed through the piece-rate wage 
payment system was overridden by a number o f factors. First, each worker had a personal 
wage rate defined through his/her seniority and skill level (Hethy and Mako 1989). Second, 
there were political pressures to maintain wages close to the average wage in order to keep 
wage differentials low. Compared to the immediate post-war period, these pressures 
became weaker during the late state socialism, but they did not disappear completely 
(Ferge 1979).
Another important development in workplace management practices in Hungary was for- 
profit work sessions. In 1982, a new law introduced further elements o f market economy 
into the centrally planned production system by allowing the workers to work ‘ for profit’ 
during the overtime hours thus introducing the economic enterprise logic directly into the 
factory (Stark 1986). Yet these ‘enterprise business work partnerships’ remained limited to 
the overtime hours and weekends. They were also highly dependent on their enterprise as 
they often used the equipment o f the company and required managerial permission to 
establish the ‘ for-profit’ work sessions (Komai 1986). Thus, overall, despite introducing 
certain market-based logics such as the price signalling mechanism in wage setting and for- 
profit work practices, the dominance o f the bureaucratic control over production and work 
remained unquestioned also in Hungary.
Thus even the most advanced example o f economic and enterprise reforms that could be 
observed -  the Hungarian economic reforms o f the New Economic Mechanism known 
under the name o f ‘market socialism’(Komai 1990) -  did not get rid o f the main features o f 
the Soviet central planning. Although the law o f value became a more prominent 
organising logic, the non-economic organising logics did not disappear. Direct bureaucratic 
regulation and control over composition and quantity o f output, agreements with suppliers, 
technological choices, hiring and firing o f labour was replaced through indirect one (Komai 
1990), the tax system remained unpredictable and ad-hoc as, at times, firms could be forced 
to pay more taxes, i f  central authorities felt that a firm had ‘too much money’ ; on the other 
hand, firms experiencing financial difficulties were sometimes granted exemptions. 
Similarly, while investment decisions could partially be made at the company level, four- 
fifth  o f the overall investment decisions were still made by the central planner. And as far 
as firm  profitability measures were concerned, profitability became only to a certain extent
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a performance indicator as firms did not become genuine profit maximisers. The famous 
‘ soft-budget constraints’ continued to exist:
In principle, the firm  should cover expenditures from revenues made on the market. 
In practice, earnings from the market can be arbitrarily supplemented by external 
assistance. [...] The state bureaucracy exhibits a paternalist attitude toward state- 
owned firms (Kornai 1986: 1697-8).
Thus, the role o f the price mechanism became more prominent, but it was still not decisive 
in the resource allocation as the overwhelming amount o f production inputs and outputs 
continued to be determined centrally. The productionist attitude was preserved in the 
paternalist attitude towards state owned firms. Furthermore, industrial production remained 
skewed in favour o f large firms. Finally, the financing system o f banks continued to act as
credit-rationing administrative authority and not as a genuine bank following 
commercial principles [...]. It is strongly connected with the planners’ and the other 
authorities supervision o f the state-owned firms (Komai 1986: 1696).
Despite several waves o f liberalisation attempts Central European state-owned enterprises 
have preserved a number o f non-economic enterprise organising logics. In the field o f work 
governance and benefits, the role o f non-wage economic benefits such as vouchers for 
holidays, transport, sport facilities, child care facilities that were managed by trade unions 
remained a common phenomenon. Also, trade unions did not protect workers in cases o f 
conflict as they had all strata o f enterprise hierarchy from workers to high management in 
their ranks (Flethy and Mako 1989). Rather, trade unions saw their role in administering the 
welfare benefits and ‘managing labour on behalf o f the director’ (Pravda 1981: 57). A 
common phenomenon on work organisation was that despite trade unions having the 
‘production’ function rather than ‘worker protection’ function, the power between the 
management and the shop floor was relatively balanced due to the high autonomy o f work 
organisation (Hethy and Mako 1989). Due to this high autonomy and informal organisation 
even piece-rates were set ‘ in accordance with the bargaining process’ (Hethy and Mako 
1974: 154) between the workers and the management. The constant shortage o f skilled 
labour and high turnover rates increased the bargaining power o f workers.
While the state-owned sector remained under the more direct bureaucratic control and thus 
did not divert very far from the original Soviet model, an important difference between 
Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian models o f production, on the one hand, and the Soviet
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one, on the other, was in the non-state sector, in particular in the agricultural sector. In 
Poland, practically the whole agricultural sector remained privately owned, while in 
Hungary, cooperatives dominated the agricultural sector and certain market mechanisms 
were established early on. Thus, compulsory delivery quotas at low administratively set 
prices that covered the largest share o f agricultural production were abolished as early as in 
the mid-1950s. Other non-state trades were in the field o f small shops, restaurants, 
construction but with a maximum number o f employees in an enterprise being limited to 
seven, these sectors remained marginal. In 1984,165,000 people in Hungary worked in the 
formal private sector (Kornai 1986: 1705). Thus, overall, in all three countries considered, 
the share o f the private sector remained limited and mainly restricted to the agricultural 
sector.
To sum up, even i f  the semi-totalitarian spell weakened early in Soviet satellites in Central 
European allowing, as Hankiss describes it, ‘ the inescapable compulsion to think in 
alternatives’ (Hankiss 1990: 7), in none o f the three countries studied the deviation from the 
Soviet model o f production and work was as extensive and profound as it was in the 
Yugoslav case (Amason 1993: 148). Production to plan rather than to market with all its 
implications that were just elaborated represented the dominant non-economic enterprise 
organising logic.
II. The three non-economic organising logics of state socialist 
enterprise
The first non-economic enterprise institution that I discuss is that enterprise is perceived as 
an 'authoritarian paternalist' (Clarke 2004: 407). This concept can be broken down into two 
institutions: stakeholder organising logics related to social and work provisions, on the one 
hand, and organising logics related to the company governance, on the other. As far as the 
first dimension is concerned, by law, jobs were guaranteed and practically no 
unemployment existed. The pressures o f marketisation o f labour power were reduced due 
to fu ll employment and the state guarantee o f employment. Another important phenomenon 
o f the state socialist socio-economic regimes was the fact that enterprises were not only 
production sites but they also had important functions in the state's welfare policies. They 
provided social security, holiday homes, housing, child care facilities, social clubs, sports 
facilities etc. (Clark and Soulsby 1998). By adopting this form o f ‘enterprise paternalism’ 
(Ashwin 1998: 191), enterprises became mediators o f state protection and social benefits.
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The relation was paternalistic as workers materially depended on enterprises due to the 
overall difficulty o f access to certain facilities and services in a partially non-monetary 
economy.
The second dimension o f the ‘authoritarian paternalist’ firm is related to the issues o f 
enterprise governance. The idea o f pluralism at a work place was unknown and decisions 
were made by a company director and thus the Party elite. Although in some capitalist 
firms, too, the authority o f a CEO is hardly ever challenged, the extent o f his/her power is 
nevertheless limited by law. This is where the key difference from the state socialist firm 
emerges: in the state socialist system o f production, there was no dominance o f law and no 
consistency in labour law enforcement. Hendley (1996) finds that law failed to restrain 
management. On the one hand, this was a consequence o f the fact that ‘demand for rule o f 
law’ was low as workers were atomised and unions were not autonomous. When I say that 
workers were atomised, I refer to the fact that the system opposed self-organisation o f 
labour. Thus, official organisations o f workers -trade unions -  did not have to organise 
workers or promote their specific interests -  rather, they were the part o f the management 
structures. A famous metaphor that is often used is trade unions being the ‘ transmission 
belts’ between the Party and the workers. On the other hand, also the ‘supply o f rule o f law’ 
was insufficiently provided by the state. The courts had neither independence nor political 
neutrality as tenures and promotions o f judges depended on their relationship with the Party 
and the nomenklatura. Finally, the Party elite did not want to be constrained by law as since 
Lenin it perceived itself as the ‘vanguard party’ that stood above the uneducated masses 
that had a false consciousness. Thus, law never became autonomous in state socialist 
societies: ‘ law was viewed not as an interactive process that took account o f societal 
interests but as a one-way projection o f authority that reflected only the interests o f those in 
power’ (Hendley 1996: 18). Law thus was unable to restrain the power o f company 
managers. This is why I can refer to this system as an ‘authoritarian paternalist’ enterprise.
Furthermore, the authoritarian position o f the company director was also strengthened over 
the conflicts about resource allocation and benefit distribution that did exist in the state 
socialist firms even i f  they did not take place along the class lines that would be the case in 
a stylised capitalist firm. The foundation for the paternalist protector function o f 
management was ‘bureaucratic-paternalist system o f conflict resolution’ (Clarke 1993:27). 
Workers expected their shop chief and their line manager to act on their behalf when 
negotiating with a company administration. Thus, there was an implicit social contract
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between the workers and a foreman or a shop chief. On the one hand, ‘a good chief 
defended his or her shop, secured supplies, did not seek to drive the workers above the 
demands o f the plan in order to advance him or herself, and was fair in the distribution o f 
penalties and rewards’ (Clarke 1993: 19). On the other hand, workers abandoned all ideas 
o f self-organisation. State socialist unions strongly depended on the Communist Party. As 
already mentioned, the functions o f trade unions were different from those o f unions in a 
capitalist production system. Their functions were not in the field o f employee 
representation but in disciplining the workforce, raising productivity and managing o f 
enterprise welfare provisions (Lavigne 1995: 7). How closely the authoritative side o f 
enterprise directors was linked to employee welfare provisions is demonstrated by Soulsby 
and Clark:
[enterprise directors tended to manage their enterprises autocratically, and to do 
things which disrupted the precarious stability o f the enterprise as little as possible. 
However, many o f these same autocrats used strategies in non-production spheres 
to improve their own legitimacy, for example, by expanding social and welfare 
activities (Soulsby and Clark 1996: 232).
These welfare, housing, recreation and other non-work assets represented an important 
share o f state socialist company assets and this ‘ income-in-kind’ was an important amount 
in relation to workers’ monetary wages (Clark and Soulsby 1998).
Certain paternalist features o f state socialist enterprise and certain non-economic organising 
logics have practically disappeared with the regime change. Thus, welfare benefits 
provided through the company have largely disappeared. The material dependence was thus 
reduced: the functions o f providing child care, housing, leisure and health care facilities are 
no longer provided by enterprises. Yet certain ‘paternalistic’ protection organising logics 
such as provision o f credit and holiday vouchers are still in place and are valued by the 
labour force. In fact, the protective function o f the enterprise evolved with the socio­
economic situation. In the post-1989 period with its high level o f unemployment and social 
insecurity, having a job with a MNC in itself represents a certain guarantee o f job and 
income stability. While paternalism in benefit provisions has been considerably restricted, 
paternalism in work provisions has also been restricted but managed to evolve taking new 
forms.
In addition, authoritarian paternalism in company governance has largely been preserved. 
Management and labour are considered to have an overlapping understanding o f what a
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company is and what its development path should be. Thus, institutions o f managerial 
authority are not really contested -  overall rather cooperative and harmonious employment 
relations are the norm. What has changed is the ‘ institutional furniture’ : during state 
socialism, the common norm was political regulation o f the modernisation process that 
manifested itself in managerial prerogative only challenged by the Communist Party 
(Ashwin 2003). Now, the institutional framework is very different, it is characterised by 
market regulation. Rather than a pluralistic understanding o f modernisation process in 
which organised interests play a pivotal role, it is a common understanding between capital 
and labour representatives about enterprise being an ‘authoritarian paternalist’ that 
survived.
The second non-economic enterprise organising logic was the valuation o f enterprise as a 
social organism and as a source o f competitive industrial capabilities rather than a profit 
maximiser. As elaborated below, the enterprise organising logic o f competitive industrial 
capabilities also refers, beyond valuation o f industrialisation and production process, to the 
labour force and its collective identity as well as to the valuation o f industrial production in 
the context o f local community development.
The concept o f industrial capabilities refers to industrial strength o f an economy: as 
mentioned in the Introductory Chapter, state socialist regimes had a strong belief in 
industrialization; industrial strength was considered to be an asset and was highly valued. 
Economic growth especially in industry was a central pillar o f the communist political 
regime by which its success was officially supposed to be judged. Industrial capabilities 
were a crucial dimension o f economic development: they were key to regional and local 
development. Several features are associated with enterprise being an industrial organism, a 
source o f industrial capabilities. First, large production sites with high headcount were 
common in industry. Industrial sector was organised in large state-owned enterprises while 
small and medium-size firms were rare. Thus, in Hungarian industry in 1975, the three 
largest producers supplied two thirds o f products in 508 out o f 637 product aggregates 
(Komai 1986: 1698). Second, as we already know, managers in state socialist firms faced 
an incentive system that was oriented not to increasing efficiency and profits but to plan 
fulfillment and political loyalty. In Czechoslovakia, ‘ the emphasis on production activities 
associated with ‘meeting the plan’ moved management focus away from issues o f cost and 
quality management’ (Soulsby and Clark 1996: 233). Even for Hungary that, as we saw, 
had a somewhat more reformed production system, it was noted in relation to firm
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performance: ‘ financial discipline is lax, and there is no strong market coercion to enforce 
the search for profits’ (Kornai 1986: 1698). As already mentioned, this phenomenon was 
described by Kornai as a ‘soft budget constraint’ : loss-making firms were given subsidies 
and their managers were not replaced. The non-economic rationale o f the state socialist 
incentive system meant that the company was often maximising its production costs. This 
was due to the fact that it was not interested in maximising the produced surplus but rather 
in hiding its potential and minimising the surplus:
since neither the worker, not the enterprise, not the association, nor even the 
ministry, had any rights to the surplus produced they could only reliably expand the 
resources at their disposal by inflating their production costs [...] (Clarke 1993:26).
Productivity potential thus was not taken seriously as the planning took the form o f 
‘planning from the achieved level’ (Clarke 1993: 27). This means that all future production 
targets were raised on the basis o f past achievements. While efficiency and productivity 
were not central to managerial thinking, managerial incentives were set to promote growth 
and size o f a company. As, the bigger was a company, the bigger was the social benefit 
package attributed to the enterprise and the bigger was its standing. Thus, company 
standing expressed in its size was a key preoccupation o f state-socialist managers.
Apart from the preoccupation with size and headcount, the production process itself was 
one o f the most time consuming prerogatives o f the state socialist managers. The informal 
hierarchy o f departments o f a state socialist enterprise helps to understand the internal 
‘productionisf priorities. The personnel department that controlled the ideological and 
moral aptitudes o f workers is often considered as the most powerful department (Mezei 
Interview September 2008). Yet after that, the department o f production was the most 
important one, imposing its logic on finance, personnel and supply services. These other 
departments, on the other hand, had little authority. This implicit hierarchy was expressed 
by the fact that their employees were predominantly female (Clarke 1996: 17).
A  further feature o f enterprise as a source o f industrial capabilities was the managerial 
priority o f preservation and development o f long-term industrial and technological 
capabilities. Yet the focus o f industrial development was different. Despite the 
‘ fetishisation o f technology’ (Kabalina and Clarke 2001: 1) - progress was measured by the 
number o f inventions and innovations - innovation in the command economy took only 
limited, very specific form. Industrial organisation, especially during the early stages o f
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state socialism, was based on accumulation o f inputs rather than on technological and 
organisational innovation - this extensive growth strategy o f very fast industrialisation fared 
rather well until 1960s. However, when the technology gap became apparent hereafter, in 
order to catch up with the West the central planners chose the option o f creating few high- 
technology sectors (Campos and Coricelli 2002). Consumer goods sectors remained 
underdeveloped and product innovation was low. In addition, industrial base was 
overdeveloped in relation to the service sector. A t the beginning o f transition in 1989, the 
industrial sector made up around 47% and 42% o f the GDP in the CEECs and CIS, 
respectively (Campos and Coricelli 2002: 811).
Thus ‘productionst approach’ refers to the high valuation attributed to the industrial 
capabilities and to the production process itself, in contrast to financial outcomes related to 
profit maximisation. However, the state socialist enterprise organising logic was that o f 
competitive industrial capabilities as even without the law o f value competitive pressures 
existed. The economic organising logic o f the law o f value was largely absent as producers 
did not have to compete for consumers. However it would be wrong to assume that no 
competition pressures existed in state socialist system. While the competition for 
consumers was low, competition for production resources and production-related benefits 
was high. The level o f competition for resources among companies as well as within 
companies was strong and pervasive at every level o f the production process:
Individual workers and brigades competed for resources within the shop, while
uniting behind the shop chief in the competition for resources within the enterprise.
Enterprises competed for resources from the ministry, while uniting in the
competition for resources within other ministries (Clarke 1993: 27).
As it was the function o f the state bureaucracy to generate contracts and to enforce them, 
bureaucratic pressures were in a certain way a replacement for competition pressures. This 
allows us to the state socialist non-economic enterprise organising logic o f competitive 
industrial capabilities.
The enterprise organising logic o f competitive industrial capabilities presupposes not just a 
high valuation o f industrialization and production but also refers to the common identity o f 
the labour force that contributes to the production process. During state socialism, close to 
the idea o f enterprise being a source o f industrial capabilities was a strong perception o f 
enterprise being a social organism. It was associated with the term ‘ labour collective’ that
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represented the attitudes o f collective belonging among the labour force. It has been argued 
that the valuation o f a labour collective did not emerge naturally but was used to 
manipulate labour into obedience and hard work by invoking collective values. According 
to some authors, the concept o f ‘ labour collective’ can be considered as a tool o f 
dominance for the ruling strata o f Party administration. Clarke argues that the manipulation 
o f the concept ‘ labour collective’ contributed to the alienation o f workers from the labour 
process. He insists that:
the fetishised form in which the social character o f human labour confronted every 
individual worker in the form o f the labour collective, as an alien object to which 
his or her own labour activity is subordinated, was in a sense the state socialist 
equivalent o f the capitalist alienation o f labour in the fetishised form o f the 
commodity (Clarke 1993: 26).
In other words, as commodification o f labour alienates the workers in the capitalist 
societies, the pseudo-socialisation o f labour through the idea o f ‘ labour collective’ had a 
similar alienation effect on workers in state socialist societies. Although recognising the 
ambiguous nature o f this concept, Clarke still acknowledges its deep entrenchment into the 
collective psyche o f state socialist stakeholders:
[t]he idea o f the enterprise as a labour collective is an ideological fiction which 
masks the fact that the one thing that the enterprise cannot tolerate is the collective 
organization o f its workers. Nevertheless it is a powerful fiction: it is in the name of 
the labour collective that the administration rules the enterprise, and presses its 
interests against higher authorities, and it is in the name o f the labour collective that 
individual workers are subjected to managerial authority (Clarke 1993: 26).
Yet regardless o f the degree o f instrumentalisation o f the concept one cannot deny its 
mobilising power. The concept o f ‘ labour collective’ was deeply embedded into the sense- 
making o f workers and managers o f state socialist enterprises.
Some authors wonder i f  the phenomenon o f ‘ labour collective’ had had its roots in the 
cultural specificity o f the Central and Eastern Europe or in the specificity o f the state 
socialist production system. There is extensive evidence o f the existence o f ‘ labour 
collectives’ in Russian enterprises (Ashwin 1998; Vlachoutsicos 2001; Ashwin and Clarke 
2003); in some cases it is interpreted as a specifically Russian cultural legacy. Thus, 
Vlachoutsicos (2001) sees in collectivist value system at work as a continuation o f decision 
making process common in medieval Russian villages. This study, on the other hand, 
interprets ‘ labour collective’ as a legacy o f the state socialist production regimes. Countries
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o f Central and Eastern Europe have been historically and culturally different from Russia 
but they experienced the state socialist system o f production and thus also developed a 
valuation o f industrial capabilities and o f the labour force contributing to the production 
process. Clark and Sousby discuss a similar phenomenon to that o f a ‘ labour collective’ by 
describing a close relationship between enterprise and community life in former 
Czechoslovakia as ‘organisation-community embeddedness’ . This close ‘relationship’ is 
exemplified by names o f enterprises carrying the local town or village names as well as 
retired enterprise employees continuing to live in the flats provided and owned by the 
enterprise (Clark and Soulsby 1998). Thus, beyond valuation o f industrialisation and 
production process, the enterprise organising logic o f competitive industrial capabilities 
refers to the labour force and its collective identity as well as to the valuation o f industrial 
production as a key for local community development.
The collective enterprise identity was not the only key concept in state socialist companies. 
Socialist institutions promoted individualist as well as collective identity. This is why 
Ashwin described the ‘ labour collective’ as symbolic collectivism. Collectivism was 
partially symbolic as it was evoked when needed to unite the workers but, when necessary, 
social organisation o f production was dominated by more individualistic perceptions and 
actions. Segmentation o f the labour force within the enterprise is a crucial example o f such 
symbolic collectivism. Labour segmentation has been a widespread phenomenon within 
state socialist labour collectives. The differentiation between core and peripheral workers 
o f an enterprise was common. The internal hierarchy was sustained not through wage 
differentials that were limited but through discretionary allocation o f work and enterprise 
welfare benefits as well through assignment o f professional and skill categories. Further 
privileges that were enjoyed by the core workers were related to the allocation o f privileged 
jobs, promotion to political posts, work-related awards, and Party membership. The core 
labour force was characterised by longer tenure, evidence o f voluntary social activity on 
behalf o f the labour collective and a greater degree o f commitment to meet production 
targets (Schwartz 2004). The issue o f commitment was crucial as the production system 
was characterised by production breakdowns and supply shortages so that fu lfilling o f 
quantitatively defined plan targets at the end o f the month was associated with additional 
shifts and overtime known as ‘ storming’ . Peripheral workers also participated in ‘storming’ 
but as a reserve labour force they were mainly involved in auxiliary jobs in and around an 
enterprise. Finally, it has been argued that labour segmentation was also a disciplining
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mechanism: the presence o f peripheral workers ‘was consciously used by the enterprise 
management as a means o f social control over the other workers’ (Schwartz 2004: 277).
Yet labour force segmentation was not the only feature that challenged the collectivist 
enterprise identity o f ‘ labour collective’ . Thus, Kharkhordin (1999) finds a high degree o f 
individualism in Russian society. Individualism in the enterprise context meant that despite 
certain limitations, individual selection and pursuit o f desired professional career was 
possible and labour collectives were not for eternity defined entities. Similarly, (Schwartz 
2004: 274) reports: ‘while wage systems and structure, pay scales, skill differentials and 
premiums were stipulated in the all-Soviet wage and occupations handbooks drafted by the 
planning organs and ministries in Moscow, and were substantially uniform across 
industries, the external labour market had the features o f a relatively competitive market, as 
workers were basically free to train for a profession o f their choice and choose their 
employers’ . Furthermore, despite the egalitarian provisions for most plan production 
activities, firm recruitment strategies were at least partially competitive. Although internal 
company hierarchies were the key principle o f the social organisation o f production, a 
competition dimension among employees was not completely absent. The examples o f 
poaching o f best workers are cited in the literature, even i f  poaching incentives were not 
based on wage differentials but on social benefits. Yet despite all the enumerated caveats 
‘ labour collective’ was an established non-economic enterprise organising logic during the 
state socialism.
To sum up, state socialist enterprise was valued as a source o f competitive industrial 
capabilities. This meant a certain collective identity o f the enterprise labour force based on 
production capabilities as well as a valuation o f enterprise industrial capabilities beyond 
company limits: as a motor o f regional and local development.
The third non-economic enterprise organising logic that existed during state socialism was 
enterprise functioning as a discretionary bureaucracy. A  bureaucracy is an organisational 
structure that contains a hierarchy o f authority, is dominated by explicit rules and 
regulations and is characterised by rationalisation and specialisation (Weber 2001). As the 
two other state socialist enterprise organising logics, this enterprise logic was by definition 
non-economic as it had an organising logic different from the law o f value and price 
mechanism regulating supply and demand. The functioning o f the state socialist enterprise 
was not based on the market logic or price mechanism but on the guidance o f the Party-
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state and nomenklatura. Thus, the state socialist production system was a large bureaucracy 
dominated by the Party state.
To a certain extent, this organising logic was similar to what has been described for firms in 
market economies. The theory o f the firm in institutional economics (Williamson 1975) 
pointed out that non-market procedures and rules - and hierarchy o f managerial authority - 
regulate the social exchange within the company. Similarly Chandler, describing the rise o f 
modem professional bureaucracy in American economy, argued:
In many sectors o f the economy the visible hand o f management replaced what 
Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand o f market forces. The market 
remained the generator o f demand for goods and services, but modern business 
enterprise took over the functions o f coordinating flows o f goods through existing 
processes o f production and distribution, and o f allocating funds and personnel for 
future production and distribution (Chandler 1977: 1).
As elaborated in Chapter II, this theory has been developed further and replaced by more 
complex understandings o f the firm that include a societal (Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986) and 
a power dimensions and see the firm as a site o f contestation (Amoore 2000) rather than 
pure coordination o f resources. However, while these more complex views o f the nature of 
the firm  reject the simplistic distinction between markets and hierarchies, even these 
theories do not question the hierarchy o f authority as one o f the main organising principles 
o f the firm  (Hamilton and Feenstra 1995). Thus, Chandler’s proposition that ‘the existence 
o f a managerial hierarchy is a defining characteristic o f the modem business enterprise’ 
(Chandler 1977: 7) has never been completely challenged. Marsden argues that:
limits must be set on management authority i f  employment relationship is to have 
any appeal to workers: no one would sign up to unlimited obligations (Marsden 
1999: 31).
However, he shows that the extent o f managerial authority to control the work process can 
differ. On the continuum between a strong managerial authority, on the one hand, and a full 
worker autonomy, on the other, work organisation ‘ seeks to group tasks by 
complementarities in workers skills’ (Marsden 1999: 33) and in this way sets the limits to 
managerial authority. The type o f work organisation and transaction rules that are often 
found in Germany are described as those that lim it managerial authority the most. In state 
socialist production system the whole production system represented one big bureaucratic 
structure in which official authority lay with the Communist Party. The state socialist
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enterprise bureaucracy was closely linked to the political imperatives defined by the Party 
nomenklatura. Weber predicted that a socialist system o f production would be a highly 
developed bureaucracy as state control was expected to make the ‘political’ disappear 
through its merger with ‘economic’ (Giddens 1972). Weber’s expectation that such 
organising logic would lead to an expansion o f bureaucratisation came true.
However, the logic o f managerial authority in state socialist production system somewhat 
contrasted with the above presented views on the enterprise bureaucracy. A major 
difference o f state socialist production bureaucracy from a firm  in a market economy was 
the fact that the hierarchy o f authority was less pronounced due to the constant need to 
‘muddle through’ and to improvise. Not all decisions and activities were carried out exactly 
according to prescribed rules and regulations and not all work activities were regulated by 
hierarchical authority and were specialised. A  high level o f discretion based on individual 
autonomy was present. Thus state socialist organisation o f production had a high share o f 
discretion as it was characterised by a neglect o f formal rules and regulations and by a high 
informality o f the production process and arbitrariness o f the central planner commands. In 
other words, using Mintzberg’s (1979) typology o f four organisational types that 
distinguishes between cases according to the type o f adjustment (standardisation and 
mutual adjustment), on the one hand, and the units controlled (inputs vs. outputs), on the 
other, state socialist system o f production can be approximated to an operating adhocracy. 
Rather than being a machine bureaucracy or a professional bureaucracy where 
standardisation o f either work roles or skills is advanced and is under a strict hierarchical 
managerial control, state socialist firm tried to control the final outcomes rather than work 
roles -  the quantity o f output, but in a rather ad-hoc fashion. In a similar vein, state socialist 
enterprise was described as a ‘ fake bureaucracy’ (Sztompka 1993a) as formal rules and 
regulations were regularly ignored and the whole net o f informal rules and conventions 
existed.
Formally, an enterprise director had absolute authority. However, although formal 
hierarchical organisational structures existed, the main managerial decisions were still 
made informally. The whole production process was based on negotiation between 
companies’ directors and plan administration. Chronic shortages and disruption o f supply 
also made company management open for informal solutions and deals. Given that the 
irregularity o f supply was the main factor undermining the plan achievement it is not 
surprising to find that rather than managing work organization, the main preoccupation o f
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enterprise management had been assuring the supply or negotiating new production goal 
with the state administration (Clarke 1993). In this domain, it was difficu lt to have strict 
rules and thus informality was a natural outcome o f this ‘muddling through’ process.
The arbitrariness and unpredictability o f the central planner was high in fields o f 
intervention: taxation, investment decisions, price setting etc. This led to a managerial 
insecurity around the decision-making process: ‘Because o f the ceaseless and unpredictable 
changes o f the financial rules, taxes, and subsidies, firms feel insecure and exposed to the 
arbitrary improvisations o f the bureaucracy’ (Kornai 1986: 1698). This arbitrariness and 
unpredictability also took a part o f responsibility for a company away from its managers: 
because o f a large number o f interventions by the central planner, managers could argue 
with good reason that the decisions were made in consultation with the bureaucracy and i f  
there were problems, the causes lay outside his or her responsibility.
The informality and arbitrariness o f centrally planned production system had a direct 
consequence for the work organisation. The achievement o f production quotas was mostly 
delegated to the shop floor that thus enjoyed a high degree o f autonomy. Ordinary workers 
had a high degree o f control over the work process (Clarke 2004: 407). In production, due 
to permanent shortages and bad links to other enterprises, a 'do-it-yourself approach was 
often preferred (Van Zon 1996). In other words, the concepts o f management or managing 
the production have been practically unfamiliar. Some observers perceive the high level o f 
individual control over the production process and individual work tasks as a contradiction 
as, at the same time, workers were atomised and for the most part unable to organise 
themselves collectively. So, how could they acquire this power and work control? Clark 
explains that ‘workers have a high level o f control over production not because they have 
won a battle to seize control from the management, but because they have been given a 
high degree o f responsibility for ensuring that they achieve the tasks assigned to them’ 
(Clarke 1993: 18). Thus, high autonomy was associated with high level o f discretion. The 
high degree o f self-determination and control were there but in an informal, not self- 
reflective way.
Another example o f circumventing the formal regulations was the reward system. The 
piece-rate system that had been the predominant reward and incentive scheme up to the late 
1970s was based on a contradiction as it measured individual effort and was thus unable to 
take the breakdowns and irregularities o f supply into account. This inherent contradiction
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that was at the core o f the piece-rate system and the formal adherence o f enterprise 
administration to it must have made it ridiculous in the eyes o f workers. The rule o f piece- 
rate was circumvented in two ways. First, piece-rate was practically ignored: the shop floor 
leader ensured that workers ended up with a regular wage more or less regardless o f 
performance. So, there was practically no connection between work effort and reward for 
it. Second, at the same time, when the piece-rate payment mechanism was used, it was a 
highly discretionary system through which individual workers could be penalized (Clarke 
1993: 20).
Apart from the salaries, non-monetary benefits and rewards were also distributed in a 
highly discretionary manner. This was enabled by a complex informal stratification o f the 
state socialist enterprise. The implicit divide discussed earlier in this Chapter went between 
the core and auxiliary workers. The selection for core workers was based not only on their 
technical and professional knowledge and skills but also on their moral and behavioral 
attitudes. These core workers had to carry more responsibility in the production process: 
they were the ones to work overtime during the ‘storming’ sessions at the end o f the month 
(Clarke 1993: 22). Thus, informally, labour collective did not represent a unified, equally 
treated group o f people. Among employees there was an acceptance o f a high informal 
segmentation o f the enterprise labour force. In this context, the distribution o f social 
benefits, although formally rule-bound, was a highly discretionary process.
Control over these benefits was the most powerful tool at management’ s disposal, 
and the management used it to a full effect. The granting o f withholding o f benefits 
could be used to lure, reward, or retain key categories o f skilled workers, as well as 
to punish the shiftless (Ashwin 2003: 100).
Discretion was often related to personalised relations: people in control o f resources would 
use their position to fu lfill obligations towards family members or to ensure favours for the 
future. The system o f personalised favours was characteristic for the state socialist 
production system, even i f  this phenomenon known as ‘blat’ was most predominant in the 
sphere o f consumer goods and in supplier relations (Ledeneva 1998). The discretionary side 
o f administration was also visible due to the high level o f competition for resources at 
every level o f the production process.
The high level o f informality was not the consequence o f a lack o f formal rules; on the 
contrary, it was the consequence o f a large amount o f formal regulation. In the social
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organization o f production, the sphere o f law was neither neutral nor autonomous but 
instrumental to the purposes o f the Communist Party. The consequence o f Party dominance 
for the field o f employment relations was that no voluntary agreements and regulations 
were possible and the state dominated the field. The consequence o f that, in turn, was an 
over-prescriptive legal framework. Formal regulation being over-prescriptive was another 
reason for informality o f employment relation. Such things as pay norms, ta riff scales, 
length o f the working day and week, meal breaks, days o ff etc were stipulated in the 
respective national Labour Codes. The consequence o f that was that ‘ the gu lf between the 
regime’s prescriptions and everyday reality was filled by informal practices which became 
the dominant means o f regulation the employment relationship’ (Ashwin 2003: 99).
This is why the socialist work organisation with its high level o f informality and low level 
o f rule-bound activity is described by the concept o f ‘ fake modernity’ (Sztompka 1993a). 
Grancelli understands the concept as a combination o f three components: ‘ imposed 
modernity in some domains o f social life ’ , ‘vestiges o f traditional, pre-modem societies in 
many others, and ‘symbolic ornamentations pretending to imitate Western modernity’ 
(Grancelli 1995a: 2). An example that he cites to illustrate the concept o f fake modernity is 
that o f underground economy:
the underground development o f a market economy was not due only to the 
rigidities o f the command economy: it was the result o f changes in the behaviour o f 
bureaucratic cadres within an institutional context characterised by overlapping [...] 
traditional and modem traits (Grancelli 1995a: 7).
While the concept o f ‘ fake modernisation’ may be somewhat overstating the point, it brings 
to the fore the discretionary, not rule-bound nature o f regulation o f state socialist firm based 
on personified and clientilistic relations and certain circumventing o f the formal hierarchy 
o f authority. This is why one can describe such type o f firm  bureaucracy as a discretionary 
bureaucracy. As rules to guide the decisions were circumvented, organisational decision 
making process had a high degree o f flexib ility as it needed to adjust to circumstances. As 
objectivised and rule-bound decision making was rare, what prevailed was a high level o f 
uncertainty related to the production process. Such a system could only survive due to 
certain sets o f skills. The distribution o f productive resources depended on the negotiating 
skills and personal contacts o f shop chiefs, line managers and higher managers but also on 
coordination and strong technical skills o f ordinary workers.
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In the context o f the Japanese factory Toyota, Koike describes certain types o f skills as 
‘ intellectual skills’ that are necessary to deal with uncertainty on the shop floor. ‘Workers’ 
intellectual skills comprise the know-how for dealing with uncertainty on the shop-floor. 
Uncertainty on the shop floor consists o f problems and changes in operations’ (Koike 2002: 
392). Yet while for Koike intellectual skills refer first and foremost to resolving problems 
related to defects in product quality, product quality was not a priority during state 
socialism. For Koike, intellectual skills also refer to dealing with ‘quantitative change in 
output, a change in production methods, a change in products and a change in labour m ix’ 
(Koike 2002: 395). In this description, several features o f a Toyotist ‘ intellectual sk ill’ 
structure can be applied to the skills in the state socialist production system where 
production output and labour mix were highly unstable and high level o f uncertainty 
regarding these factors existed. Intellectual skills were relevant for managerial staff and 
workers, especially core blue-collar workers. For blue-collar workers, in addition to 
intellectual skills, the level o f technical expertise was also quite high. In Hungary, before 
the regime change, 60% o f blue-collar workers were skilled with a technical certificate 
from a vocational school and 20% were semi-skilled i.e. had uncertified skills but were 
trained for a given stage o f production. Thus, only 20% o f the blue-collar workforce was 
unskilled (Czandor Interview December 2008). It is this combination o f intellectual, 
negotiation and social skills o f managers and intellectual and technical skills o f blue-collar 
workers that state socialist production system could function despite its high level o f 
uncertainly and discretion.
To sum up, discretionary bureaucracy was yet another non-economic enterprise organising 
logic o f state socialist firms. It was based on a high level o f autonomy and discretion was 
linked to intellectual, negotiating and social skills o f managerial staff and intellectual and 
technical skills o f the shop floor staff.
Conclusion
The aim o f the Chapter was to embed the study o f post-communist enterprise organising 
logics in a specific historical socio-economic context o f state socialism. The Chapter 
introduced three state socialist non-economic enterprise organising logics. They describe 
state socialist enterprise as authoritarian paternalists, as sources o f industrial capabilities 
and as discretionary bureaucracies. Table 2 summarises the non-economic enterprise logics 
o f the state socialist era.
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Table 2: Non-economic enterprise organising logics during state socialism





Firm  governance and 
welfare provisions
Authoritarian paternalist
Strong managerial authority with strong 
paternalist welfare provisions)
Firm  perform ance
Source of competitive 
industrial capabilities, 
productionist approach
Valuation o f industrial capabilities and 
industrial strength as a source of extensive 
growth, preoccupation with size and 
headcount, competitive pressures despite 
the absence o f the law of value. Perception 
of the enterprise as a social organism.
W ork organisation 
and skills Discretionary bureaucracy
Formally, the organising logic of large 
bureaucracy led by the Party state 
dominated, but in reality the hierarchy of 
authority was low due to high level o f 
discretion and informal decision making.
The Chapter discussed the three non-economic enterprise organising logics as a historical 
phenomenon embedded into the state socialist production system. A ll three enterprise 
organising logics were clearly non-economic as they constrained the power o f the price 
mechanism and the law o f value by emphasising other, alternative organising logics. The 
organising logic o f an authoritarian paternalist combined a strong director’s authority with 
managerial responsibility to protect workers’ welfare. The enterprise organising logic o f 
competitive industrial capabilities combined the valuation o f industrial capabilities and 
collective identity o f the labour force beyond company limits with competitive pressures 
for resource allocation. Finally, the Chapter discussed the enterprise organising logic o f a 
discretionary bureaucracy according to which there were some formal rules o f the 
production process related to the Party authority but they were counterbalanced by a high 
level o f discretion and informal decision making. Thus, each o f the three studied enterprise 
organising logics were different from the economic organising logic o f the law o f value and 
cost-efficiency.
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Conclusion for Part 1
The aim o f Part 1 was to introduce the main conceptual frameworks that underpin this 
study as well as to embed the study in the historical context o f post-communist Central 
Europe. Chapter I elaborated on a number o f concepts and theories derived from the 
experiences o f post-war West European political economies. The role o f organised interests 
o f capital and labour has been identified as crucial for dealing with class divide. Yet when 
contrasting these concepts with studies o f post-communist transformation I had to conclude 
that neither macro-level, nor micro-level evidence allowed me to identify organised 
interests o f capital and labour as forces o f societal re-embedding o f economic liberalism. 
Thus, using West European ‘ institutional template’ did not prove to be useful for 
understanding the dynamics o f political economy o f industrial modernisation in Central 
Europe. Institutional theories o f the firm and especially their constructivist strand presented 
in Chapter II offered more useful approaches for understanding the post-communist 
political economy as they conceptualised the firm as a site o f contestation and conflict. 
However, most decisively, introducing the writings o f moral philosophy that distinguished 
between utilitarian and deontological ethical motives and translating this debate into 
Weber’s concepts o f value and instrumental rationality allowed me to identify this 
alternative way in which the Polanyian societal re-embedding can be conceptualised. I 
theorised that societal embedding in post-communism has taken place when the idealised 
and ideal-typical picture o f economic liberalism held by post-communist stakeholders is 
being limited, constrained and moderated. This adjustment has taken place under the 
pressure o f non-economic organising logics based on deontological values o f local 
stakeholders. Chapter III discussed the three non-economic enterprise organising logics as a 
historical phenomenon embedded into the state socialist production system.
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Part 2: Enterprise organising logics in post­
communism
During the systemic change o f post-communist transition, Central European social 
organisation o f production has witnessed a radical break from the previous system 
dominated by non-economic organising logics. Despite this radical and profound 
institutional change, Central European production systems were able to rapidly rebound 
and modernise themselves during a short period o f 20 years. This unprecedented industrial 
modernisation has been a puzzle not only due to its speed and scope but also due to the fact 
that supporting institutional foundations such as ‘true’ collective actors, as identified by the 
comparative capitalism literature in Chapter II, have been largely missing. In post­
communist production systems, one does not find the institutional ‘classical suspects’ , the 
forces o f societal re-embedding that drove Western European post-war modernisation: state 
and unions have been weak, local capital divided. The type o f modernization that emerged 
has been described as foreign-led modernisation (Drahokoupil 2008). MNCs have been 
identified as potential key drivers o f this type o f industrial modernisation. Yet important 
inflows o f foreign direct investment do not necessarily always lead to regional industrial 
modernisation and upgrading, as examples o f countries such as Mexico and Brazil 
demonstrate. In these countries, foreign direct investment (FDI) remains an enclave 
phenomenon.
To recapitulate, Chapter II linked the political economy literature to the institutional and 
normative frameworks. As discussed in Chapter II, enterprise organising logics are defined 
as different types o f rationality (value or instrumental), principles o f valuation, logics (of 
appropriateness or o f consequence) and different orders o f worth that structure social 
reality (Albert 1993; March and Olsen 2004; Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). Chapter III 
described a number o f non-economic enterprise organising logics that existed during late 
state socialism. It described three non-economic enterprise organising logics that dominated 
state socialist system o f production and work in which enterprises functioned as 
authoritarian paternalists, sources o f competitive industrial capabilities and as discretionary 
bureaucracies.
The main goal o f Part 2 is to empirically follow up the dynamics o f expanding economic 
liberalism, on the one hand, and to trace the re-emergence o f non-economic organising 
logics, on the other. For the company level analysis o f post-communist production regimes,
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the role o f local actors and theirs value rationalities need to be carefully studied. Polanyi’ s 
societal embeddedness can be linked to the normative dimension, namely by distinguishing 
between different types o f ethical motives in stakeholder behaviour or, to use Weber's 
terminology, different rationalities. Normative frameworks are crucial for the period o f 
post-communist transformation because o f a fast institutional change in production systems 
and labour markets. During periods characterised by dramatic institutional change, actors 
adopt several roles: they are rule-takers but they are also rule-makers. Normative 
continuities represent the necessary stability in such circumstances. This is why 
understanding the embedded value rationality during such periods is critical.
Chart 1: The evolution of enterprise organising logics in post-communism















logics of economic 
liberalism and the 
law of value
This study argues that although after 1989 the institutions o f labour unions, o f managerial 
authority as well as o f work organisation in Central Europe have been ‘under construction’ , 
certain continuity from the state socialist period to the post-communist era has been 
preserved. The role o f Part 2 is to show that even after the emergence o f economic 
liberalism and thus o f the law o f value associated with it, non-economic enterprise 
organising logics have re-emerged to become a constitutive part o f collective identity o f 
Central European workers and managers. In other words, the main empirical argument 
developed in Part 2 is that while some non-economic enterprise organising logics have 
disappeared, others have survived. Thus, in the post-communist industrial system, the 
economic and non-economic organising logics co-exist (see Chart 1).
Informed by the writings o f moral philosophy and Weber's rationality concepts, as well as 
by the writings o f March and Olson as well as Boltanski and Thevenot, the normative
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dimension o f enterprise organising logics discussed in this study implies that, rather than 
being exclusively founded on the law o f value and instrumental or utilitarian rationality 
related to cost-efficiency, the defining logic o f resource allocation within the production 
system is also founded on principles o f social regulation and moral commitment, such as 
paternalism, authority, collectivism, and individual autonomy. The normative dimension 
inherent in the non-economic enterprise logics restrains the organising logic o f scarcity, 
efficiency and price mechanism in the regulation o f production and work.
This finding is surprising as institutionally there has been a radical break with the previous 
system. At least in three fields o f enterprise activity the new economic organising logics 
emerged: in firm governance and welfare provisions, in firm  performance and in work and 
skill organisation. First, as managers were considered to be the agents o f short-term cost- 
efficiency and o f the law o f value, the expansion o f managerial authority represented the 
economic logic in the field o f firm governance. Second, in the evaluation o f firm 
performance, the role o f financial results increased in comparison to the state socialist 
production model in which the law o f value was subordinated to political orders o f the 
Communist Party. Finally, more de-contextualised managerial and standardised work 
organisation practices were used as tools to increase cost-efficiency and financial results.
Despite the dramatic institutional shift and the expansion o f the law o f value, I observe a re­
configuration and re-emergence o f certain non-economic organising logics. With the 
regime change, the dominance o f the Communist Party over the definition o f enterprise 
organising logics disappeared. Yet certain non-economic organising logics have been 
preserved, although in a new institutional form, and continue to regulate production, 
employment and work. They take the form o f (i) paternalism and welfare protection, (ii) a 
‘productionist approach’ in evaluating firm  performance that considers the firm as a source 
o f industrial capabilities, and (iii) a valuation o f skill autonomy and discretion in work 
organisation and managerial practices. The coming together o f a more pronounced 
economic logic o f the law o f value, on the one hand, and o f the three non-economic 
organising logics, on the other, has created new enterprise logics that combine the 
economic and the non-economic rationales. The enterprises in my case study function as 
authoritarian paternalists, as sources o f competitive industrial capabilities and as 
discretionary bureaucracies. The first organising logic views the enterprise as a source o f 
director’s authority but also acknowledges management responsibility for the employee’s 
welfare protection. The second is based on the perception o f the enterprise being a social
99
organism and as a source o f valuable industrial capabilities, despite the increased 
financialisation o f firm performance. Finally, the third relates to the enterprise being a 
discretionary bureaucracy in which rules and regulations dominate production and work but 
are counter-balanced by individual discretion and autonomy based on local knowledge and 
technical skills.
Part 2 thus argues that despite a profound institutional change, certain continuities from the 
state socialism production regime have survived. Rather than by principles o f scarcity, 
price competition and the law o f value, the state socialist production was characterised by 
non-economic rationales. During the systemic change, although institutions o f labour 
unions, o f managerial authority and company ownership, but also o f work organisation, 
experienced a profound change, certain non-economic enterprise organising logics have 
been preserved, although in a re-configured form. In other words, while the institutions o f 
production, work organisations and employment relations have known a dramatic change 
over the last 20 years, certain value rationalities and non-economic enterprise organising 
logics have survived the transition process. The link between the non-economic enterprise 
organising logics o f the state socialist era and non-economic enterprise logics o f the post­
communist period is not necessarily linear. Continuity in value rationality does not 
presuppose a causal link from the former to the latter but it defines the options in the 
normative repertoire o f stakeholders and makes certain choices more probable than others. 
The pre-dominant role o f the non-economic enterprise organising logics during state 
socialism has definitely been one o f the most important reasons behind the strong re- 
emerging o f non-economic organising logics during the post-communist era.
Despite an institutional shift from a socialist to a capitalist production system and thus a 
dramatic change in most underlying institutions, this study observes a re-configuration and 
a partial preservation o f non-economic organising logics in enterprise activities o f the VW 
subsidiaries. As far as my engaging with neo-institutional theory is concerned, by 
considering enterprise institutions as well as the underlying organising logics in the 
discussion o f institutional change, this study tries to overcome the limitations o f the 
institutional theory that cannot deal well with a radical, systemic change that has taken 
place in post-communist countries. I argue that the dramatic institutional change in external 
environment o f the firm as well as in internal features such as ownership structures, work 
organisation, managerial authority etc. meant an expansion o f economic logics associated
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with economic liberalism. However, it has partially been ‘cushioned’ by non-economic 
enterprise organising logics thus representing a form o f Polanyian counter-movement.
The non-economic enterprise organising logics analysed in this study are not unique to VW 
subsidiaries in Central Europe, or to state socialist and post-communist settings. Certain 
features such as enterprise being a flexible bureaucracy are present in any firm. Also other 
features can be found in certain socio-economic settings. Thus, for example, the 
understanding o f the firm as authoritarian paternalist has been discussed for the Japanese 
firm (Sako and Sato 1997; Dore 2000). Also, seeing the enterprise as a social organism, as 
a source o f industrial capabilities and skills has been common in German as well as 
Japanese firms (Streeck 1991). Thus, non-economic enterprise organising logics discussed 
below are not unique to state socialist or post-communist production regimes. But although 
all three organising logics per se are not a unique post-communist phenomenon, certain 
dimensions are more pronounced than in other settings. Thus, using the example o f Soviet 
enterprises Ashwin (1998) shows that the role o f the enterprise in people’s life under state 
socialism was bigger than it has been the case in the Western context and even bigger than 
it has been the case for large Japanese enterprises. Also, certain features o f the state 
socialist system such as the pervasive role o f the Communist Party and the missing 
neutrality and autonomy o f the judicial system contributed to a specific form o f informality 
and o f a strong authoritarism within the company. These issues are discussed in greater 
depth in Chapters V  and V II.
Part 2 is organised as follows. Chapter IV  elaborates on the rationale for choosing the 
automotive industry and the VW  Group as a field o f case study research. Chapters V, VI 
and V II use the empirical evidence collected during the field research in 2006-2008 in four 
subsidiaries o f the VW  Group in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The 
task o f these three Chapters is theory verification: they show that certain legacies o f the 
state social system o f production have been preserved far beyond the regime change. These 
Chapters provide evidence that the three non-economic enterprise organising logics have 
been re-configured and partially preserved during the transition period.
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IV. The rationale for case selection
This research project chose a case study method as its empirical method o f investigation. 
As already discussed in the introductory Chapter, case study methodology is considered to 
be the most useful way o f dealing with theory building when no causal relationship is at 
stake. It is based on theoretical sampling as the goal in case study research is not to 
generalise to a larger population but to derive theoretical generalisations that would refute, 
confirm or extend a theoretical proposition. Accordingly, the selection o f the cases is based 
on criteria other than randomness. Criteria for selecting a case or cases are defined by the 
emerging theory: there can be exploratory cases, extreme or unique cases, or again, typical 
or representative cases. One approach to a case study that is not concerned with making 
causal claims can be in finding a critical or revelatory case that helps to redirect a 
researcher’s attention to an entirely new field or to a new phenomenon that was previously 
under-researched or neglected (Yin 2003). Precisely this kind o f a critical/ revelatory case 
study has been used in this empirical inquiry. The case study that is discussed in Part II sets 
out to provide the empirical evidence for the existence o f local non-economic enterprise 
organising logics and to explore the post-communist transformation as a single 
phenomenon.
This Chapter elaborates on the different steps o f the theoretical sampling o f the case study. 
It is organised as follows. First, it elaborates on the reasons for choosing the automotive 
industry as the sector o f field research. It then considers the reasons for choosing a foreign 
company as a case study over a domestically owned one. In Section II, the Chapter 
elaborates on the rationale for selecting the Volkswagen (VW) Group as the enterprise to 
undertake case study research.
First, the existence o f local non-economic enterprise organising logics presupposes certain 
continuity from the state socialist period. Thus, it was important to choose an industry that 
had strong historic legacies in the respective countries. But the key rationale behind 
choosing the automotive industry is the following: an important industrial upgrading o f the 
automotive industry has emerged as a regional phenomenon. The existence o f common 
non-economic enterprise logics has supported this evolution despite national institutional 
differences. Second, the interest o f the study was to identify non-economic enterprise 
organising logics in the context o f expanding economic liberalism and the dominance o f the
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law o f value. This phenomenon has not been uniform in the post-communist societies, with 
some parts o f the society being shielded from economic liberalism for longer. A  foreign 
MNC was selected as a critical case for a strong drive towards the law o f value that is 
represented by strong competitive pressures along the international value chains.
Finally, the choice o f the VW  Group was based (i) on the argument that the Group was 
among the rare cases where such a case study could be conducted across the four countries 
in a consistent manner thus allowing to demonstrate non-economic organising logics as a 
common post-communist Central European phenomenon and (ii) on the argument that the 
company might be the most supportive o f the re-emergence o f local non-economic 
organising logics due to the experience o f an unprecedented industrial upgrading that all 
four subsidiaries went through. The corporate culture o f the VW Group that is usually 
described as a stakeholder model was assumed to be conducive to the re-emergence o f local 
non-economic organising logics. Furthermore, the fact that the plant subsidiaries have been 
present in all four countries and have all experienced significant industrial modernisation 
led by the headquarters represented an evidence o f commitment to the Central European 
production locations on the side o f the German headquarters. By modernising the new 
Central European production locations and thus showing a long-term commitment that goes 
beyond the short-term oriented law o f value the VW headquarters provided an environment 
in which local non-economic enterprise logics could re-emerge.
I. Selecting the automotive industry
There are two reasons that made automotive industry appropriate for studying enterprise 
organising logics in post-communism. First, an important factor behind its selection has 
been the fact that Central Europe has had a long tradition o f automotive industry. The 
tradition o f car-making in Central Europe goes back to the pre-World War I period. Later, 
during state socialism, despite the overstretched specialisation o f the COMECON and 
higher priority o f industrial policy given to heavy industry and armament rather than 
consumer goods such as cars, practically each country had its own car production (Rode 
interview April 2007). Even i f  the car technology was mostly imported from the West and 
only little genuine research and development took place, vocational training and 
engineering traditions were strong.
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Automotive industry was organised in large vertically integrated state combines. Hungary 
had highly developed and independent supplier networks but with weak core firms (Van 
Tulder and Ruigrok 1998: 32). It used to export a large number o f components to Russia for 
Lada cars. Poland, on the other hand, had a number o f strong, highly vertically integrated 
final producers such as FSO, FSM and FSR, but not a strong supplier base. 
Czechoslovakia, similar to Hungary, was a country with strong industrial and crafts 
traditions in the region due to the fact that it was part o f the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It 
also produced a successful Skoda brand and had supplier networks spreading across the 
whole territory. Furthermore, in the Slovak part o f the country, there was a big military 
complex that experienced a huge ‘shake-up’ in the early 1990s. A  part o f the labour force 
could be re-employed in the expanding car manufacturing (Pala’ interview March 2007).
The second reason for the selection o f the automotive sector has been the fact that it was 
the sector in which the success o f industrial modernisation during the last 20 years is 
undoubted. The modernisation o f the automotive industry has not only been fast; it has also 
been profound (Radosevic and Rozeik 2005). Central Europe as a whole has become a 
regional hub for automotive production. This re-emergence o f strong industrial capabilities 
in the region is an unexpected outcome that not many regional observers would have 
predicted 10-15 years ago. The share o f automotive exports increased from 7-15% across 
the Visegrad four in the early 1990s to around 25% o f all exports in 2006. A similar 
important increase is documented for the share o f automotive industry in manufacturing 
production. There, the share has increased from just below 15% for the four Visegrad 
countries at the beginning o f transition to above 25% in mid 2000s, as the Charts below 
demonstrate (Hancke and Kurekova 2008). The re-emergence o f strong industrial 
capabilities in Central Europe has been identified as a regional phenomenon. It is the area 
o f the south-west o f Poland, the Czech Republic, the north-west o f Hungary and the west o f 
Slovakia that attracted a lot o f FDI and experienced a fast industrial upgrading (UNCTAD 
2006). In the early 2000s, some observers started to realise the strong regional dimension o f 
modernisation calling the area ‘Detroit East’ (Businessweek 2005). The Chart below 
illustrates the ‘Detroit East’ region.
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Chart 2: The role o f automotive industry in Visegrad four
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Source: Hancke and Kurekova (2008)
The existence o f  the com m on local non-econom ic organising logics has undoubtedly 
contributed to the fast regional industrial upgrading. It is the regional trend o f  industrial 
m odernisation that provides the com m onality for the four cases considered: independently 
from privatisation strategies and investor profiles, in all four countries considered, the 
autom otive industry has experienced an im portant revival during the last 15 years.
The traditions o f  the m achine tool production in the region as well as the fast modernisation 
o f  the industry in all four countries have been the two m ain factors that determ ined the 
choice o f  autom otive industry as the sector for em pirical research. However, the upgrading 
argum ent rem ains som ew hat controversial. Some authors disagree with the fact that the
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recent industrial m odernisation represents a new phenom enon o f  industrial m odernisation 
seeing it at best as a re-em ergence o f  the regional industrial capabilities6.





Source: U N C T A D  (2006 : 91 )
The choice o f  a foreign owned com pany over a dom estic one had a following rationale. The 
industrial autom otive landscape in Central Europe, as in W estern Europe and other 
industrialised countries, is dom inated by production netw orks that are organised around 
transnational autom otive m anufacturers. Regional industrial m odernisation went together 
with the dom inant position o f  foreign capital in the ownership structures. In Central Europe 
today, one tenth o f  all FD1 stocks to the big countries in the region are in the autom otive 
industry (U N C TA D  2006), while for sm aller countries such as Slovakia this share is even 
higher. In the four Visegrad countries autom otive sector has been one o f  the top 
destinations o f  the m ultinational com panies (M NCs) from the ‘triad’ - W estern Europe, US 
and Asia (the Table below  includes also other Central and East European countries for 
com parison).
g
Some authors (Van Tulder and Ruigrok 1998) tend to disagree with the upgrading thesis. First, the number of cars 
produced and sold in the region before 1989 was higher than during the 1990s. Despite important increases in production 
during the 1990s. Central European countries just managed to keep their share in the world production stable: while in 
1990 the region produced 5.0% of cars, in 2002 this share was only 5.6%. Thus, the industrial development of region can 
be better described as a re-industrialization or a different industrialization. Second, while some companies were 
modernised by their new foreign owners, this has only been a small share of previously existing industrial capabilities, 
many big industrial names, in contrast to Skoda, were not preserved. Thus, if we consider the vehicle production industry, 
such industrial names as Iatra and Liaz in the Czech Republic and Ikarus in Hungary did not survive the ‘introduction of 
markets'. Third, the effect of MNCs was small in relation to the rest of the industry and industrial modernisation was at 
best partial: while the production sites of the automotive MNCs were modernised, their supplier base was much less 
developed. The supplier systems of automotive production in Central Europe experienced a strong fragmentation after the 
break-down of the state socialist in-house production model. As the focus on the ‘core competences' has become a mantra 
of international auto production, the degree of vertical integration has been reduced every where.
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Table 3: Automotive MNCs in Central Europe
European MNCs
BMW Kaliningrad/RUS
PSA Kolin/CZ, Tmava/SK, Nysa/PL
Renault Kolin/CZ, Tmava/SK, Novo Mesto/SL, Moskau/RUS, Taganrog/RUS
Fiat Tychy & Bielsko Biala/PL, Nishnij Nowgorod/RUS
VW Group
VW Bratislava/SK , Sarajevo/BiH, Poznan/PL





G M/Ope I Szentgotthard, Esztergom/HU, Gliwice/PL, Zeran/Warschau/PL, 
Katowice/PL, Togliatti & Kaliningrad/RUS, Zaporoshje/UA
Ford Bielsko-Biala/PL, Minsk/BY, St. Petersburg/RUS
Asian MNCs
Daewoo (until Zeran/Warschau/PL, Craiova/RO, Ischewsk/RUS
2000)
KIA/ Hyundai Zilina/SK, Nosovice/CZ Kaliningrad/RUS, Rostow/RUS
Suzuki Esztergom/HU
Toyota Kolin/CZ, Jelcz-Laskowice/PL
Source: Rode Interview April 2007, updated by the author
For investors from Western Europe, US and Asia, Central Europe has become a regional 
hub not only in terms o f investment, but also in terms o f production. In 2006 the four 
Visegrad countries plus Slovenia jo in tly produced two m illion vehicles. Poland and the 
Czech Republic are the largest car makers followed by Hungary and Slovakia. The role o f 
foreign investors has also been very important for employment. While in the early 1990s, 
around one third o f the labour force in the automotive sector worked in foreign affiliates, 
by the end o f the 1990s this share increased to more than two thirds (See Table below).
Table 4: Share of employment in foreign affiliates in the automotive industry
C ountry 1993/1995 1999/2000




Source: Radosevic and Rozeik (2005: 17)
The automotive industry in Central Europe is thus dominated by global production chains 
where the level o f competition is extremely high and pressures for optimisation and good 
financial results are significant. In other words, the fact that the automotive industry today 
is organised globally means that the pressures o f international competition that the 
privatised plants experience are strong. Competitiveness needed to be shown in both in 
terms o f production location and in product markets, as foreign companies that acquired
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them have been parts o f the international value chain and had to survive in the conditions of 
a strong international competition. For the study o f societal re-embedding this means that 
the institutional change o f privatisation, expansion o f managerial authority, as well as 
pressures for optimisation o f production and work process have been strong and thus can be 
associated with Polanyian economic liberalism.
II. Selecting the VW Group
This Section elaborates on the reasons for selecting the VW  Group as the site for the case 
study. Among the reasons for this selection are: the existence o f VW  subsidiary plants in all 
four Central European countries since the early 1990s; a common phenomenon o f a highly 
pronounced industrial modernisation that all four plants underwent that indicates a certain 
level o f commitment that the V W headquarters have shown towards their Central European 
investments and employees; the role o f German human resource practices abroad that leave 
the issues such as wages, working times, social provisions to be decided at the subsidiary 
level and the relative labour-friendly VW  corporate governance. Thus, the choice o f the 
VW  Group was based (i) on the argument that the Group was among the rare cases where 
such a case study could be conducted across the four countries in a consistent manner thus 
allowing to demonstrate non-economic organising logics as a common post-communist 
Central European phenomenon and (ii) on the argument that the company might be the 
most supportive o f the re-emergence o f local non-economic organising logics due to the 
experience o f an unprecedented industrial upgrading that all four subsidiaries went through.
The VW  Group was selected from a number o f large MNCs that have dominated the 
Central European car industry as the Group is the only company that has been present in all 
four Visegrad countries. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it has been dominating the 
car assembly landscape early on. In 1991, VW  Group acquired a stake in Skoda in the 
Czech Republic and the former Skoda’s supplier plant in Slovakia. Only in early 2000s was 
it challenged by two new-comers: the French PSA (alone and in cooperation with Toyota) 
and the South Korean Kia/Hyundai. Poland’s market was divided between Korean Daewoo, 
VW, Fiat and later GM/Opel. Ford invested in Bielsko-Biala in 1992 but withdrew in the 
late 1990s. Fiat bought a majority stake in the Polish FSM with which it was already 
cooperating since the 1960s. VW started producing cars in Poznan and engines in 
Polkowice in early 1990s. The Warsaw FSO plant changed its owners several times: first it 
was sold to the Korean Daewoo, then after its bankruptcy in Korea it was re-sold to
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GM/Opel and most recently to the Ukrainian holding ZAZ UkrAVTO. Finally, Hungary 
was early conquered by V W ’s Audi, GM/ Opel and the Japanese Suzuki. Audi, apart o f the 
VW  Group, started production in Hungarian Gyor in 1994. Thus, the VW  Group is among 
the rare cases where such a case study could be conducted across the four countries in a 
consistent manner: the Group is the only automotive company that is present in all four 
countries and looks back at almost 20 years o f automotive production in Central Europe.
Another rationale for selecting the VW  Group is the high level o f long-term commitment 
that the German headquarters have shown towards their Central European investments and 
their employees. The VW Group allocated significant investments, production and 
employment capacities to its new Central European subsidiaries. By preserving and 
building up important local human and industrial capacities in the region the German 
headquarters have facilitated the preservation and re-emergence o f local non-economic 
enterprise organising logics. The VW  Group has been in the first wave o f large foreign 
investors who came to Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and today, the 
Volkswagen Group is the largest single foreign investor in Central Europe. V W ’s 
involvement in Central Europe is exceptional as it has important production plants in each 
o f the four Visegrad countries. It took stock in the jo in t ventures it entered and gradually 
built them up bringing them under its full control by the late 1990s.
In 1991, the VW  Group acquired a stake in Skoda in Mlada Boleslav in the Czech 
Republic, and in the former Skoda’s supplier plant in Bratislava, Slovakia. In Skoda, after 
the original acquisition o f 31.5% in 1991, VW  increased its control share to 60.3% in 1994, 
70% in 1995, and finally to a full ownership in 2000. In VW  Bratislava, the jo in t venture 
started in 1991, the fu ll ownership was acquired in 1994 and the company changed its 
status to become incorporated as a Slovak company at the end o f 1998. The former Tarpan 
factory in Polish Poznan entered a jo in t venture with VW  in 1993 with original 
participation o f 25.4% and the full VW  ownership followed in 1996 (VW  Poznan 
website7). A VW  engine plant was built in Polish Polkowice. Audi, a producer o f luxury 
cars in the VW  Group, bought land and buildings from the RABA plant in the Hungarian 
Gyor in 1993, and production started in 1994.
7h ttp ://w w w .v o lksw aq en .d e /vw cm s/m aster pub lic /v irtu alm aster/en 2/un ternehm en /m ob ilitv  and sustainabilitvO /reqionen/ 
E u ro p a/P o zn a n .h tm l
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Increases in production numbers since the early 1990s were also very important. Over the 
period o f 1992 to 2005, V W ’s car production in Central Europe multiplied by four, while its 
employment increased 2.5 times. It increased the automotive production in the Central 
European region to two m illion cars in 2007. In 1990 the share o f VW  cars produced 
outside o f Germany was 41% but it increased dramatically to 65% in 2000. Today, the VW 
Group produces 15% o f its total output in Central Europe and has 42,000 employees in the 
region which amounts to around 12% o f the company’s global labour force o f 345,000. 
Production and employment strategies o f the VW  Group in all four Central European 
production locations intensified during the late 1990s - early 2000s. A ll four subsidiaries 
have experienced a strong growth in production volumes and a constant build-up o f the 
workforce. VW  Slovakia has developed into a big plant: from just over 400 employees in 
1992 to 9,065 total employees and 8,700 direct workers in 2006 (VW  Slovakia presentation 
2007, Holecek). Additional 1,600 employees are employed by an employment agency. VW 
Poznan employed only around 500 people at the early stages o f the jo in t venture between 
FSR Tarpan and the VW  Group (Winter 2006b). Employment figures more than doubled 
from 2002 to 2007 (to 6,600 employees) and in 2009 the number o f employees reached 
6,900. In Audi Gyor, the number o f employees experienced a five-time increase in the last 
ten years: from 1,011 in 1996 to 5,373 in 2006. Increases in employment were the strongest 
during the ‘build up’ phase in 1996-1999 with around thousand people hired every year 
(Radi Interview August 2007). Since then the employment has stabilised at around 5,500. 
Skoda Auto increased its employment numbers from 15,000 in the early 1990s to the total 
o f 26,000 employees with at least 15,000 employees working directly in production. It is 
thus the largest assembly plant in Central Europe. Therefore, employment increases have 
been important since the mid-1990s in all four VW  subsidiaries representing a strong 
commitment o f the VW  Group headquarters to their Central European investments. By 
building up local labour force, the VW  Group has shown its long-term commitment 
towards Central European investments and thus provided the basis for development and re- 
emergence o f local non-economic enterprise organising logics.
Table 5: Basic data for the four VW Group subsidiaries




1991 1991 1993 1993
Employment 26 000 9 257 6 600 (2007) 5 373
Cars produced almost 600 000 238 000 442 000 23 675
Source: own compilation
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However, among the most important reasons for selecting the VW  Group as a site to study 
local enterprise organising logics has been the exceptional industrial upgrading. Industrial 
modernisation and upgrading in productive investment as well as production depth and 
product profiles have represented further evidence o f German headquarters’ long-term 
commitment to the Central European production locations. By modernising their Central 
European production sites German headquarters introduced new economic organisational 
rationales that focus more on the law o f value and economic efficiency but they also 
showed a certain adherence to the logic o f long-term commitment which facilitated the 
preservation and re-emergence o f local enterprise organising logics.
The VW  Group invested important amounts into the new production sites, especially since 
the mid-1990s - early 2000s. In the early years o f investment i.e. in the early 1990s a 
common practice was to bring old equipment from Germany, however, this practice was 
abandoned in the late 1990s (Interview March 2007, VW  Bratislava). Investment in VW 
Bratislava - somewhat low by international standards in the first half o f the 1990s at around 
EUR 20 m illion per year - constantly grew in the second ha lf o f the decade reaching its 
peak in 2001 at EUR 350 million. After this major investment wave it came down to 
around 90 m illion euro a year. For the period 1991-2006, EUR 1.3 billion were invested in 
the site (VW  Slovakia presentation 2007). Audi also emerged as a big investor. In the early 
1990s, investments in Audi Gyor were low, but for the early 2000s there have been annual 
investments o f around EUR 350-400 million (Audi 2006:68). By 2006, cumulatively, EUR 
2.5 billion have been invested in the plant not counting the R&D investments (Audi 
presentation 2007). In Skoda, the original investment plan amounting to DM 9 billion 
(EUR 4.5 billion) until 2000 was reduced at an early stage to DM 3.7 billion (around EUR 
1.8 m illion) due to financial problems o f the mother company (Dorr and Kessel 2000). This 
move by the headquarters encountered strong criticism on the part o f the public and the 
authorities. The reservations o f the Czech stakeholders were only revoked once it was 
announced that despite this reduction in the planned investment, all planned major 
restructuring plans would be adhered to, even i f  over a longer time period and in a more 
moderate form (Sperling 2004). The overall investment level remained important: until 
2003 Volkswagen invested more than USD 1.5 billion in Skoda8.
8 According to Globalautoindex, www.globalautoindex.com.
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Also, the production profiles were modernised. In the early 1990s, the Central European 
VW  subsidiaries had a ‘peripheral’ production profile: the cars produced were based on the 
old technology and old models; these were mostly small cars with a simple technology. But 
over time, V W ’s strategy was to upgrade its previously peripheral production locations by 
introducing the most recent models and the newest technology. Thus, what was new in 
V W ’s product policy was the upgrading o f the status o f peripheral production facilities. For 
the production depth, the evolution was similar. In the late 1990s-early 2000s, the 
complementary strategy, especially in the field o f production complexity, collapsed as more 
production processes with higher value added were transferred to the East along with 
certain sourcing capabilities. The following paragraphs describe the strategies o f individual 
VW subsidiaries.
VW  Production in Slovakia started very modestly with very low volumes o f Passat and 
Golf, the two major VW  sedans in the mid-size segment. The first significant increase in 
production came in 1998 when the volume tripled from 41,000 to 125,000 within a year. 
Since 1999 the production mix has been balanced between G olf and Polo, the latter being 
until recently the smallest VW  model. The production further doubled in terms o f the 
number o f units produced between 1999 and 2002. The SUV (sport utility vehicle) 
production started in 1998 in Bratislava. In 2003 came the industrial and technological 
breakthrough, with one third o f production starting to go to the SUV segment and this share 
increasing to two thirds in 2006 (VW Slovakia presentation 2007) This model strategy that 
at the beginning ran under the project name ‘Colorado’ (Mikulikova 2002) was developed 
in the early 2000s. Thus, today, the Slovak VW plant specialises in high-end low-volume 
models such as the VW  Group sport utility vehicle collection: Audi Q7, Porsche Cayenne 
and Volkswagen Touareg. The product upgrading thus has been strong.
Skoda’s evolution was also impressive but the development was gradual. Most importantly, 
Skoda was able to retain its brand. Yet although the Skoda brand was kept, the original 
Skoda cars were o f low quality and limited technology base. Two early Skoda models were 
Favorit that was produced between 1988 and 1994 and Felicia produced between 1994 and 
2001, However, over time, the industrial upgrading at Skoda has been strong: its product 
range has been modernised and the diversity o f models extended. The production strategy 
included integration o f Skoda into V W ’s platform strategy. In this context, the first decisive 
innovation was achieved in 1996 with the introduction o f middle-range Octavia on the 
Golf-platform. The introduction o f the compact car Fabia in 1999 was the second big step
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o f upgrading as the platform introduced was new and the VW  only introduced own vehicle 
with this platform a year later (Sperling 2004). In 2001, Skoda has even started to expand 
its segment range by introducing Superb, an upper medium range car. The production o f 
the fourth model line, a minivan Roomster, started in 2006. This production strategy 
included integration o f Skoda into V W ’s platform strategy. In this context, the first decisive 
innovation was achieved in 1996 with putting Octavia on the Golf-platform. The 
introduction o f the compact car Fabia in 1999 was the second big step o f upgrading as the 
platform introduced was new and the VW  only introduced its own vehicle with this 
platform a year later (Sperling 2004).
In other plants, no own brand was kept and the plants started producing the established 
VW, Audi or Skoda cars and components, thus following a less autonomous ‘periphery’ 
strategy. Low-segment small and medium-size models have been the main types o f models 
produced: VW  Polos in Slovakia, u tility  vehicles such as T5 and Caddy in VW  Poznan. 
The production o f commercial and special purpose vehicles started in the Polish Poznan 
around the same time. Special destination utility cars have been produced in VW  Poznan 
since 2001, the transporter T5 in 2002 and Caddy in 2003, while TT Coupe o f Audi was 
produced in Gyor. Audi Hungaria in Gyor represents a somewhat special case in its mix o f 
products, yet industrial upgrading is visible there as well. The evolution o f car production 
at Audi Gyor has experienced some upgrading in products through the exclusive rights o f 
production together with the German plant. Audi started to produce its small but pricy cars, 
the sporty TT Coupe and Roadster, in 1998 and in 2006 the second generation9 o f TT was 
launched. The Gyor plant enjoys a certain level o f exclusivity: in cooperation with the 
headquarters in Ingolstadt it is the only producer o f TT Coupe.
The upgrading o f VW  Poznan in terms o f model choice has been important although less 
pronounced in comparison to the other plants. As in VW  Slovakia, in VW  Poznan, 
decisions on products, sourcing and sale channels are centralised in Germany (Interview 
March 2007). As far as the product strategy is concerned, it has remained for some time 
within a periphery realm and moved to a transnational strategy only in the early 2000s. 
Since 1993, old Polish models o f transport cars and since 1994 old Skoda models Favorit 
and Felicia were assembled there in SKD (semi-knocked down) mode. It is in the early 
2000s that the production o f first new models, just developed within the VW  Group,
This car is a two-door vehicle in the Audi’s medium segment, one o f the most modest models of this 
luxury producer but at a base price range from EUR 33 000 to EUR 44 000.
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started: special destination u tility  cars in 2001, T5 in 2002 and Caddy in 2003 (VW Poznan 
website10). Thus, the plant significantly improved its position in the areas o f autonomy and 
product strategy.
To sum up, industrial upgrading in model choice has been pronounced in all four VW 
subsidiaries. Over time, the subsidiaries were able to acquire exclusive rights within the 
Group to produce certain models or, at least, models were updated: over time the 
subsidiaries were able gain tenders for producing the most recently developed models. 
Thus, at least since the late 1990s, the strategy o f periphery shifted to a transnational one 
where foreign plants compete on equal terms with German plants for the right to produce 
the newest models. The company thus moved from being a production oriented 
multinational in the 1970s and 1980s to a globally operating transnational company in the 
1990s (Pries 2003). The crucial dimension that has changed in the early 1990s is the change 
o f relationship between the headquarters and the subsidiaries from a centre-periphery 
relationship to that o f an intra-organisational competition. This implies that a clearly 
defined hierarchy between a ‘centre’ and a ‘periphery’ disappeared.
Apart from the change in product profile and underlying technology, the other important 
change was the ‘deepening4 o f the production process. The level o f production depth has 
increased substantially over the years. Skoda has developed into an almost fu lly integrated 
manufacturing plant. It has its own motor and components production. An important 
upgrading step took place when the construction o f a new motor plant was agreed. Engine 
production is one o f the core functions o f a car plant; having this competence has 
significantly improved the standing o f the company within the VW  Group. Skoda is the 
only producer o f the 1.2 litre engines for the whole Group (Interview December 2006). The 
company also has its own gearbox production and its own foundry (casting) facilities, 
press, welding (body shop), painting, important component production (such as gearboxes), 
quality control and a tool-making unit. VW  Slovakia has also experienced the upgrading in 
the production depth. The Slovak plant has its own motor production; since the late 1990s, 
VW  Slovakia produces several types o f engines and gearboxes; their majority is exported 
within the Group (Interview March 2007), The plant also has its own foundry (casting) 
facilities, press, welding (body shop), painting and quality control. Like Skoda, the VW  
Slovak engine production supplies the whole VW  Group. Thus, the level o f upgrading in 
the Slovak subsidiary has been high in both dimensions assessed. In VW  Poznan, the
10 http://www.volkswagen-poznan.pl
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upgrading in production depth has been even more significant. During the 1990s, the plant 
had an extremely low production depth. A new foundry facility was opened in 1996. Also, 
after fu ll ownership was acquired in 1996 a more sophisticated CKD (completely knocked- 
down) production mode o f newer Skoda models was introduced in 1997. The component 
production was further strengthened in 2003. As in the two other plants, apart from the 
basic assembly functions such as press, welding and painting, VW  Poznan has its own 
foundry facilities, some component production (such as gearboxes) and quality control 
(VW  Poznan website). In Audi Hungaria, the overall production depth for vehicles has 
remained low. It comprises final assembly and final quality control with painted bodies 
being imported from Germany (Keune and Toth 2007: 6). However, it would be wrong to 
argue that the value added in the plant is low: the plant has been an engine plant rather than 
a final assembler. It has been largely upgraded in its function in the global value chain as 
far as engine production and sourcing o f parts for engines is concerned. Since 1996, engine 
production has been relocated from Ingolstadt to Gyor and the number o f produced motors 
increased from 200,000 in 1996 to 1.9 m illion in 2006. Today it produces around 400 types 
o f engines for the whole VW  Group and it also has received some strategic sourcing 
responsibilities for the whole VW Group.
In terms o f the sourcing decisions, the VW  Group is responsible for the platform (engines, 
gearboxes, axe, cockpit, seats), while Skoda can decide independently on the rest (Dorr and 
Kessel 2000). What is important, however, is that the company has received important 
Group-wide functions: it is responsible for the material procurement o f the whole VW  
Group from Central Europe (Sperling 2004: 190). Skoda also has done important 
investments in the field o f R&D and has own R&D centres employing 1,420 engineers 
(EUR 203 m illion investment). In the Skoda plant, R&D facilities were preserved also due 
to a strong voice o f local management and unions (Sperling 2004: 187) allowing the plant 
to remain a full-fledged integrated manufacturing site; only few R&D activities were 
outsourced (Dorr and Kessel 2000). This achievement is especially impressive given a high 
concentration o f R&D activities at the headquarters. A  new development centre was opened 
in 1999 and another in 2001 so that in 2007 the R&D staff totalled approximately 1,300 
(Interview December 2006). Development activities have not been restricted to Skoda’s 
own competence, the upper part o f the car: the Czech engineers also conducted 
development activities for the VW  ‘platform11 ’ (Sperling 2004: 187). This evidence clearly
11 Skoda cars share the platform with the VW models in engines, gears, axes, cockpit and seats while 
Skoda is responsible for the upper part o f the car (Nanasi Interview December 2006).
115
indicates that the company has shifted from a peripheral position o f the early 1990s to a 
transnational position in the product and sourcing strategy within the Group by the early 
2000s. In Audi Gyor, the R&D facilities are more recent. The company created an R&D 
centre in 2003-2004, employing approximately 100 engineers working on production 
process and quality control (Keune and Toth 2007). Today, it produces around 400 types of 
engines for the whole VW  Group and it also has received some strategic sourcing 
responsibilities for the whole VW  Group.
Table 6: Industrial upgrading in the four VW Group East European plants in the 
1990s













Skoda CZ (Favorit, Felicia) 
early 1990s
VW SK 1990s (VW Polo)
VW PL 1990s (SKD Skoda 
models)
Audi HU engine production 1990s
Periphery strategy of model choice and sourcing
Table 7: Industrial upgrading in the four VW Group East European plants in the 
2000s




Audi HU car production (since 
1998 TT Coupe)
Skoda CZ (Own brand/Octavia, 
Fabia, Superb since 2001/ New 
engine plant/Own R&D facilities) 
Audi HU engine production 2000s 
(more exclusive rights and more 
sourcing autonomy)
VW SK (Audi Q7, Porsche 








VW PL (special destination utility 
cars in 2001, T5 in 2002 and 
Caddy in 2003)
Periphery strategy of model choice and sourcing
I described how internationationalisation strategies o f the VW  Group in all four production 
locations intensified in terms o f production and employment numbers in the late 1990s - 
early 2000s. However, what is even more surprising is the great speed o f the qualitative 
upgrading o f the Central European subsidiaries. The features o f qualitative industrial 
upgrading -  going towards high rather than low production depth and towards transnational
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rather than peripheral position in the product choice and sourcing -  allow constructing a 
two-dimensional space in which the evolution o f the four plants over time can be traced. 
Although clearly both dimensions are continuous variables, for simplification they are 
presented as two-level variables. Table 6 and Table 7 present the changes in the two 
dimensions when the mid-2000s are compared to the mid-1990s.
The overall picture that emerges is that o f a strong industrial modernisation in all four 
plants. Since the late 1990s, the Group’s intemationationalisation strategies in all four 
production locations intensified in terms o f investment volumes, production and 
employment numbers. Yet what is even more surprising than the high speed o f the 
quantitative modernisation o f the Central European subsidiaries is the qualitative change 
that is taking place. I observe an important change in both dimensions when the mid-2000s 
are compared to the mid-1990s. Since the late 1990s- early 2000s, in all four VW Central 
European production plants I find evidence o f upgrading in industrial capabilities in terms 
o f product and sourcing decisions and in production depth. In terms o f model choice, 
during the late 1990s - early 2000s, all subsidiaries were allocated responsibilities for the 
assembly o f new, most modem and sophisticated models. They often became the only sites 
o f production o f these products. Some enlargement o f autonomy has also taken place in 
R&D and in sourcing capabilities. Production depth has also increased by moving from 
SKD12 to CKD and then to integrated manufacturing mode o f assembly and also with the 
construction and modernisation o f component plants.
As already pointed out, the role o f the VW  headquarters in this industrial upgrading is pre­
dominant: the headquarters in Wolfsburg have the decisive competences in the main car 
production, the headquarters in Hanover for the commercial vehicles and headquarters in 
Ingolstadt for the Audi brand. The latter is also responsible for product range, product and 
process standards as well as for research and development. But the competences o f the 
subsidiaries are significant and are growing. We have seen that Skoda has advanced the 
furthest in this process, but what emerges is the general phenomenon o f growing local 
autonomy and competences in the production process, sourcing and more sophisticated 
production range for the subsidiaries. These developments have taken place over only a 
short period o f ten years. Thus, the role o f ‘ local factors’ has also been extremely 
important. A fast industrial upgrading in Central Europe stands in a sharp contrast to the 
evolution o f the VW  subsidiaries in other parts o f the world where a relatively slow
12 SK D  stands for sem i-knocked dow n, C K D  stands for com pletely  knocked dow n
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upgrading and partial disengagement o f the MNC from the production process were 
documented. Thus, VW  subsidiary in the Brazilian Resende followed quite a different path: 
the degree o f outsourcing has been enormously high. The module suppliers were given all 
responsibility for cars assembly and thus the outsourcing o f manufacturing takes place 
within the VW  plant (Winter 2006b). Also, VW  plants in Mexico show a much slower pace 
o f modernisation. The contrast between VW  Group subsidiaries o f different regions is not 
explored systematically in this study, but this reference provides a first evidence o f the 
importance o f ‘ local factors’ that might have facilitated the strong industrial modernisation 
in Central European VW  plants.
Finally, apart from the important industrial modernization a further factor that has been 
crucial for selecting the VW  Groups as the site o f the case study have been the role o f 
German human resource practices in general and the labour friendly VW  corporate 
governance practices in particular. Numerous studies pointed out that German managers 
and German MNC headquarters have particular, different from the American or Asian 
investors, ways o f dealing with their operations abroad. They allow for a high degree o f 
autonomy in employment relations and human resource practices (Bluhm 2007). Most 
‘human resource management’ issues such as wages, working times, welfare provisions etc. 
are left to be decided at the company level and are not dictated from the headquarters. 
Furthermore, Maurice, Sellier et al. underline the role o f German practices to adjust the job 
according to worker’s skill. They argue that due to the fact that vocational training is 
widespread and highly valued in Germany, ‘ the firms tend to organise production around 
the norms o f the training system’ (Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986: 68). Marsden (1999: 34) 
describes this approach as a ‘ training approach’ in which tasks are allocated according to 
the skills o f employees rather than according to the technical or production necessity. Due 
to a strong system o f vocational training at home, German managers, even i f  not 
approaching the work organisation in the Central European subsidiaries with the same 
degree o f openness as they would do it in Germany, might still have a greater respect for 
local vocational training and technological traditions than some other investors. In other 
words, German managers are expected to let local ideas and local enterprise organising 
logics to ‘manifest themselves’ easier than Asian or American managers would do.
Due to the highly participative VW  corporate governance system, even i f  the MNC has not 
transferred the labour rights o f German workers to Central Europe but has rather adjusted 
its practices to a more permissive level o f respective national legislations, a permanent
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confrontation with labour representatives in the subsidiaries is not a viable option for the 
VW  Group either. This fact has made it more probable for local non-economic organising 
logics in the VW  subsidiaries to survive and to be further developed.
Ill. The multiple case study
The method o f empirical inquiry selected in this research project is a case study; more 
specifically, it is a multiple case study. However, the cases are not selected along the lines 
o f the four automotive plants o f the Volkswagen (VW) Group in Central Europe, as the 
main purpose o f the research was not to compare and contrast the national legacies but 
rather to underline the common state socialist legacy and to explore the post-communist 
transformation as a single phenomenon. It is thus a theoretical framework that drove the 
definition o f the cases. In this research, the three cases are the three subfields o f enterprise 
activity: enterprise governance and welfare provisions, enterprise performance and work 
organisation. The decisive factor for choosing these three subfields was the fact that in all 
three o f them one could identify a strong expansion o f the law o f value and thus o f the 
economic organising logic. In firm governance and welfare provision, this ‘economic’ logic 
was the abolition o f other stakeholders such as the Communist Party and trade unions, so 
that managerial authority could expand. Also, a large share o f enterprise-based welfare 
provision disappeared. In firm performance, financialisation o f results i.e. establishing strict 
financial performance targets has become more pronounced. Finally, in work and skill 
organisation, the desire for higher efficiency led to pressures for de-contextualisation o f 
managerial knowledge and a higher standardisation and Taylorisation o f the work 
organisation.
A multiple case study presupposes the logic o f replication for data collection. Such 
theoretical replication means that each further case has theoretically similar results. In this, 
the logic o f multiple case studies is close to the logic o f several experiments. Theoretical 
sampling o f case studies also presupposes a theoretical saturation i.e. there is a criterion for 
judging when to stop empirical sampling. Theoretical saturation means that no further 
empirical data can further develop properties o f the theorised categories (Glaser and Strauss 
1999). In the three present case studies, a theoretical saturation is reached when the 
argument o f a societal embeddedness based on non-economic organising logics is 
demonstrated in three different subfields o f enterprise activities. Introducing a further 
subfield would not be essential for the validity o f the argument.
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Conclusion
The goal o f this Chapter was to elaborate on the criteria for the theoretical sampling o f the 
case study. The Chapter provided the explanation for selecting the automotive industry and 
a foreign automotive MNC in general and the VW Group subsidiary plants in particular as 
the site o f field work research. Among the rationales for this theoretical sampling I 
especially underlined the strong industrial modernisation that took place in Central 
European VW  subsidiaries, but also the role o f German HRM and certain features specific 
to the VW  Group. The strong quantitative and qualitative modernisation o f the VW  plants 
in Central Europe is interpreted as a sign o f VW ’ s long-term commitment to its Central 
European investments, while certain VW-specific and German-specific factors were 
assumed to be facilitating the re-emergence and development o f local normative 
commitments and obligations -  the non-economic organising logics.
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V. The authoritarian paternalist enterprise
A t the centre o f my attention in this Chapter are the organising logics o f enterprise 
governance and employment provisions in the VW  subsidiaries in Central Europe. More 
specifically, this Chapter disentangles the dynamics o f the economic and non-economic 
organising logics: the expansion o f managerial authority and its societal embeddedness that 
together have contributed to the firm functioning as anuthoritarian paternalist. The evidence 
from the four subsidiary plants o f the VW  Group in Central Europe presented in this 
Chapter demonstrates that despite dramatic changes in institutional structures, the non­
economic enterprise organising logic o f authoritarian paternalism survived the institutional 
change, even i f  in an altered form. Thus, despite the fact that institutions o f managerial 
authority have undergone a dramatic expansion, the non-economic enterprise organising 
logic o f employee protection re-emerged in the post-communist era.
In firm  governance, the logic o f economic liberalism took the shape o f expanded 
managerial authority. A  stronger concentration o f decision making power within 
managerial authority can be considered as an example o f the instrumental logic, the logic o f 
consequence (March and Olsen 2004). It represented a form o f Polanyian dis-embedding as 
stakeholders did not have any strong normative commitments in relation to the new 
emerging managerial elites and no prior experience that would suggest strengthening 
managerial power. Furthermore, stronger managerial authority, the non-intervention o f 
other social actors, such as unions, in the enterprise governance and the law o f value were 
idealised: they were seen as a means to ‘catch-up’ and to modernise. Polanyian societal re­
embedding, on the other hand, took the form o f restraining this expanding management 
authority, even i f  not by directly challenging it, but by constraining and ‘embedding’ it into 
the pre-existing normative commitments. These implicit commitments or logics o f 
appropriateness have been managerial and firm obligations o f employee welfare protection. 
Despite changed institutional and legal provisions that enlarged managerial authority, 
enterprise stakeholders still share the organising logic that the firm  is a paternalist ‘care­
taker’ o f its employees (see Chart below for a schematic presentation).
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Post-communist production in Central European VW  subsidiaries
Enterprise  as  
authoritarian  
paternalist: strong  
director’s authority  
is shared with  
unions: em p loym ent 
gu aran tees  and  
generous w e lfa re  
provisions by firms.
N on-econo m ic  
enterp rise  
organising logic of 
e m p lo y e e  w elfare  
protection
E cono m ic  organising  
logics of expansion  
of m an ag eria l 
authority
E nterprise  as  
authoritarian  pa te rn a lis t: 
the  exp anded  
m an ag e m e n t authority  is 
lim ited by the  
com m itm ent to provide  
for em p lo y e e  w elfa re . 
A uthoritarian  g o vern an ce  
d esp ite  institutionalised  
labour representation; 
firm s live up to 
exp ecta tio ns  to provide  
e m p lo ym en t and w e lfa re  
provisions above  sectora l 
averages .
As outlined in Chapter III, firms in state socialism were driven by a number o f non­
economic organising logics. One o f them was the fact that enterprise functioned as an 
authoritarian paternalist. It combined a strong director’s authority with the director’s 
responsibility for welfare protection o f the company’ s employees. The non-economic 
enterprise organising logic had two dimensions: the welfare protection dimension, on the 
one hand, was expressed through generous provisions related to the protection o f the 
employment status as well as social and welfare benefits provided by the company. The 
authoritarian nature o f firm  governance, on the other hand, was expressed in the acceptance 
by all stakeholders o f a strong authority o f the Communist Party in the decision making 
process.
The authoritarian and paternalistic management style corresponded well to the trade unions' 
role o f the 'transmission belts' that merely transmitted orders and information from the 
Party state to workers. Union functions were not in the field o f employee representation but 
in welfare provisions such as social security and benefits related to holidays, housing etc., 
so that union membership depended mainly on social provisions rather than on organising. 
As the union’s relationship with their members was very limited, unions were dependent on 
management. In other words, unions had a function o f social service providers rather than
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that o f social partners. Yet although during state socialism firm governance institutions 
were never forms o f a genuine industrial democracy, trade unions still shared the governing 
responsibility for the socialist firm.
During the early years o f transition, a number o f institutional transformations related to 
firm governance and welfare provisions took place: both management and unions become 
independent from the Communist Party, many state owned enterprises were privatised and 
there was a change in the legal provisions concerning firm governance. This implied that at 
the enterprise level, managerial authority was largely extended, while union role was 
heavily curtailed13. Thus, while trade unions in the state socialist regime were directly 
involved in the decision making process together with management, these rights were 
withdrawn from them during the early post-communism. The logic had been that once the 
links to the Communist Party -  and often the Communist Party itself -  were dismantled, 
independent management would steer company affairs in a more efficient way, a way 
compatible with ‘market economy’ , i.e. with the laws o f supply and demand and with the 
law o f value.
Privatisation was the second major institutional change that affected many state owned 
companies, putting foreign managerial elites centre stage. Among several privatisation 
options, foreign capital was often considered as the fastest way to modernise. The state saw 
several advantages in allowing foreign capital to participate in the privatisation process: 
what was expected from the foreign investor was not only technological and marketing 
skills, knowledge o f Western markets and distribution channels, but also some broad 
‘Western know-how’ , a transfer o f knowledge concerning the ‘ rules o f market economy’ 
that local stakeholders did not have, the economic organising logic o f the law o f value. An 
important distinction needs to be made. Abolishing the dominant role o f the Party in 
enterprise management was an explicit final aim o f reforms that followed the logic o f 
appropriateness: the desire to not have Party influence in the field o f business and work was 
based on the experience o f stakeholders, it was embedded in the experience o f state 
socialism. However, other institutional changes in ownership and regulation o f firm 
governance followed the logic o f consequence: they were seen as a means o f 
transformation, not its final goals, as these reforms were not defined by local experience 
but rather by ‘experience from elsewhere’ (Soulsby and Clark 2006: 1397). The
13The discussion on the extension of managerial authority refers to the formal process of corporate 
decision making within the realm o f representative industrial democracy. More informal channels of 
authority and control are discussed in Chapter VII.
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expectations associated with the foreign owners and economic liberalism were highly 
idealised. Privatisation and attracting o f foreign owners were means to other goals, such as 
modernisation, additional financial resources, and access to new markets. In other words, 
the reforms o f economic liberalism taking the form o f enterprise privatisation and 
expansion o f managerial authority were examples o f utilitarian ethics and the logic o f 
consequence as they were means to another end. Through the introduction o f the law o f 
value these institutional changes were expected to have as a consequence modernisation o f 
the enterprise.
In the VW  Group subsidiaries, while a high share o f managerial decisions was transferred 
to the German headquarters, foreign capital privatisation meant a strong expansion o f the 
local managerial authority: the old decision-making system consisting o f the Party, 
nomenklatura and trade union representatives was abolished. The expansion o f managerial 
authority was more than a change in ownership; on the wave o f political and economic 
transformation the legal provisions also changed. Post-communist labour laws have largely 
expanded managerial authority, as during the previous regime company management was 
in the hands o f Communist Party administrators, with unions being their right hand. In the 
market economic regimes introduced in the early 1990s, labour did not receive any strong 
co-determination rights. The Czech Republic and Slovakia introduced the obligation for 
employers to negotiate and conclude collective agreements i f  unions demanded it, while in 
Hungary, obligations to negotiate but no obligation to sign an agreement were introduced. 
From the four countries considered in this study, only Hungary had an early provision for 
works councils but even this legal requirement was only followed in some large companies. 
The position o f labour was somewhat strengthened in the early 2000s, when national laws 
were adjusted to the Directives o f the European Union (EU) in the wake o f the accession o f 
these countries to the EU. Yet, even today, there are still very few legal labour co­
determination rights. The existing rights include rights to negotiate collective agreements 
that define pay and pay systems, working time and over-time as well as a number o f minor 
issues such as planning plant holidays and social funds. Overall, the legal provisions and 
de-facto power relations within companies both supported the expansion o f managerial 
authority and strongly limited the role o f labour.
These institutional changes that strengthen the position o f management met with a societal 
re-embedding, underpinned by the logic o f appropriateness. Stakeholders were interested in 
privatisation and the attraction o f foreign owners as means o f transformation, but they did
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not lose sight o f what was considered as the final ends o f firm existence. The non-economic 
organising logic o f providing for the welfare o f its employees has been preserved. Thus, the 
non-economic organising logic o f firm governance has been that o f employee welfare 
protection. However, the expansion o f economic liberalism and the societal re-embedding 
have not been chronological or sequential. Both logics - the logic o f consequence and the 
logic o f appropriateness - have been active at the same time.
This Chapter studies the expansion o f managerial authority and societal re-embedding by 
focussing on the role and self-perceptions o f trade unions in the VW plants. In the post­
communist period, trade unions needed to re-invent themselves as their old legitimacy 
based on the support o f the Communist Party crumbled. In the new institutional 
configuration, union role and identity has become that o f a ‘management’ s junior partner’ . 
Thus, they do not question managerial prerogative and support managerial efforts to 
modernise and upgrade the companies. Three elements constitute the evidence for this 
logic. Section I o f this Chapter argues that unions and works councils have remained junior 
partners to management as they are unable to develop their own agendas that would differ 
from managerial goals in substantive terms, due to their full concentration on company 
affairs and extremely weak links to branch unions. Section II argues that despite relatively 
ample formal provisions o f employee rights for information, consultation and supervisory 
board participation, labour representatives do not use their position to exercise any decisive 
influence on plant level decision making and thus the daily running o f the company is 
dominated by managerial prerogative. Section III argues that also in collective bargaining 
over wages and working conditions the role o f unions has for a long time remained 
extremely limited as agreements hardly ever went beyond provisions o f the respective 
Labour Laws. Although more recently, company unions have begun to show a higher 
awareness o f their employee welfare protection function and they argue that it is them who 
protects the workers rather than management, they still do not feel responsible for certain 
groups o f peripheral workers, such as agency workers.
Despite the de-jure and de-facto expansion o f managerial authority, the non-economic 
organising logic o f a ‘paternalist’ firm has been preserved. Enterprise governance is 
constructed in a way that employee representatives constrain managerial authority to a 
certain extent through the commitment o f employee protection. The classical argument o f 
union weakness in post-communism that I discussed in Chapter II is thus reconsidered 
through the prism o f the normative societal re-embedding. Unions are weak not only
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because they do not have organisational capacity or sufficiently resources or due to harsh 
legislation but rather because they have only slowly come to realise their protective 
function, as until recently this was - and still to a large extent is -  perceived to be the 
responsibility o f company’s management, while unions’ role is still perceived to be 
supporting the production process. Thus, despite dramatic institutional changes, the 
expectation o f the firm commitment towards the employees has been maintained. This logic 
o f appropriateness somewhat counterbalances the expansion o f managerial authority and 
allows the firm  maintain its ‘authoritarian paternalist’ organising logic.
/. Authoritarian governance despite institutionalised 
labour representation
This Section argues that managerial authority in the daily running o f the company has been 
strongly extended despite the introduction o f ‘more democratic’ institutions o f works 
councils and democratic trade unions. The new institutional forms o f industrial democracy 
introduced after the regime change, such as works councils and participation in the 
European Works Council did not significantly strengthen the role o f labour representatives 
who remain subordinated to management.
In continental Europe, where stakeholder systems o f enterprise governance dominate, 
managerial authority is counterbalanced by institutions o f representative industrial 
democracy. This enterprise system o f corporate governance is based on two pillars. First, 
there exists a dual form o f employee representation (for example, through works councils 
in Germany14, committee d’entreprise in France etc.) and thus it ‘ outsources’ the tensions 
and conflicts surrounding the wage bargaining to the trade unions on the multi-employer 
level, allowing for company level issues to be discussed and decided in a collaborative and 
cooperative atmosphere. Second, in many countries, large companies have two-tier board 
systems - the management/executive board and the supervisory board - and labour has a 
high weight in decision making o f the company through participation on the supervisory 
board.
The German labour law provides since 1952 for several strong rights for labour in the workplace. Works 
councils have important rights such as right to information on economic and business performance, right to consultation 
and the right to co-determination which guarantees the participation of labour representatives in the meetings of the 
supervisory boards in large companies.
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In Central Europe, national legislations provided early on for collectively organised 
employment relations at the enterprise level through the right to form trade unions. Three 
people can establish a trade union in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As far as works 
councils are concerned, following the German example, Hungary introduced works 
councils in 1992. However, apart from Hungary, the dual system o f representation did not 
gain ground in the 1990s. Other countries have had a ‘ simple’ employee representation 
through trade unions, i f  at all. The Hungarian labour law included most o f the provisions o f 
the Directive since 1992, when the two-channel system o f employee representation was 
introduced through establishing the information right o f works councils. However, a 2005 
amendment further strengthened the position o f labour. According to the law and restated 
or sometimes slightly expanded in collective agreements, labour representatives have 
consultation rights concerning employment contracts, mass redundancies and with regard to 
measures that concern a large number o f employees (Jurgens and Krzywdzinski 2007:22).
Table 8: Formal labour participation rights in the four subsidiaries of the VW Group




Yes, 1/3 Yes, 1/3 No Yes, 1/3
Inform ation and 
consultation
Regular meetings Regular meetings Regular meetings WC active since 
mid-1990s
Source: own compilation
Yet in the early 2000s these rights were strengthened through adjustments o f the respective 
national labour laws to suit the 2002/14 European Directive on information and 
consultation. Information and consultation rights were extended through adjustment o f 
national laws in 2001 in the Czech Republic, in 2002 in Slovakia (Kohl and Platzer 2004) 
and in 2006 in Poland. Works councils were made legal in the Czech Republic, although 
only in cases when there were no trade unions. The Czech ‘residual’ model (Marginson and 
Meardi 2006) was an invention that insured trade union power as it established works 
councils only in plants with no trade union presence. I f  a trade union was formed, the 
works council has to be dissolved. This rule allowed the trade union to be the only 
employee representative in the work place. Slovakia and Poland took over the ‘ residual’ 
Czech model first but in 2003 Slovakia moved to a fu lly  dual system o f representation 
joining Hungary (Kohl and Platzer 2004: 135). Poland’s changed legislation in 2006, 
finally also introducing works councils in companies with 100 or more employees from 
2006 and in companies with 50 or more employees from 2008. However, unions and
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management can also sign an agreement about not introducing works councils. In a short 
period after the passing o f the new legislation in 2006, there have been four times more 
agreements between unions and management not to establish works councils (3965 vs. 
1019) (Skupien 2006) than before 2006. Thus, even i f  works councils are legally allowed, 
trade unions dominate employee representation in Poland.
Overall, today, there are two models o f employment relations in Central Europe. The first 
group is a dual system o f representation that can be found since 1992 in Hungary and since 
2003 in Slovakia. The second is that o f the Czech Republic and Poland where there are 
either trade unions or works councils with unions having a priority or at least a possibility 
o f functioning as works councils. Thus, independently from the fact i f  the formal institution 
o f a works council is brought into existence or not in a specific workplace, information and 
consultation rights that are stipulated in 2002 EU Directive 2002/14 on information and 
consultation have been put in place in all four countries by the early/mid 2000s.
The four VW  subsidiaries have been precursors on the use o f information and consultation 
rights. In all four subsidiaries labour-management interaction and exchange has taken place 
almost since the privatisation - through works councils or/and trade unions. In Audi Gyor, 
this relationship is most institutionalised as labour force is represented by works councils 
that however closely cooperate with unions in the plant. A works council was established in 
1994. There are regular monthly meetings with the HR manager and in cases o f urgent 
issues (Kelemen Interview August 2007). Unions and works councils’ leaders have shown 
certain assertiveness in their statements as far as their relations with management are 
concerned. The union leader explained that the relations with management have not always 
been cooperative but that unions would like to preserve a stakeholder mode o f governance:
German managers know exactly what the roles o f trade unions and works councils 
are. However when they come to Hungary, they leave this knowledge at home and 
start from scratch but they have to realise that employees have rights in the 
enterprise (Kiss Interview August 2007).
This assertiveness probably is related to the fact that the management o f Audi Gyor was the 
one with the most adversarial attitude as it refused to recognise unions and support the 
works council in the early stages o f its activity (Keune and Toth 2007).
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In the other three subsidiaries no formal works councils exist but since the late 1990s, 
management uses the ‘ information and consultation’ tool extensively in an informal way. In 
Skoda, information o f and consultation with labour representatives has been taking place 
regularly: a special Economic Committee with representatives o f trade unions and 
management has been meeting regularly (Skoda presentation 2007). Today, unions meet 
the personnel manager once week, while twice a year there are meetings with the whole 
executive board (Interview Podhaisky December 2006). The Economic Committee is, 
however, clearly used to inform the labour force, not to consult it about outstanding 
decisions. The HR manager in Skoda referred to the Economic Committee as to the 
‘communication platform’ (Interview Podhaisky December 2006).
In VW  Poznan the development has been similar. Regular weekly meetings take place 
between the Union Committee and management representatives. Thus, unions in VW 
Poznan confirm that they were consulted and informed on a regular basis about all relevant 
developments (Interview March 2007). These regular meetings between management and 
unions/ works councils are very useful to facilitate the information flow within the plant. 
Information and consultation are managerial tools to communicate with the labour force, 
while unions see their goal in promoting employee engagement in production activities. 
Only in cases o f big crises such as mass redundancies can this tool be used to protect 
employees as trade unions can then strike a pre-emptive action.
Even in the most institutionalised case o f Audi Gyor, formal rights o f information and 
consultation have not been seriously used by employee representatives. In its early days, 
the works council did not have financial or other resources as management refused to 
provide those. Only over time the works council was able to acquire certain resources 
(Keune and Toth 2007). Its position however remains subordinate as its consultation and 
information rights are fairly limited -  certain protection in cases o f mass redundancies 
exists as there is a right o f consultation in circumstances that affect a large number o f 
workers. It has co-decision rights only in the sphere o f provisions for holiday homes and 
social funds and it has certain consultation rights in training issues. According to its 
president, the function o f the works council is to be a ‘direct link between employees and 
management in the general interest o f work peace and long-term preservation o f safe and 
peaceful work process’ (Kelemen Interview August 2007).
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Labour participation in the supervisory board is the second pillar o f the new industrial 
democracy institutions introduced in the national Labour Codes after the regime change. 
According to the respective national labour codes, labour representatives are included in the 
supervisory boards in all countries but Poland. Labour participation on the supervisory 
board exists in Skoda since 2000, in Audi Hungaria since 1995 (before the legal obligation 
o f 2001) and in VW  Slovakia since 1998. In Poland, the law does not require employee 
participation in supervisory boards and no employee participation exists in VW  Poznan. In 
contrast to the German case where in large companies one finds an almost fu ll parity 
between labour and employer representatives on the supervisory board, in Central Europe, 
labour representatives o f large companies have a much smaller proportion o f seats on the 
supervisory boards. Thus, labour in VW  Slovakia has one third o f seats on the supervisory 
board, while in Audi Gyor, there is one employee representative for 13 members o f 
supervisory board (Kelemen Interview August 2007).
Again, as in the case o f information and consultation rights, despite providing employee 
representatives with more information, supervisory board participation does not give labour 
direct power to influence important enterprise related decisions. Moreover, unions do not 
seem to take their role on the supervisory board very seriously. In one o f the interviews in 
VW  Slovakia, a union member admitted that she was not aware about her boss being a 
member o f the supervisory board (Slovakia Interview March 2007). Also in other plants, 
union participation in the meetings o f the supervisory board has had no implications for 
union activity. Thus, as has been the case o f information and consultation rights, this 
seemingly more democratically oriented institution continues strengthening managerial 
authority in the enterprise.
To sum up, in Central European VW  subsidiaries, the introduction o f more legal rights for 
workers had only a limited effect on the real powers o f labour representatives and the scope 
o f managerial authority has been extended. Labour representatives have not attempted to 
actively and strategically use their newly acquired rights to participate more actively in 
decision making o f the company. Their verbal assertiveness does not translate into 
mobilisation or collective action. This evidence from the four VW subsidiaries corresponds 
closely to the argument on ‘weak labour’ in post-communist Central Europe presented in 
Chapter II. The next two Sections attempt to explain this phenomenon. In contrast to earlier 
explanations, this outcome is argued to be founded on the non-economic organising logic, 
the logic o f appropriateness embedded in the state socialist production system.
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II. Company unions as management’s junior partners
The main argument o f this Section is that based on the experience o f state socialist 
production system and on the new ideas o f economic liberalism, union leaders accepted the 
dominant role o f management and contented themselves easily with their new role o f 
‘management’ s junior partner’ . Despite strong membership coverage, trade unions remain 
largely ‘company unions’ and thus management’s junior partners. In other words, unions 
do not challenge managerial prerogative and accept the expansion o f managerial authority. 
Even i f  there is a variety o f circumstances related to union resources, union structures and 
intra-union relations that weaken union’s position vis-a-vis management, the role o f the 
economic organising logic o f firm governance should not be ignored. In other words, 
unions themselves believe that a modem capitalist firm  needs to have a strong managerial 
authority.
A ll four VW  subsidiaries in Central Europe are strongly unionised. In the respective 
national contexts this is an exception rather than the rule. At the national level, unions in 
Central Europe have seen a very important fall in membership. With some rare exceptions, 
all EU-27 countries have been facing a decreasing union density. For the last ten years, a 
fall o f 10-20% has been documented. However, the four Visegrad countries still stand out 
as between 1995-2004 trade union density has literally halved (Eurofoundation 2007). In 
comparison to the national but also sectoral averages, the first factor that is striking when 
the subsidiaries o f MNCs and especially o f western European automotive MNCs are 
considered is their persistently high union membership. In comparison to the national level 
unions, the four VW  subsidiaries managed to build up and preserve a high level o f union 
membership. While country averages in union density dropped over the last decade to low 
levels o f 30% in Slovakia, 22% in the Czech Republic, 17% in Hungary and Poland 
(Eurofoundation 2007: 6), the unionisation in the automotive MNCs remained high at 50- 
90% o f the overall labour force and substantially higher among the blue-collar workers. In 
Skoda, the strongest union is the national based metal worker union OS KOVO. Its 
coverage rate is high: in 2006-7 the membership rate was 65-67% overall and in two 
factories outside o f the main site that are dominated by the blue-collar workers the 
membership rate was even higher, reaching up to 85%. In VW  Slovakia, the only union OZ 
KOVO covers 70% o f employees, while in Audi Hungaria the two existing unions covered 
around 50% o f all staff in 2007. As Audi was a greenfield investment, unions had to be 
established anew. However, at the very early stage and despite a ‘ sceptical’ attitude o f
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management, more than half o f the original 500 workers were unionised (Kiss Interview 
August 2007). Thus, unions managed to organise all four factories relatively early and over 
the 1990s they managed to build up or preserve a high level o f membership. Yet, despite 
these very impressive membership numbers, the level o f union mobilisation and 
participation in enterprise decision making is low: the junior position o f unions vis-a-vis the 
management is preserved. The junior position o f trade unions despite such high 
membership rates may be a surprise for a Western observer. I consider several explanatory 
variables for this phenomenon, among them the role o f economic organising logics o f firm 
governance.
Union pluralism is one possible explanation for this development. Metalworker unions in 
the four Visegrad countries are organised in large metalworker federations. However, while 
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic we find a unitary structure with one large federation - 
OZ KOVO and OS KOVO in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, respectively, in Hungary 
and Poland, pluralist structure o f unions prevail with metalworkers represented by three 
different unions - VASAS, LIGA and Workers Councils Union - in Hungary and two 
unions - OPZZ and Solidamosc - in Poland. A ll these unions existed before 1989 and thus 
with the regime change, they all faced the challenge to redefine their organisational identity 
and their goals at the beginning o f ‘transition’ . This was somewhat less relevant for Polish 
Solidamosc and the two new Hungarian unions as they were perceived as ‘new’ unions and 
thus did not carry the burden o f the communist past. The old metalworker union 
organisations, on the other hand, ‘ reformed from w ith in ’ and re-established themselves. 
Yet apart from these ‘officia l’ unions there is also a large number o f ‘ independent’ 
company unions in each country, even Solidamosc is often challenged by other, more left- 
wing unions. Such a high union pluralism is translated to high pluralism at the company 
level. In three out o f four VW  subsidiaries considered in this study there are two unions on 
the company premises: a large ‘officia l’ union and an independent union. Usually, one 
union is marginal and the other dominates. Thus, especially during the 1990s when their 
relationships were often characterised by a high level o f conflict, union pluralism was one 
reason for a subordinate union position. More recently, after a phase o f conflict during the 
1990s, the two respective unions started to cooperate and thus the chances for management 
to use ‘divide and rule’ strategy to weaken the common union position have somewhat 
diminished.
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Second, financial and organisational resources o f unions remain extremely limited. In Audi 
Hungaria, these accounted to 1% and 0.5% o f their wage for VASAS and the independent 
union, respectively. Also, company support remained for a long time very limited. Only 
since late 1990s unions can also increasingly rely on company support, financial and other. 
With the exception o f Skoda that has 20 full-time union members, there are only very few 
unionists who are paid by the company to do union work full-time. In VW  Slovakia, there 
are ten people working full-time and half o f them are paid by the company; this includes 
five ‘people o f trust’ . In Audi Hungaria, there are two full-time labour representatives - the 
chair o f the works council and one trade union representative -  who are paid by the 
company. Also, most resources are concentrated on dealing with employee concerns rather 
than developing own strategic positions. The rest o f the membership fees are put in a 
special fund. Yet overall Central European unions do not enjoy the strong institutional and 
organisational support that labour representatives have in many other continental European 
countries such as Germany.
Third, apart from the lack o f finances, ideological differences often prevail between the 
branch and company level unions. Thus, VASAS union representative at Audi Gyor stated 
that their relationship with the branch level union has been at arm’s length because the 
‘branch level union still has not overcome the legacies o f the previous regime’ (Interview 
Kiss August 2007). This organisational and ideological separation between company and 
branch level unions is another reason behind the weakness o f the branch level unions and 
their incapacity to generate alternative ideas on work organisation and company 
governance. A further related reason is the fact that branch level unions prefer to focus on 
two specific issues that they consider more urgent than company governance: first, 
recruiting new members in the SME sector that is largely unorganised and, second, 
developing union positions to broader economic reforms and legal reforms that post­
communist governments have been dealing with during the last 20 years and in which 
unions participate through tripartite fora (Mifka Interview March 2007).
Thus, we have seen that a number o f institutional, organisational and ideological factors 
contribute to union weakness. Yet among the factors behind unions’ junior position vis-a- 
vis management, the role o f the logic o f appropriateness that constitutes the organising 
logic o f firm  governance is crucial. In Central Europe, metalworker unions tend to be 
company unions. It is a company-based union identity that makes unions have their 
company as the main focus o f concern and thus not be interested in developing and
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supporting the branch level unions. In addition, in some companies, such as Audi, the 
independent unions prevail and thus the link to branch level unions does not exist. Thus, 
independently from the union being part o f a larger union federation or being fu lly 
‘ independent’ , the profiles and strategies o f unions have not been coordinated or guided by 
branch level unions, as the links to the higher level unions are practically non-existent. The 
main reason for that can, again, be found in the legacy o f state socialism, when unions were 
dependent on the Communist Party and were highly atomised. This atomisation reached 
such a high level that when a worker changed the company even within the same sector, he 
or she would have needed to jo in  the union again in the new company (Rode Interview 
March 2007).
This high level o f atomisation has been preserved in the self-perception o f unions even i f  
institutionally branch and higher level union structures still exist. The VW subsidiaries are 
no exception to this rule. Company unions have only very little interaction with the branch 
level and thus there are no strong branch level union elites that could engage into strategic 
thinking about own concepts and policies. Only a small proportion o f enterprise level funds 
goes to the branch level. The VW  subsidiaries are flagship companies with huge number o f 
members in comparison to the rest o f the economy, yet their contribution to the branch 
union funds is relatively limited. In Skoda, only 25% o f the membership fees goes to the 
national level o f OS KOVO (Eurofoundation 2006). In VASAS, it is 50% o f member fees 
collected at the company level that go to the branch level unions but this figure is 
undermined by the fact that this union is very small, having lost most o f its members to the 
independent company union. Furthermore, in most instances and especially pronounced in 
Poland, membership in the branch level union is not automatic but requires a joining fee 
that many company level unions cannot afford to pay (Cibiera Interview March 2007). This 
contributes to the fact that branch level unions are understaffed and short o f financial and 
organisational resources to develop their own alternative to management concepts.
I f  the national and branch level unions do not play an important role in supporting company 
union independent identity, thus downgrading unions to ‘management’ s junior partners’ , 
one could wonder i f  international union cooperation could at least partially take over this 
function. The integration o f union representatives in the European Works Councils (EWC) 
o f the VW  and General Works Council o f Audi AG are further institutional evolutions that 
could strengthen union position within the plants. Yet the evidence does not seem to 
support this hypothesis so far. The impact o f international union cooperation is insufficient
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to really make a substantial difference on development o f own concepts and perspectives 
that would be different from those o f management. As far as the integration in the EWC is 
concerned, in 1994, the European Union legislation provided for creation o f EWC in 
companies which are active in more than two countries and have a minimum o f 1000 
employees. The EWC in the VW  Group exists since 1992 i.e. before the European 
legislation, and the representatives o f Central European subsidiaries have been a part o f it 
from early on. Since Skoda’s incorporation in the VW  Group in 1991, first three, then two 
o f the trade union representatives have been participating in the VW  European Works 
Council. Other VW  plants have been participating in the VW  EWC from early on as well. 
In the case o f Audi, also from early on and before joining the EU in 2004, Hungarian WC 
representatives have been attending the meetings o f Audi’ s ‘ Gesamtbetriebsrat’ -  General 
Works Council. Yet the exposure to international dimension has been only limited in 
promoting an independent union identity and position. Union and works council 
representatives in Audi Gyor explained that in a situation o f conflict with the management, 
contacts with the German works councils in the headquarters were more helpful than 
annual meetings in a large international circle (Kiss Interview August 2007).
Thus, despite high levels o f union membership, unions remain in their ‘junior partner’ role 
in relation to management and thus indirectly support the expansion o f managerial 
authority. No own agenda was developed on issues o f work organisation, while union 
control over work place organisation and arrangements is low. In three out o f four cases, 
company unions play the role o f works councils in their daily interaction with management 
and in the fourth case there is a close cooperation between works councils and trade unions. 
One could have thought that this would foster the development o f independent concepts o f 
work organisation among labour representatives. Yet this has not happened. In VW 
Slovakia, until mid-1990s, trade unions are described by the personnel manager as being 
‘dependent on the management’ (Holecek Interview March 2007).
Finally, the economic organising logic o f enterprise governance that supports the expansion 
o f managerial power has come to dominate also trade unions’ way o f thinking. This 
becomes obvious when the unionist and works council leader at Audi Gyor states when 
speaking about company’s governance that ‘ it ’s not a democracy here’ (Kelemen Interview 
August 2007). A t large, unions leave management ‘ to manage’ while unions take care o f 
worker grievances. This approach was tellingly described by a German expatriate manager 
in VW  Slovakia when he looked back at the introduction o f changes in work organisation:
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It is not like we do not communicate here with unions but the resistance and all the 
doubts/objections that you would get in Germany, these doubts are here much 
smaller. In Germany, you have to describe all the projects in great detail before you 
can implement them. Here, it is a trial and error approach (Zeller Interview March 
2007).
Thus, despite institutionalisation o f certain limited legal labour representation rights during 
the late transition, the economic organising logic o f authoritarian firm governance has 
become dominant. Managerial authority has been expanded and became the dominant 
feature o f firm  governance, with unions adopting the role o f ‘management’s junior 
partners’ . Among the factors that have contributed to this outcome are union structures, 
internal union divisions, lack o f resources but also the economic enterprise organising logic 
o f unions that accept the dominant management position.
III. Enterprise as a welfare protector
While the last Section described the authoritarian logic in firm  governance that remains 
dominant despite important institutional changes o f privatisation and institutionalisation o f 
certain labour rights, this Section deals with the non-economic organising logic o f 
enterprise governance, that o f the welfare protector. Because ‘ [mjoral considerations and 
social ties o f an economic actor lim it his strategic options and thus also his power15’ 
(Streeck 2007: 15), this other enterprise logic provides -  i f  not a counter-balance -  then at 
least a certain limitation to the expansion o f the managerial logic described in the previous 
Section.
The non-economic enterprise logic that I refer to is that o f a ‘welfare protector’ . This 
enterprise organising logic is not unique to post-communism. The phenomenon o f ‘welfare 
corporatism’ was described for Japanese companies (Dore 1973) as well as later for large 
American companies (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1985). Thus, more generally, ‘core’ firms in 
dual economies tend to have work and employment practices associated with welfare 
corporatism. Yet, in post-communism, non-economic enterprise logics o f state socialism 
have certainly been an important factor behind this phenomenon. As enterprises were 
responsible for providing welfare and employment benefits during state socialism, in post­
communism, the enterprise and the management are still expected to ensure an appropriate 
wage level and employment benefits and social conditions such as holiday provisions while
15 Own translation
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unions do not see themselves responsible for ensuring appropriate wage and employment 
conditions o f employees.
Important institutional changes took place during post-communist transformation in the 
field o f employment contracts and wage setting. First, employment contracts as well as 
wage setting were liberalised and freed from the dictate o f Party-led administrative 
planning. However, a certain re-regulation subsequently took place providing a new legal 
framework. Today, employment contract provisions are regulated to a large extent by the 
provisions that are set out in the respective Labour Codes and in collective bargaining 
agreements. Collective bargaining was introduced in 1990 in Slovakia, 1991 in the Czech 
Republic, in 1992 in Hungary and in 1994 in Poland. Yet collective bargaining at the 
branch level remains an exception rather than the rule; single employer bargaining 
dominates Central Europe.
In the case o f the VW  Group, most issues o f human resource management have remained a 
prerogative o f local management where headquarters do not intervene. Despite the fact that 
these company level collective agreements represent a new, post-communist type o f 
institutional arrangement, what emerges behind this new institutional framework is that the 
firm  is still a paternalist towards its employees. Collective agreements show a very limited 
negotiation position o f employee representatives, with management in control and defining 
most o f provisions when agreements are concluded. Thus, as far as conditions o f 
employment contracts are concerned, unions to a large extent rely on state provisions and 
management’s goodwill to define those. As far as wage increases are concerned, unions for 
a long time have not seen it as their most important task to push for higher wages, neither 
during the times o f early transition when real wages were falling, nor in the late 1990s- 
early 2000s when the enterprises had a very high productivity growth. The Section argues 
that wages slightly above branch level averages and indexation o f wages only to the level 
o f inflation have long remained the scope o f union goals. Only very recently, this approach 
o f implicit wage moderation o f unions was replaced by more pronounced demands o f 
higher wage increases.
In the three VW  subsidiaries in Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic, the first 
collective agreements were already concluded in the early 1990s. In VW  Slovakia the first 
collective agreement was signed in 1993, and subsequently renewed every two years. 
Similarly, at Skoda collective agreements are concluded regularly since the early 1990s. In
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Audi Gyor, a first collective agreement was signed only in the early 2000s. Today, 
collective agreements exist in all four plants with wages, working time and work 
organisation being the three central issues at stake. These agreements follow practically the 
same format everywhere: while wage agreements are concluded for one or two years, 
further issues on working time etc. are re-negotiated in a five to three year rhythm. The 
dominance o f the management in signing collective agreements has been especially visible 
in Audi Gyor, where the management has been looking for a ‘win-win situation’ . Collective 
negotiations between unions and management took place for six years without an 
agreement and only in 2001 the management became serious about collective bargaining as 
the national employment law was amended introducing more possibilities for negotiating 
working time flexibility.
MNCs have been in a comfortable position in Central European countries as they can pay 
wages above branch averages but still keep remuneration far below the productivity 
increases. Thus, VW, like most other large MNCs, has been famous for paying wages 
above branch averages but wage increases mainly cover inflation increases and do not 
cover a substantial part o f productivity increases thus they do not always allow maintaining 
the purchasing power and achieving ‘a balanced participation in productivity increases’ , as 
the European Metalworker Federation coordination rule demands (EMF 2006: 49). Thus, 
Skoda has been the sixth16 employer in terms o f wage levels in the Czech Republic (OS 
KOVO Interview). With their wages at 660 euro in 2001 (M ikulikova 2002) and at 730 
euros in 2007 Skoda employees were 10% above the national average (Handelsblatt 
02.05.0717). VW  Bratislava’s pay conditions are also above sectoral collective agreements 
as well as above sectoral averages. The average wage in VW  Slovakia was 602 euro in 
2001 (Mikulikova 2002) and 657 euro (32,000 Slovak Krona) in 2006 which was
1 ftpractically twice the national average o f 18,000 krona. In collective negotiations in VW 
Poznan, trade unions managed to achieve wage increases above inflation indexation, but 
the margins remain low. Upon its establishment in Gyor 1993, Audi Hungaria set wages at 
a very low level -  32,000 forint -  but still remained 15% above the branch average o f 
competitors. In 2007, the average wage in the plant was 800 euro or 200,000 forint (Kiss
16 W ith  T R W  occupying the first, Bosch the second place
17 A rtic le  ‘ Das K reu z m it den K osten'
18 T P C A  first tried to recruit people to w o rk  on 8 ,0 0 0  C Z  krona per m onth (V o le s  In te rv ie w  12 .2 0 0 6 ) T h e  starting w age level 
today is gross 12,000 C Z  K w h ich  is 4 0 0  euro and 80 0  euro in PPP.
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Interview August 2007). But this important increase in nominal wages can be explained to 
a large extent by high inflation levels in the 1990s (20-25% per year). In spite o f this large 
increase o f approximately 10% per year over a 15 year period, most o f the time wage 
increases were just covering inflation (Kiss Interview August 2007). Thus, despite high 
union density and thus potentially high mobilisation, real wage increases in four VW 
subsidiaries have been kept very low, especially when compared to the high productivity 
increases.
One reason behind this weakness o f collective agreements is inadequate or absent higher 
level collective agreement provisions. Although in Slovakia and to a lesser extent in the 
Czech Republic, higher level collective agreements exist in the metalworking sector, they 
do not cover automotive industry. In Poland, branch level negotiations in the metalworking 
sector took place for several years and then collapsed in 1997, due to refusal o f employers 
to continue negotiations due to difficu lt economic circumstances (Konowrocki Interview 
March 2007). The Hungarian unions probably receive most support from the branch level: 
the National Interest Reconciliation Committee in which representatives o f branch level 
unions participate, formulate guidelines for individual sectors that deal with wage increases 
and certain other issues. The nominal wage increases that the Committee suggests are based 
on inflation and the sector’s last year’s productivity and represent ‘ the floor’ for company 
negotiations. They are thought to allow company level unions to have a stronger position in 
the negotiations with the management (Szoke Interview June 2008). Yet these guidelines 
are not obligatory and it is difficult to say i f  they have an impact on wage increases. Thus, 
the weakness o f company level agreements can partially be attributed to the non-existence 
o f higher level collective agreements.
Structural factors thus are important in explaining the limited protection function o f unions; 
however, the normative dimension also matters. Until very recently, company unions did 
not see wage increases as their main field o f action. For a long time, there were only very 
few tensions in the collective bargaining process. Only recently the situation has started to 
change. In Skoda, the unions threatened to go on strike in 2000 and 2001, but unions and 
management managed to reach a compromise after all (M ikulikova 2002: 50). Apart from 
that, unions did not use their strong membership base to establish more conflictual position 
with the management over wages. Cooperation with the management was the norm up to 
the mid-2000s as wage increases were considered broadly appropriate. Only since the mid- 
2000s, the situation has been gradually changing with union wage demands becoming
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somewhat more pronounced. During the round o f wage bargaining at the Skoda Auto in 
spring 2007, a compromise was reached setting the nominal wage increase at almost 13% 
with expected inflation rate o f 2-3%. In VW  Slovakia, the wage negotiations that were 
concluded in early 2007 resulted in a wage increase o f 7.5% for two years, somewhat above 
expected inflation. In Audi Hungaria, the wage negotiations for 2007-2008 resulted in a 
wage increase o f 7-10% (increase was a fixed sum) with an expected inflation rate o f 6%. 
On several occasions the wage negotiations become more prolonged and tougher, lasting 
sometimes several months, as the examples o f Skoda and Audi Gyor show. This can be 
interpreted as a slight increase in assertiveness among trade union leaders. Yet despite this 
somewhat more pronounced wage growth and tougher wage negotiations, real wage 
increases still remain far below the double-digit productivity increases. Thus, the ‘welfare 
protection’ side o f collective agreements between management and unions is fairly limited; 
it is thus still up to the managers to set up satisfactory wage provisions.
An explanation for such a limited engagement o f unions in the area o f wages is the non­
economic organising logic shared by unions and management that it is the company that 
should provide for employees’ welfare. This widely established organising logic that sees 
firm director and firm management as a welfare and employment protector and provider 
has been extensively documented in the literature on post-communism. For instance, 
Zaslavsky writes about a ‘ state-dependent worker’ (Zaslavsky 1995). Also, Hungarian 
unionists, when describing the consequences o f mass redundancies that took place in the 
automotive industry in the 1990s confirmed that ‘ for some people, [a redundancy] is a 
tragedy’ (Interview Csurgo December 2008). They pointed out that in the Hungarian 
language the word for a self-employed person -  kenyszervallalkozo -  literally translated 
means a desperate or a forced self-employed individual (Interview Mezo December 2008). 
Being self-employed is considered to be an exception rather than the rule; a default option 
for the vast majority o f people is still to be employed.
As far as the VW  subsidiaries are concerned, this shared non-economic organising logic o f 
the enterprise being a welfare protector o f its employees has been preserved. So far, the 
management has fulfilled this logic o f appropriateness by paying wages slightly above the 
national and sectoral averages, as shown above, and by providing certain further 
employment and welfare benefits above the legal requirements. For example, Skoda’s 
weekly working time is fixed by collective agreement at 37.5h which is below the 40h limit 
set by the law. Similarly, in VW  Slovakia collective agreement fixes the official working
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time has been at 37.5h, down from 40h prior to 2004 (Petrova Interview March 2007). One 
more improvement that has been emphasised by the HR manager at Skoda are holiday 
provisions: Skoda’s employees are entitled to five weeks holidays, while the law provides 
only for four weeks (Podhaisky Interview December 2006).
Furthermore, MNCs are famous for providing more stable employment contracts, thus 
working in a MNC increases individual employment stability. Open-ended employment 
contracts are still the most common scenario even i f  some flexibility has been introduced in 
national labour laws, such as the possibility o f several consecutive fixed-term annual 
contracts. In VW  Slovakia, the collective agreement provides some protection against mass 
redundancies in the form o f promises o f ‘appropriate activities that would stop or reduce 
mass redundancies’ as well as a requirement that individual cases o f firing are discussed 
with the unions (Volkswagen-Slovakia 2007: 8). In VW  Slovakia, an annual employment 
contract is changed into an open-ended contract after the first year, while the law allows for 
three follow-up annual contracts. Taking into account the general casualisation o f the 
employment relationship across the post-communist economies, this additional stability o f 
employment that is associated with MNCs is highly valued by the employees. Although 
these provisions have been negotiated collectively, there is only a limited role o f unions as 
most MNCs have such arrangements (change from fixed-term to open ended employment 
contract after one year) (Mikulikova 2002). In Audi Gyor, the vast majority o f 5,400 
employees have an open ended contract after a three months probation period, and there are 
only 300 employees on fixed-term contract whose annual contracts have been renewed for 
another year, while national legal provisions allow fixed-term contracts to be renewed five 
times (Radi Interview August 2007). Thus, employment stability, as set out in the 
employment contracts, is largely regulated by the state and company management and 
unions can only rarely claim a role in improving these conditions.
The organising logic that sees the enterprise as a welfare protector is reinforced by 
perceptions that MNCs are ‘good employers’ . The general perception is that large firms are 
better as, as discussed above, they are more stable employers, but also providers o f many 
additional welfare benefits such as additional 13th wage, health care, holiday vouchers etc. 
For example, in Audi Gyor these additional provisions amount to 200,000 forint or 800 
euro per employee per year. Thus, despite the fact that the wage gap between MNCs and 
sectoral local averages became much smaller than what was the case in the early 1990s
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when these firms were first recruiting, these additional benefits represent an additional 
attraction o f MNCs, strengthening their ‘welfare protector’ function.
More generally, the often reported image o f VW  Group as a ‘good employer’ is an example 
o f the non-economic enterprise organising logic o f a welfare protector. During state 
socialism, turnover rates in the peripheral reserve labour force were high. They had a 
negative but not disastrous effect for production because the missing workers did less harm 
to the production process than what would be the case in a modem capitalist economy. 
During economic transformation, economy-wide labour turnover increased dramatically. 
This has often been attributed to low wages. However, the majority o f MNCs -  although 
there are a number o f notable exceptions to this rule such as TPCA in the Czech Republic -  
were able to build up a reputation o f ‘good employers’ so that the enterprise organising 
logic o f the welfare protector was preserved. The VW  subsidiaries are such examples with 
relatively high perceived employment stability. It has been underlined in the interviews that 
the average tenure o f the workforce in the VW subsidiaries is still exceptionally high. Thus, 
Skoda’s average tenure has remained high, at 11.9 years, despite the low average age o f 
employees o f 38 years (Skoda 2005). In VW  Slovakia, labour turnover has been more 
severe. Thus, already in the m id-1990s, retention has been a problem due to low wages, 
long distance commuting and high labour intensity. In Audi Gyor, the human resource 
manager was proud to report that the turnover rate had been going down and had overall 
been below the national average. The rate was 1% per month in 2000, while the goal was 
0.4% (Radi Interview August 2007). Overall, compared to the national data, these turnover 
problems remain limited.
Thus, in the VW  subsidiaries, the usual tenure remains high, above the national average. 
This has been emphasised by stakeholders as a genuine advantage. The above average 
employment stability is an additional bonus for employees who value the ‘protectionist’ 
function o f the company. To demonstrate the popularity o f working for a MNC, the trade 
union leader in Audi Gyor proudly reported how in 2006 there have been 2,000 candidates 
for 100 positions (Kelemen, Kiss Interview August 2007).
To sum up the argument, in most cases the ‘company’ , rather than the trade union, is 
associated with the employee ‘welfare protection’ . Neither the wage premia that these 
companies’ employees have enjoyed in comparison to the sectoral averages, nor the 
employment stability, nor the attractive additional benefit packages were based on unions’
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efforts or class struggle. Most o f these company advantages were given by VW subsidiaries 
to their employees due to the goodwill o f management. I f  the goodwill o f the employer was 
not there, it is d ifficult to imagine these benefits would still be provided.
The previous paragraphs elaborated on the fact that the enterprise has been conceptualised 
as an authoritarian welfare protector. Trade unions do not need to insist on this non­
economic organising logic because management lives up to the employee expectations o f 
employment stability and welfare provision. Yet a qualification o f this argument is needed: 
not all employees enjoy this enterprise protection, as certain groups are excluded from it. 
The organising logic o f the authoritarian welfare protection does not seem to apply to them. 
This goes back to the state socialist tradition o f internal labour segmentation. During post­
communist period, the internal labour segregation remained: segmentation o f the labour 
force into the core and periphery has been one o f the characteristics o f work organisation. 
Today, peripheral workers are employed by employment agencies rather than by the 
production plants themselves; they are low paid and not unionised.
In Germany, employment security has been at the heart o f IG Metall’ s involvement 
(Jurgens 1997: 112). In German VW  plants, unions were able to influence the working 
conditions even for people on different types o f contracts (JUrgens and Krzywdzinski
2006). In contrast, in Central European subsidiaries, this has been a field where unions have 
not played any role. A ll VW  plants have a higher level o f external flexib ility than VW 
Germany with higher levels o f agency work which is not covered by collective agreements. 
Overall, in the Visegrad countries, when comparing across sectors, the automotive industry 
has one o f the highest numbers o f agency workers as a share o f the total workforce. This 
share o f agency work is around 10% but can go up to 30% during peak production periods.
Although the share o f agency workers varies from plant to plant, the overall recourse to 
external flexib ility is larger in VW  subsidiaries in Central Europe than in Germany (see 
table 9 for overview). Skoda had a total labour force o f 26,000 employees19 with 15,000 
blue-collar workers in 2007. In 1996, Skoda employed 1,300 agency workers with high 
month-to-month fluctuation. In the mid-2000s, almost one sixth o f the total labour force, 
4,000 workers had temporary contracts and were ‘ leased’ from an employment agency 
(Eurofoundation 2006). In VW  Bratislava, cooperation with employment agencies started
The main plant in Mlada Boleslav had 22 000 employees, with two others Kvasiny and Vrchlabi 
employing 1 700 and 1 100 people, respectively.
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in as early as 1998. In 2007, the plant had a total o f 10,800 employees, with 9,300 core 
employees and 1,600 blue-collar workers employed through nine employment agencies. At 
the beginning, the share o f contractuals who were practically all blue-collar workers was 
relatively low at about 5% o f the workforce; in 2007 this share increased to 18-20% 
(Holecek Interview March 2007). The situation is similar in Poland. In 2007, VW  Poznan 
had 6 600 employees, but only one third were core workers; one third had temporary 
contract and one third were hired by an employment agency. Audi Gyor started its 
cooperation with temporary agencies in 2006 due to changes in legislation which made this 
possible. So far, it had the lowest number o f agency workers -  in 2007 these were 260 out 
o f 5,400 overall and out o f 3,200 blue-collar workers. Yet as the HR manager made clear, 
such low recourse to agency workforce is only due to changes and missing clarity in the 
national labour law:
First, in 2003-2004, upon introduction, these new provisions were free. Yet in July 
2007, there has been a change in the labour law. Employment agency workers have 
more and more rights in other industries like construction. This is why Firms are 
afraid o f using these new provisions as they are afraid that workers might slowly 
change their status o f employees (Radi Interview August 2007).
Table 9: Use of agency work in VW Group plants
Plant Share of leased employees in total 
staff
R epresented by unions
VW Germany Around 5% Yes
VW Skoda 15% No
VW Bratislava 18%-20% No
VW Poznan 33% No
VW Audi 4% N/A
For comparison:
Opel Bochum 20% Yes
GM Opel Gliwice 5-10% No
Source: own calculation on the basis o f diverse sources, including interviews
In addition to agency workers to whom the ‘protection function’ o f the enterprise does not 
extend, a small number o f employees are ‘borrowed’ from other companies, such as 
supplier companies. Although the work o f these employees is highly integrated into the 
production process o f the assembly plant -  they practically do the same work as VW 
employees -  they are also not covered by the enterprise ‘protection function’ : their 
remuneration and collective representation rights are different from those o f the core labour 
force (Interview December 2006). In certain cases, these workers are covered by other 
companies’ collective agreements, but in many cases they are not covered by any
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agreement. The employment conditions and remuneration o f agency workers are 
substantially lower than these o f ‘core workers’ . A t Audi Gyor, their wages represent on 
average 50% o f the Audi workers average; they do not receive any additional benefits that 
Audi workers enjoy such as holiday or meal vouchers. For these workers, ‘we just have to 
fu lfil labour code requirements’ , reported the top HR manager (Radi Interview August
2007).
In Germany, agency work in VW  plants amounts to around 5% o f the overall workforce 
and is covered by collective agreements. Trade unions have achieved that they can 
represent and bargain for contractuals (Jurgens and Krzywdzinski 2006). For Central 
European VW  subsidiaries, this has not been the case so far especially because in this field 
there are no legal obligations to have a union agreement. But in most cases, unions also do 
not feel responsible for the agency workers. When asked why this is the case, the 
Solidamosc union leader from GM/Opel explained that representing agency workers would 
be difficu lt as it is not clear who is their employer, the agency or the firm  and thus it would 
be difficu lt to know with whom to negotiate the collective agreement (Cibiera Interview 
March 2007). In Skoda, the experience with non-core workers went far back into the state 
socialist era which might explain why the trade union’s stance has been overall quite 
unsupportive o f peripheral workers.
Before 1989, Skoda employed prison labour to take care o f undesirable jobs (Pavlinek and 
Smith 1998). The company employed up to 1,600 prison convicts and 1,520 Vietnamese 
workers. The convicts worked in the oldest and physically most exhaustive parts o f the 
production line, e.g. they made up 90% o f the press shop (Pavlinek 2008: 79). In the early 
1990s, the distinction between the core and periphery workers was very pronounced. When 
production numbers were volatile, employees -  mainly foreign workers -  were laid o ff 
(Pavlinek 2008: 87). In the mid-1990s, the situation improved slightly. Skoda unions 
seemed to have gained a slightly stronger position and were able to partially protect non­
core workers. In 1995, employees o f module suppliers that were employed on the premises 
o f Skoda were covered by Skoda negotiated collective agreements concerning wages (Dorr 
and Kessel 1995: 19). Furthermore, employees o f module suppliers could participate in ‘all 
social service provisions o f Skoda -  from parking spaces, canteen and social rooms to 
company health care centre and enterprise health insurance funds’ (Dorr and Kessel 1995: 
20). The company also has the obligation to take back those employees who were working 
for the module suppliers.
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Yet later reports show a less optimistic picture. What Skoda ended up with was a 
production process with suppliers directly integrated in the assembly production process. 
This mechanism that has also been described as ‘ strategic insourcing’ (Pavlinek and Smith 
1998: 627) which means that component producers bring their products and assemble them 
directly on the Skoda premises. The employees o f these supplier companies working at 
Skoda are not covered by collective agreements, have thus lower wages and fewer rights 
than the core workers. In addition to ‘strategic insourcing’ , agency workers remained the 
norm. Interestingly, to underline the difference between the core ‘ labour collective’ and the 
periphery agency workers, the latter are hired from Poland (Pavlinek and Smith 1998). For 
peripheral workers, the non-economic enterprise organising logic o f welfare and 
employment protection does not seem to hold; they experience a far greater degree o f 
commodification o f work. Pavlinek reported that Skoda management was planning to 
‘ replace Polish workers with cheaper and, according to one manager, “ less demanding” 
Ukrainian labour’ (Pavlinek and Smith 1998: 628). Thus, the argument o f enterprise’s 
continuous organising logic o f ‘welfare protection’ does not extend to the peripheral labour 
force due to ideational reasons: these workers are considered to be outside o f the 
enterprise’s sphere o f responsibility and thus the enterprise management does not feel the 
obligation to protect these workers. This attitude has been shared by unions that did not feel 
responsible for protecting the welfare o f the peripheral workers.
However, some recent developments seem to suggest that union identity as pure company 
unions has started to change, albeit slowly. First, in September/October 2007 Poland saw 
the signing o f a cooperation agreement among Solidarity trade union leaders from seven 
automotive companies. Their main goals are pay increases and improvement o f certain 
working conditions but this cooperation intends to strengthen the position o f individual 
unions in respective companies (Towalski 2007). Although pay and other matters still 
remain to be negotiated at the individual company level, this initiative o f inter-company 
union coordination and information exchange is a step towards a union activity whose 
impact can go beyond the company level. Second, for the first time the issue o f temporary 
workers was included into the agreement between management and unions at Opel Gliwice 
collective dispute that ended in November 2007. The company agreed to change the status 
o f some o f the workers from temporary to permanent. It declared that the policy o f taking 
over temporary staff would become a regular company policy, and it also defined a ceiling 
for the share o f temporary staff in the company’s overall labour force (Czarzasty 2007). Yet
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the scale o f these recent union activities remains very limited and cannot be considered as a 
structural break with what we have observed for the past two decades.
To sum up, during the transition period, the firm ’s management has been expected to 
provide for workers’ employment and welfare. The non-economic enterprise organising 
logic o f ’welfare protector’ has been preserved despite a dramatically changed legal and 
institutional regulation o f employment relationship. It is only slowly that this enterprise 
norm has been changing and unions have been feeling more responsible for protecting the 
labour force.
Conclusion
This Chapter describes how managerial authority expanded, representing a Polanyian 
movement o f economic liberalism, but how despite the strong institutional change led by 
the economic logic o f consequence, certain dimensions o f a non-economic logic o f 
appropriateness have been preserved. The expansion o f managerial authority followed the 
instrumental logic related to economic liberalism. The logic that all stakeholders, including 
union representatives, share has been that management needs to have the full freedom to 
‘govern’ the company, as a means to some other higher goal. Despite the legal position o f 
labour representatives, such as unions and works councils, improving over the years, 
employee representatives remain management’ s junior partner. Firstly, the metalworkers 
unions have not managed to come up with their own concepts concerning firm  governance 
remaining de facto company unions. They closely follow managerial arguments and 
prerogatives around production and upgrading. Secondly, unions have not identified wages 
as their main focus, and, despite high membership rates, they have not challenged 
management on wage issues despite very high productivity increases. Pre-emptive 
concession bargaining has been the norm.
However, the expansion o f managerial authority has been at least partially counter­
balanced by a stakeholders’ non-economic organising logic o f firm governance which is 
informed by the logic o f appropriateness. According to this organising logic, one o f the 
final goals o f company functioning is its role o f a ‘welfare protector’ . Unions did not try to 
challenge the strong managerial position because the organising logic o f the firm acting as 
employee welfare protector has remained strong, also in trade union thinking. Unions did 
not need to insist on this common organising logic because the VW  management lived up 
to the employee expectations o f high (or at least above-average) employment stability and
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welfare provisions. The expectation o f managers adopting the protector role can be seen as 
a normative societal re-embedding o f increased managerial power: the company is expected 
to provide workers with wages and working conditions above the sectoral average. Thus, 
the enterprise continues to function as an authoritarian paternalist, although in a 
configuration different to state socialism.
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VI. The enterprise as a source of competitive industrial 
capabilities
Chapter III described how state socialist enterprises could be characterised as sources o f 
competitive industrial capabilities, as during state socialism, industrial capabilities were 
considered as strategic resources, even i f  the focus o f administrative planners was rather on 
heavy industry than on consumer goods. The other dimension o f the non-economic 
enterprise organising logic was the productionist attitude: employment stability based on 
the administratively set output targets was a key feature o f state socialist production 
regime. A shift from state socialism to market economy in this context meant an adaptation 
o f employment and production numbers to ‘market demands’ and the law o f value. In 
market economies, the volatility in product demand can imply an increased flexib ility o f 
production and o f employment levels which could endanger employment stability. Thus, 
with the introduction o f a market economic rationale, state socialist non-economic 
enterprise institutions have been challenged by the new logic o f market-driven efficiency 
and competitiveness. The combination o f private ownership, pressures o f international 
competition and the increased role o f cost efficiency were expected to make economic 
competitiveness to the predominant measure o f enterprise performance.
State withdrawal from the production process and the arrival o f foreign owners were 
associated with a larger focus on profitability, the new desired field o f managerial action. In 
other words, these reforms that were characterised by a strong instrumental rationality, the 
logic o f consequence related to cost-efficiency and profitability. However, this Chapter 
argues that despite important institutional changes in the structure o f markets and firm 
ownership, preserving industrial capabilities has remained an enterprise organising logic for 
local actors, a non-economic logic o f appropriateness, an end in itself. Thus, an 
understanding o f the enterprise as a social organism and a source o f industrial capabilities 
remains alive. Despite the new institutions o f increased competition, the expectation o f 
enterprise commitment to its employees survived from state socialist era to the present day. 
This commitment is associated with what I call the ‘productionist stance’ o f local actors. 
Embedded in the state socialist legacy, it is based on the desire to preserve employment 
numbers and to develop local industrial capabilities, even i f  it sometimes goes contrary to 
the pure logic o f cost efficiency and short-term financial profitability.
149




Post-communist production in Central European V W  subsidiaries
Enterprise  as a source of 
com petitive  industrial 
capabilities:
extens ive  grow th m odel 
asso ciated  with
N on-econo m ic  
productionist logic  




E nterprise  as a source of 
com petitive  industrial 
capabilities: 
coalition for brand  
survival and for 
m odernisation o f plants: 
investm ent, upgrading of 
industrial capabilities, 
building up local 
innovation underp inned
quantita tive  production  
ta rg ets  and politically  
m otivated  allocation of 
resources. B ureaucra tic  
com petition for
resources
E conom ic logic o f bv collective aareements
financialisation of firm
perform ance, with cost-
effic iency and short-term
profitability becom ing m ain
ob jectives of firm
perform ance.
An important industrial upgrading took place during the late 1990-early 2000s in all four 
VW  subsidiaries in production volumes but, most importantly, in production depth, product 
range and strategic positioning within the VW  Group. In all four subsidiaries, the industrial 
upgrading was linked to a dramatic increase in employment volumes. To a certain extent 
this industrial upgrading and employment increase have been a part o f the overall Group’s 
strategy that largely depended on decisions about transnational distribution o f production 
volumes and technology investments mainly made in the VW  Group headquarters. 
Nevertheless, the Central European valuation o f the industrial capabilities has been an 
important factor for industrial upgrading and employment growth. The industrial 
capabilities are valued as a final end, as a value in itself, rather than as a means to an end. 
Despite the new ‘market’ organising logic o f greater efficiency, increased market 
competition and the law o f value, local management has preserved a clear ‘productionist’ 
attitude in its desire to attract more investment to the production location, to ensure 
production over time and to upgrade. Again, these have been final goals, valued for their 
own sake. Thus, this ‘productionist’ organising logic that is rooted in the experience o f 
state socialism is based on deontological ethics. Its overarching goal has been to build up, 
develop local capabilities and make companies to full-fledged partners within the VW 
Group. Both local unions and local management have shared this productionist attitude. 
Local managers were looking for German know-how to modernise their plant, but they still
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perceived it as their main task to ‘develop’ the company. Thus, whenever the opportunity 
emerged, local managers, together with unions, showed through their actions that high 
employment and industrial upgrading remained their highest priority, while market 
efficiency rationale remained a secondary factor.
The rest o f the Chapter elaborates this argument in more detail. Several dimensions o f the 
non-economic productionist logic are discussed. In Section I, stakeholder attitudes and 
strategies o f preserving the industrial capabilities at the time o f privatisation are assessed. 
The role o f local coalitions between government and unions as guarantors for brand 
survival in the case o f Skoda is discussed. Section II disentangles the implicit productionist 
logic that underpinned the actions o f the stakeholders, while Section III elaborates on 
formal agreements between management and union representatives that have been built on 
this implicit logic. The last Section underlines the role o f the external dimension -  the role 
o f public opinion -  in strengthening and reinforcing the local ‘productionist’ commitment 
to firm  industrial capabilities.
This Chapter argues that the organising logic o f economic liberalism o f increased cost- 
efficiency and short-term financial performance affected the firms when the institutions o f 
ownership and control changed. Yet the local organising logics according to which the firm 
is valued as a source o f industrial capabilities remained alive. These organising logics 
imply a local commitment to the preservation o f industrial capabilities independently from 
the pure market efficiency and the law o f value. Thus, again, as in the previous Chapter, the 
organising logic o f the law o f value, related to economic liberalism, has been challenged by 
the other, non-economic enterprise logic that builds on state socialist legacies o f non­
economic enterprise logics. The result is the constant tension between the economic 
organising logic o f cost-efficiency and short-term profitability, on the one hand, and the 
non-economic logic that values industrial capabilities, on the other. Thus, the firm still 
continues to function as a source o f competitive industrial capabilities, although in the 
completely new institutional setting.
/. Stakeholder coalition for brand survival
As we discussed in Chapter III, the system o f state socialist central planning was 
characterised by the fact that resource allocation took place through political decisions 
rather than being driven by the economic rationale o f the price mechanism, resource 
scarcity and cost efficiency. With the regime change, direct political allocation o f
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productive resources disappeared and the economic rationale o f the law o f value officially 
entered the scene, either anew or less disturbed by ‘ social intervention’ in countries such as 
Hungary where certain market reforms were already implemented earlier. In the company 
context, the new market rationale meant three things. First, the links to the Communist 
Party were dismantled. Second, politically-oriented setting o f production volumes and 
prices stopped as production orders were left to ‘markets’ which meant that only orders 
from customers who were ready to pay in the hard currency at ‘market’ rather than at the 
subsidised rates would be taken. Finally, the state withdrew from the ownership structures 
by privatising the state-owned enterprises.
However, despite the new dominant logic o f market efficiency that was established in the 
early years o f post-communism, the company level reality was more complex. As with 
other enterprise organising logics discussed in Chapters V and V II, the new organising 
logic o f economic liberalism formulated and defended by the new political elites did not 
penetrate the companies overnight and did not make the previously existing commitments 
towards the enterprise disappear completely. In an environment o f high uncertainty, a 
medium- and long-term ‘market value’ o f enterprises and their viability in the future were 
unclear, yet decisions still had to be made. The governments and other stakeholders such as 
managers and trade union leaders needed to decide which existing industrial projects were 
viable for the market economy environment. And it is in these decisions that the desire o f 
stakeholders to preserve the existing industrial capabilities despite low short-term financial 
profitability can be identified.
At the first glance, the law o f value entered the scene in a very prominent way: short-term 
financial viability o f entrepreneurship became a crucial factor considered by stakeholders. 
In 1990, it was acknowledged by many that, economically, Skoda was not a viable 
company as it had large debts, declining sales and falling orders. Due to high debts, the 
company was unable to take out new loans that were urgently needed to pay day-to-day 
operations and the suppliers o f components. There were voices among the Czechoslovak 
public that suggested abandoning car production in favour o f automotive components for 
foreign car producers (Pavllnek 2008: 80). Also, the government, as company owner, did 
not want to take a high financial risk and the option o f government-led restructuring o f the 
company and its subsequent privatisation were ruled out due to the fact that neither the 
government nor the banks were ready to guarantee the capital needed, despite the fact that 
the domestic and foreign demand was estimated to be far above the production capacity
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(Pavlmek 2008: 80). Thus, Skoda was a troubled company with its East European markets 
collapsing; its financial position was close to bankruptcy.
Yet market-oriented rationale has been restrained by a non-economic organising logic. 
Thus, already during the privatisation process, next to the law o f value, a ‘productionist’ 
attitude o f local stakeholders has become visible. Industrial traditions and industrial 
capabilities, rather than pure financial retums-oriented thinking, were important to local 
stakeholders. Due to its over 100-year-old history, Skoda’s reputation o f a ‘ family jewel’ 
was strong. It gave the stakeholders the legitimacy to demand a continuation o f firm 
activities. A foreign partner that would enter in the jo in t venture was expected to invest into 
the company in order to improve quality and expand production volume (Pavlmek
2008).Thus, the solution o f jo in t venture can in this light be seen as a compromise o f the 
two logics -  letting the ‘market forces’ in the form o f a foreign investor enter the scene but, 
at the same time, ensuring the survival and preservation o f already existing local industrial 
capabilities. Thus, Skoda’s example demonstrates that local stakeholders valued the 
company as a source o f industrial capabilities and wanted to preserve those despite the low 
short-term financial profitability.
The dramatic financial situation o f Skoda might even explain the eagerness o f the 
Czechoslovak government to privatise such an important industrial project at such a fast 
pace. In other Visegrad countries, i f  important industrial projects existed, they were either 
privatised but remained in domestic ownership, as in the case o f the Hungarian industrial 
giant Raba, or they were privatised much later, after prolonged negotiations and a search 
for the ‘ right’ partner, as in the case o f the Polish FSO. Thus, a comparison across national 
borders allows us to conclude that Skoda’s foreign privatisation in itself can be interpreted 
in this context as evidence o f the ‘productionist’ logic, as marketisation through 
privatisation had as its final goal preserving o f the company’s industrial capabilities.
Large-scale government-led restructuring plans and with them more advantageous 
valuations o f companies were ruled out quite early in the three cases o f brownfield 
investments that are analysed in this study in more depth: Czech Skoda, Polish Tarpan and 
Slovak BAZ. But it is in the case o f Skoda that government demands went furthest. This is 
what makes us focus on Skoda’s privatisation in the rest o f this Section. These demands 
went beyond general investment demands and covered among other things preservation o f 
the Skoda brand. Yet why were these advanced ‘productionist’ demands for preserving
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industrial capabilities formulated and followed in Skoda, but not in its former supplier 
Slovak BAZ or in Polish Tarpan? The explanation has to do with the power balance and a 
perceived more prominent role o f the government in the negotiations for Skoda: the local 
stakeholders perceived to be in a stronger bargaining position when selling their ‘ family 
jewel’ . Focussing on the company’s medium-term industrial capabilities the stakeholders 
were confident that Skoda’s reputation and its position in international markets were good: 
a large share o f Skoda cars were sold abroad and thus Skoda was considered by 
stakeholders to be able to pass ‘the test o f markets’ .
Yet also non-economic rationales have been important for Skoda’s stronger negotiating 
position. Its reputation was strengthened by the fact that Skoda was among the few East 
European car brands that had home-grown technological developments -  many other state 
socialist car brands had to buy the technology in the West. The introduction o f its last 
model in the late 1980s strongly contributed to a significant improvement o f its previous 
international image o f a low cost, low quality car: introduction o f Favorit ‘narrowed the gap 
between Skoda and its Western competitors in the class o f small passenger cars so that 
Skoda could offer a (potentially highly) competitive product’ (Pavlmek 2008: 75). Thus, 
privatising the ‘ family jewel’ with long industrial traditions guaranteed a strategically 
strong position for the government to formulate high demands to the foreign investor. In 
other plants, the local stakeholders in and outside o f the plant were perceived to be in a 
weak bargaining position in relation to the foreign investor: in Slovakian BAZ and Polish 
Tarpan the strategic importance o f the plants was considered low. VW  Group is argued to 
have found out about the BAZ supplier plant only during government negotiations 
concerning Skoda. As a manager in VW Slovakia explained: ‘we did not have Skoda’s 
hundred years o f industrial history, this plant was relatively new’ (Wojnar Interview March
2007). Thus, it is only in Czech Skoda where local stakeholders such as management, but 
even more importantly trade unions and government, could have a strong influence on the 
privatisation process; in the two other brownfield locations and o f course in the new 
greenfield Audi Gyor plant the new foreign owner was dominant.
Two rationales dominated Skoda’s early partial privatisation. First, it was driven by the 
desire o f local stakeholders -  within the company as well as in the government -  to 
preserve local industrial capabilities with the help o f foreign investors in the short-term. 
Apart from having high debt, practically no long-term investment capital and thus no
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chances o f being able to compete in international markets Skoda even lacked financing to 
keep up day-to-day production (Pavlinek and Smith 1998). Sperling believes that:
[T]he government o f Czechoslovakia [...] was o f course interested in continuing 
the production activities o f Skoda as a foundation for future economic development 
[...], although the Czechs involved knew too well that Skoda would not survive in 
the changing and more competitive markets without some form o f co-operation 
with Western manufacturers (Sperling 2004: 184).
The situation o f Skoda’s suppliers was also critical given the following considerations: i f  
Skoda went bankrupt, the suppliers would have to share its fate. Skoda at that time had 237 
domestic suppliers and therefore its bankruptcy would have had a high impact on the 
regional economy (Pavlinek 2008: 80).
However, the time dimension is very important for the understanding o f this privatisation 
strategy. Foreign investors were perceived by the public and by the government as a 
solution for company’s short-term survival, but also as a guarantor o f the long-term 
prosperity o f the company and o f the regional economy as a whole. Thus, these ‘ strategic 
privatisations’ , as they were called, were not only motivated by the short-term financial 
returns. Preserving the existing industrial capabilities -  even i f  they were weak and not up 
to international competition at that moment -  was considered crucial because preserving 
industrial traditions was a symbol o f continuous economic development. It is in this context 
that foreign investors were considered as ‘saviours’ o f local companies, as guarantors o f 
long-term enterprise success.
The role o f government was important as it could dictate the conditions o f the joint venture. 
The preservation o f the Skoda brand was a precondition for privatisation that was explicitly 
expressed in the privatisation negotiations together with other demands such as 
maintenance o f the labour force, continuation o f relations with local suppliers, continuation 
o f R&D activities and Czech participation in company’s management (Jung, Klemm et al. 
2004). The choice o f the foreign partner -  the VW  Group -  was thus made dependent on 
the condition o f preserving the industrial capabilities o f the enterprise. The other foreign 
bidder for Skoda was Renault, yet this major French car manufacturer was not interested in 
preserving and developing Skoda’s industrial capabilities: ‘to opt for a co-operation with 
Volkswagen was the credible commitment o f Volkswagen to keep Skoda as a brand 
manufacturer coupled with the promises o f major modernisation’ (Sperling 2004: 184).
155
The jo in t venture agreement signed between the VW  Group and the Czech government in 
April 1991 explicitly stated the level o f expected investment on the part o f the German 
investor and the future production capacities. It also included clauses concerning Czech 
component producers and Skoda’s employees (Pavlinek 2008). These numerous special 
clauses were developed by government officials and were one o f the first expressions o f 
government stakeholders before a more formalised process o f privatisation was established. 
As Pavlinek (2008: 86) points out, it was only several months after drafting the Skoda joint 
venture agreement that the Czech Ministry for National Property Management formulated a 
directive that set out how privatisation projects should look like.
Joint venture plants were made by the government officials in cooperation with the 
management and trade unions, and not against their w ill. The role o f Skoda’s direct 
stakeholders - i.e. management and trade unions - in the privatisation decision was crucial. 
Local management supported the idea o f a jo in t venture with a foreign company: ‘as a 
leading industry in Czechoslovakia and based on past trade experience with Western 
partners, the Skoda management quickly realized that drastic measures needed to be taken 
i f  the company was to survive under the pressure o f competition with Western auto 
producers’ (Jung, Klemm et al. 2004: 206). The role o f local unions was also crucial for the 
choice o f the foreign partner. Despite the original preference o f government officials and 
the broad public for Renault, Skoda unions persuaded the government to select VW  as the 
preferred candidate (Pavlinek 2008). They voted against cooperation with Renault fearing 
downgrading and loosing the status o f an independent brand. Volkswagen’s previous fair 
treatment o f SEAT -  keeping it as independent brand -  gave Czech stakeholders more 
confidence that VW  promises would be kept. Union representatives also supported the 
German bidder due to strong industrial relations in Germany (Sperling 2004: 185). Renault, 
on the other hand, ‘was seen as a state company and hence not the appropriate partner for 
the privatisation process, in which the main challenge Skoda faced was overcoming the 
deficits created by the period as a state company’ (Jung, Klemm et al. 2004: 207).
Preserving the labour force was a part o f the jo in t venture agreement between the 
government and the VW Group. Despite a very large headcount, the majority o f employees 
were taken over. The fact that high levels o f employment -  around 15,000 employees in the 
early 1990s -  were preserved was a direct consequence o f stakeholder demands. In the 
Slovak BAZ that then became VW  Bratislava, on the other hand, the influence o f local 
management and government backing were much weaker. As a consequence, a very
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different employment strategy was chosen: all ‘old’ employees were laid o ff and had to go 
through re-hiring process. The company restarted with 400 employees in 1992 (Holecek 
Interview March 2007). While privatisation conditions from the government side were less 
far reaching, yet, still, these conditions contained requirements concerning a certain level o f 
investments, an obligation to use the dividends for re-investment rather than for re-payment 
o f shareholders, and a certain growth rate (Wojnar Interview March 2007).
As the VW  Group experienced a crisis in 1993-1994 and announced a reduction in 
production numbers, lower level o f investments and overall much more modest investment 
approach -  so, for example, no new engine factory was going to be built in Skoda despite 
the original promise -  the Czech government took an active stance to protect regional 
industrial capabilities. It requested an addendum to the existing joint venture agreement that 
would clearly stipulate the Group’s continuous commitment towards Skoda. Although the 
investment levels stated in the document signed in November 1994 were more modest than 
in the original agreement o f 1991, it was government’s goal to have a formal commitment 
o f the German investor to its Czech investment project. The state also gained the right to 
participate in ‘all fundamental decisions regarding the jo in t venture and a veto power over 
any decision that would dramatically affect Skoda’s activities until December 1999, when 
the VW  Group was planning to buy the remaining shares o f the company’ (Pavlinek 2008: 
90). The government also added an additional protection for the Czech suppliers in the 
agreement: once able to compete with other suppliers, local component suppliers had the 
right to supply the whole Group.
What could be demonstrated by the example o f Skoda is a general pattern o f several 
organising enterprise logics being at work; sometimes being in conflict with each other but 
sometimes supporting each other. The main demands to the foreign investor were related to 
the non-economic enterprise logics o f brand preservation, employment guarantees and 
modernisation o f the company, yet market organising logic has also been visible. It has 
been the means to reach the non-economic ends. Applying this economic logic and ‘second 
guessing the markets’ allowed Skoda stakeholders to take a much stronger stance vis-a-vis 
the foreign buyers during the jo in t venture negotiations.
The valuation o f the enterprise as a social and industrial organism went against other sets o f 
non-economic organising logics. For Czechs, such other non-economic logic was the strong 
anti-German sentiment related to the World War II. Thus, the transfer o f Skoda’s
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ownership to the VW  Group caused some controversies in the Czech public during the time 
o f privatisation talks (Sperling 2004). But also on the German side, different organising 
logics co-existed. Even i f  the warnings about a potential cannibalisation o f the main 
Volkswagen brand that focuses on good quality but more expensive family sedans by the 
re-emerging Skoda brand were expressed, non-economic organising logics have prevailed. 
The respect for industrial capabilities o f Skoda engineering tradition has been stronger than 
the fear o f cannibalisation o f the main VW  brand. Even today, when the evidence o f certain 
cannibalisation o f the German production is large, this issue is hardly discussed and, as 
Sperling argues, ‘denied by the group itself or made to appear harmless’ (Sperling 2004: 
187).
This Section attempted to demonstrate how during the privatisation process, despite several 
economic and non-economic logics playing a role, the non-economic organising logic that 
conceptualised enterprise as a source o f industrial capabilities has been crucial. Skoda’s 
privatisation has been an example o f local stakeholders - managers, trade unions and 
government officials - becoming a coalition for protection o f local industrial capabilities
//. The new goal of cost efficiency reconsidered
During state socialism, company goals were expressed in units o f production output. With 
the jo in t venture, these non-economic goals were supposed to be replaced by other, more 
market efficiency-oriented targets. But how has this change towards new company goals 
taken place and what have exactly become the new company performance goals?
Formal administratively set production output goals were replaced by cost efficiency and 
productivity goals. Financial targets and cost monitoring became a higher priority for local 
management that received responsibilities o f ‘profit centres’ within the VW  Group. The 
cost goals are set in cooperation with the headquarters and play a decisive role in 
companies’ affairs. A finance director at VW Slovakia explained that the company has 
performance and profit goals and it is ‘managed through these cost goals’ (Wojnar 
Interview March 2007).
Financial and productivity targets became a higher priority. A  new management based on 
accounting and financial indicators, known as controlling, was introduced after 
privatisation. A VASAS unionist who worked in a large Hungarian bus producer Ikarus 
during the time o f its jo in t venture with a foreign Italian owner described the shift:
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Before they came, o f course, we had a meeting every week [as well]. But the 
information [exchanged] in the meeting has changed. Every week they showed us a 
report on company finances. We started to study anew all the aspects o f the 
company [...]. This was a new style. Every director had to prepare a serious report 
o f the activity o f his department for the previous week. [..] There was a new 
requirement to show every detail, to justify the expenses. [..] It was more useful 
although more stressful. [..] Before, it was just an informal chat, something like: 
‘ ’’What did you do last week?”  -  “Nothing interesting”  (Mezei Interview September
2008).
Also, the internal cost benchmarking has become a norm. There are comparative data on 
production costs per hour across the Group and this data is communicated to all 
subsidiaries. Thus, even among ‘ low cost’ production sites o f Central Europe the 
headquarters try to build up competition. As a consequence, a greater attention is devoted 
to monitoring production costs. A t Audi Gyor, the works council leader stated that ‘We 
cannot go above 10 euro [per hour] i f  we want to remain competitive’ (Kelemen Interview 
August 2007). In addition to the continuous benchmarking, the tender system o f the VW 
Group that is comparable with that in most other large automotive MNCs, requires 
subsidiaries to. apply for new models and thus represents an additional pressure o f cost- 
efficiency for companies. ‘The competition for new models within the Group is very, very 
strong. For each new model we need to apply. There are three criteria: quality, costs and 
flex ib ility ’ , stated the HR director in VW Slovakia (Holecek Interview March 2007).
Credit institutions impose further ‘hard budget constraints’ . They lend money to the VW 
subsidiaries for investment projects. These loans can be taken without headquarters’ 
permission. Thus, normally, no inter-company credits take place, but loans are taken from 
private or semi-public banks. Thus, in case o f VW  Slovakia, these banks have been the 
European Bank o f Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and a number o f private 
banks (Wojnar Interview March 2007). The manager was happy to announce that all debts 
o f an enormous investment -1.53 billion euro over 15 years -  have been paid back by 2006 
(Wojnar Interview March 2007). Furthermore, the modem auditing concepts common in 
market economies such as balance sheet structure and own capital ratios have become 
widely used (Wojnar Interview March 2007). Thus, the level o f financial accountability but 
also o f financial pressures substantially increased to make the previously existing soft 
budget constraints that I described in Chapter III disappear.
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Productivity pressures that come from headquarters’ benchmarking are a further dimension 
o f the new organising logic o f cost efficiency. Productivity increases are fixed every year, 
often they are set quite high. Fixing expected productivity increases at the level of inflation 
is justified by arguing that thus wage increases are covered by inflation increases, without 
jeopardising the financial stability o f the company (Langenfelder Interview March 2007). 
The consequences o f these pressures are a greater emphasis on optimisation and efficiency 
at work. A  line manager from production unit explained:
O f course, productivity does not only depend on production process, but also on 
design and the nature o f parts and construction. However, the part o f production 
process and the assembly line is important. Fewer mistakes are made, fewer cars 
need to go into repair. [...] The Group’s goal is ‘ first in ’ quote o f 95%, at VW 
Slovakia this quote has been 90-95%, sometimes 80% (Langenfelder Interview 
March 2007).
In Skoda, there has been a clear change in the management narratives; they underline a new 
orientation ‘towards achievement, quality and efficiency’ (Jung, Klemm et al. 2004: 208). 
The narratives o f constant improvement o f work organisation have become widely spread. 
Thus, in Skoda, management introduced the ‘ Skoda production model’ . The predecessor o f 
it was ‘ fractal production organisation’ , a German inspired version o f the lean production 
system, introduced in Skoda in 1994 with a new model Felicia. Apart from following the 
philosophy o f continuous improvement, the idea behind the fractal -  modular -  
organisation o f production was to make the production process more transparent by 
improving information flows and more flexible by dividing production in modular groups 
(Pavlmek 2008: 95). In other VW  subsidiaries, no ‘extra’ names were given but new 
practices o f work organisation have been introduced in all plants since the m id-1990s. The 
idea o f continuous improvement is known and is referred to. During the KVP Kaskaden, 
the ‘continued improvement workshops’ , the team leaders from the assembly line come 
together with engineers and specialists from industrial engineering to propose things ‘to 
make their work better’ . Similarly, a production manager in VW  Slovakia argued that 
‘ there are always still reserves that can be optimised: material, reduction o f work errors, 
maintenance, non ergonomic movements’ (Langenfelder Interview March 2007). Just-in- 
time working practices are omnipresent: in many cases ‘system suppliers’ deliver their 
products directly to the assembly line. The manager at VW Slovakia referred to them as 
’Just-in-sequence’ , an expression that implies an even faster turn-around, as delivery times 
are very low, usually two hours (Zeller Interview March 2007). Similarly, in Skoda, 
delivery times are two to three hours.
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The consequences o f this clear shift to a lean production-oriented work organisation have 
been an increased level o f work effort required and increased pace o f work. The director o f 
the sport utility vehicle (SUV) production at VW Slovakia confirmed that ‘ turnover is high, 
qualified people are going away: work at the assembly line is hard, people prefer to work in 
a repair shop rather than on the assembly line’ (Langenfelder Interview March 2007).
Yet the development o f tougher productivity and cost efficiency benchmarks is subject to 
certain limits set by the productionist focus and by the commitment to local industrial 
capabilities that has been preserved in the Central European VW  subsidiaries. Next to 
embracing the logic o f ever higher productivity and cost efficiency, from the beginning o f 
this jo in t venture, the non-economic organising logic has also been an important rationale 
for local management. A t the core o f managerial thinking are ‘productionist’ variables 
related to employment, industrial upgrading, and product quality as well as engineering and 
technical proficiency. They matter to stakeholders regardless o f their cost-efficiency. Two 
phases can be distinguished in the evolution o f the VW  subsidiaries: the early 1990s to 
m id-1990s and the late 1990s to mid-2000s. During the second phase -  from the late 1990s 
to early 2000s -  the technological and organisational upgrading that is discussed in detail in 
Chapter IV  took place. The following paragraphs elaborate how during both phases the role 
o f ‘productionist’ logic remained important for local stakeholders.
During the first phase in the early 1990s, the process o f adaptation was most intense. It is 
especially during the early period o f special ‘hardship’ and restructuring where the 
objectives related to employment levels can be identified easily. During this early phase, 
the policies o f employment pursued directly during and after the privatisation are telling. 
During the early 1990s when production numbers were low, employees were to a large 
extent kept on board in Skoda, at least the ‘core workers’ . In 1994, restructuring o f 
production organisation meant that 800 Czech workers but much larger number o f foreign 
workers lost their job. As already mentioned, among these foreign workers were 800 
Cubans, 700 Poles and more then 1,500 Vietnamese (Pavlinek 2008: 97). Yet these large 
lay-offs have still been relatively small in relation to the overall headcount o f 15,000 and 
17,000 in the early 1990s. Thus, labour hoarding, even i f  o f course at a much smaller scale 
in comparison to state socialist times, was still partially preserved. And also during the 
second phase, examples o f temporary ‘ labour hoarding’ still exist. Thus, at Audi Gyor,
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during the periods o f model change when production volumes are low due to technical 
restructuring o f the assembly line the company kept its employees on board.
The second phase o f companies’ developments is associated with industrial upgrading and 
thus with another type o f ‘productionist’ enterprise organising logic. VW  Group’s 
intemationationalisation strategies in all four production locations intensified in terms o f 
investment volumes, production and employment numbers that went together with 
industrial upgrading described in Chapter IV. For Central European managers, the 
importance o f engineering and technical proficiency has been at the heart o f this 
modernisation process. In Skoda, introduction o f Octavia model in 1996 was described as a 
crucial moment despite the fact that the jo in t venture has been in place since 1991 and two 
early models - Felicia and Favorit - were already produced in cooperation with German 
headquarters. These two commonly developed models still had some elements o f the 
original Skoda design and technology but local managers did not express any regret about 
them being replaced by Volkswagen technology (Nanasi Interview December 2006). The 
technical and engineering supremacy o f German know-how definitely seems to have 
priority for local managers.
International comparative benchmarking techniques such as Harbour Report that compares 
data o f productivity and efficiency are familiar to the production management, but when 
confronted with relatively ‘bad’ results for VW  Group on financial and productivity figures 
from the Harbour Report, Skoda management did not see it as a big problem (Nanasi 
Interview December 2006). The director for industrial engineering explained that the low 
productivity figures o f Central European VW subsidiaries can be explained by low levels o f 
automation. Thus, the role o f comparative benchmarks in labour costs also does not seem to 
be high. When costs are evoked, they are used to justify ‘productionist’ decisions such as 
keeping a high headcount. It is acknowledged that the share o f labour costs in Central 
European automotive production is relatively low. In Skoda’s case it is 20-30% o f total 
production costs, which is significantly lower than the share for the VW  Group as a whole 
which is at around 50%. It is argued that employing people is cheaper and more flexible 
than using machines. These would need to be replaced, while people can adapt. This fact 
allowed keeping a high headcount (Nanasi Interview December 2006). A  similar argument 
has been developed by the HR director o f VW  Slovakia who argued that ‘The sophisticated 
cars that we produce here demand a lot o f manual work and manual work is cheap in 
Slovakia’ . He also referred to the employment priority more explicitly:
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One reason for low automation is that we wanted employment. [..] Ten years ago 
employment o f people was priority number one. A t that time, unemployment was 
very high in Slovak-a - 20-30% (Holecek Interview March 2007).
A clear indicator o f managerial ‘productionist’ attitude has been its desire o f medium-term 
modernisation o f the plants: the goal has been to attract more investment to the production 
location, to ensure production over time and to upgrade the facilities from low value added 
to high value added. The overarching goal has been to build up, develop local capabilities 
and move the company’s position within the Group from the periphery to the centre. In 
Skoda, improvement in the quality o f production has been described by insiders as one o f 
the crucial reasons for success. The second reason stated has been the recognition o f the 
plant as a mature partner within the VW  Group (Vacek Interview December 2006). Thus, 
despite the growing importance o f short-term cost efficiency pressures, the focus on 
technology and production quality remains. Responding to the question whether the 
financial side has become more important than the production side, the top finance manager 
at VW Slovakia, responded: ‘No, I cannot say that this is the case. The production and 
quality still matter. The allocation o f production resources could have been different* 
(Wojnar Interview March 2007). Thus, despite a shift towards the logic o f cost efficiency, 
the financial parameters still have not completely replaced medium-term goals o f 
production and employment parameters in managerial thinking.
A clear desire to build up local research capabilities has also been emphasised. Even i f  a 
big part o f innovation know-how is imported from the headquarters, especially in the field 
o f process innovation, the role o f local managers is not negligible. Even i f  local decision 
makers are not fu lly autonomous, process innovation still takes place (Nanasi Interview 
December 2006). Thus, the director for industrial engineering at VW  Slovakia was proud to 
report on the examples o f process innovation that were introduced in his company. Thus, 
for example, the concept o f ‘ supplier basket’ was introduced in his plant to deal with 
variety and complexity o f the cars constructed at the same assembly line.
Union representatives -  together with management -  also continue to share a strong 
‘productionist’ identity. Like management, company unions see their goal in company 
advancement and prosperity. An example o f union adherence to the ‘productionist mode’ is 
their emphasis on union function o f assuring production quality and discipline. As already 
mentioned, especially since the early 2000s, a high turnover has been an increasingly
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important issue in all plants. For example, in Audi Hungaria, labour force fluctuation has 
been 1% per month in 2000, while the goal has been 0.4%. In VW  Slovakia, where 
turnover rates increased in mid-2000s from 7-9% to higher levels o f 9-10% annually, they 
are still reported to be only half o f turnover rates o f other Slovak firms (Holecek Interview 
March 2007). Unions have started to capitalise on their function o f assuring discipline 
during production process. A Hungarian union leader at Audi Gyor stated referring to 
German management that: ‘ i f  they do not take our problems seriously then maybe the best 
solution for them is to go home because we cannot be efficient’ (Kiss Interview August 
2007). The HR director o f VW  Slovakia stated that ‘unions are our eyes and years: what we 
don’t see, they see’ (Holecek Interview March 2007). Furthermore, a productionist part o f 
union identity is also visible in the fact that unions also started to develop a discourse based 
on the valuation o f skills and knowledge. Unions are directly involved in the issue o f 
industrial upgrading. Thus, unions sometimes intervene directly and express their opinions 
concerning upgrading. Thus, in 2002 in Skoda, as employees perceived the danger o f 
degradation o f the product profile, a short protest action organised by trade unions was 
staged (Sperling 2004: 191).
The productionist attitude o f Central European stakeholders has been further reinforced by 
the highly ‘productionist’ approach o f VW  Group in Germany. A productionist approach 
on the German side meant that core-periphery division between the headquarters and 
subsidiaries was not permanent. The original investment decisions were driven by the 
desire to build up low-cost production locations and access new markets; the upgrading o f 
the new subsidiaries to the state-of-the-art production locations was not the original 
intention o f the VW  Group headquarters. ‘A t the beginning, three halls were constructed 
here. Now, the whole area is full o f buildings. A t that time, no one could imagine that VW 
Slovakia would become such a huge factory’ , emphasised the human resources manager 
(Holecek Interview March 2007). It was subsidiaries’ initiatives to use the window o f 
opportunity whenever it emerged to upgrade their plants. A  productionist organising logic 
o f technical and craft proficiency that has also been a feature o f the VW  Group 
headquarters was the underlying factor in industrial upgrading o f subsidiaries: when 
Central European subsidiaries proved that they were capable to produce highly 
sophisticated products, their upgrading was launched. The human resources director o f VW 
Slovakia made this argument clear at the example o f his plant:
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Originally the plan for this plant was to produce Passat. Yet in 1994, we were 
offered an opportunity to produce a four-wheel ‘G o lf for motion’ . And it is in this 
project that we showed that we were capable o f producing these most sophisticated 
cars. And this was the starting point. But this was a coincidence, not a strategic 
decision. The headquarters were looking for a cheap production location, they 
realised that in Bratislava there was an empty capacity, so they decided to give it a 
try. [..] It was only in 2000 that the strategic decision to produce the SUVs in VW 
Slovakia was made. [..] And one o f the reasons for this was that earlier we showed 
ourselves capable o f producing these sophisticated cars [...], in the excellent quality 
(Holecek Interview March 2007).
Thus, a high level o f openness about the future upgrading in the VW  Group headquarters 
has been an important factor supporting the productionist attitude and the preservation o f 
the local non-economic enterprise organising logic. The local stakeholders were the driving 
forces behind the upgrading, yet this crucial role o f local management has been possible 
due to the specific control mode and commitment mode o f the German MNC. More 
generally, Bluhm (2007) argues that the arm’s length control mode o f the German MNC 
headquarters allows certain opportunity structures to emerge. When these opportunities 
emerged, they were capitalised upon by local management to strategically enlarge the 
mandate o f its subsidiary within the Group.
Furthermore, VW  Group has not used any ‘back door’ strategy to achieve compliance with 
new managerial goals but followed a route that took into consideration the previous 
experience o f old managerial staff. Replacement o f managerial staff by new people with 
experience o f working in market economies could have been a strategy o f the headquarters. 
However, this happened only to a limited extent. Only top management was replaced by the 
German expatriates, while the large share o f local middle and line management was kept. 
(Holecek Interview December 2006). The role o f expatriates has been relatively limited in 
the medium term. Apart from Skoda’s experimental three year tandem program that has 
attracted a large number o f German managers to the subsidiary, the usual trend in all 
subsidiaries is that only the top management team is dominated by expatriates while the 
human resource manager is usually a local person. VW  Bratislava and Skoda have several 
top local managers; Audi Gyor has had the smallest number so far with only one local top 
manager - responsible for human resources.
Another reason for the ‘productionist attitude’ is the technical-engineering background that 
is dominant among local managers, rather than an orientation towards pure financial 
accountability and profit maximization. Training background o f managers in engineering
165
facilitates their technical-engineering orientation. This is how Skoda senior manager for 
industrial engineering describes his reasons to come to Skoda:
I ’ve studied mechanical engineering. [...] During my studies, in 1994, I was a 
trainee in the Audi plant. This is where I saw the first models o f the new Octavia. 
And this is the point when I became fascinated by it. I told myself: ‘ I f  we had this 
car in production at Skoda, this would be unbelievable’ . Then, some time later, I 
saw this car on the street for the first time and this is when my decision was made -  
I wanted to go work for Skoda, because the cars that they produce there are 
amazing (Nanasi Interview December 2006).
The manager further reports that what was crucial in the new model was the new level o f 
quality compared to previous models. Thus, engineering and technical excellence rather 
than pure financial parameters are the defining features o f managerial thinking.
Internal career progression is another factor that facilitates the preservation o f productionist 
focus. Internal labour advancement has remained important and many o f senior managers 
started as simple blue-collar workers. The director o f motor production at Skoda was one o f 
them. He has been working in the factory for 20 years. Originally, he was a welder, and 
then moved in the planning and preparing new models as a technical specialist before 
becoming the director o f the engine plant (Vacek Interview December 2006). Similarly, the 
director o f the SUV production at VW Slovakia was also previously a blue-collar worker 
(Langenfelder Interview March 2007).
To sum up, the introduction o f certain benchmarking and financial accountability tools in 
the Central European VW  subsidiaries allowed the economic enterprise organising logic to 
emerge. A t the same time, the headquarters’ lenient approach to managerial staff as well as 
training background and internal career ladder allowed a part o f the old productionist 
attitudes to persist. The next Section shows the role o f local production coalitions between 
management and unions in translating this productionist enterprise organising logic into 
industrial upgrading.
III. Collective agreements as production coalitions
As the previous Section demonstrated, local management in VW subsidiaries has had a 
clear ‘productionist’ attitude in its desire to attract investment, to ensure production over 
time and to upgrade. The industrial upgrading that has been discussed in Chapter IV has 
been a unique phenomenon due to its speed and scale. To convince the headquarters,
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management had to rely on the support o f key stakeholders such as local trade unions. As a 
consequence, to achieve the goal o f plant modernisation and upgrading, local management 
in VW  subsidiaries chose to treat trade unions as partners20 in issues where unions have 
legal co-decision rights. Unions have thus become important in the industrial upgrading 
process o f VW  subsidiaries. Chapter V argued that unions’ protective function in relation to 
wages and working conditions has remained very low. This Chapter brings out the other 
part o f union identity that remains dominant: between union functions -  production and 
protection -  union identity remains strongly ‘productionist’ . In this argument, the last 
Section tried to disentangle the rationale behind union productionist attitudes. I argued that 
also on the union side, preserving and developing industrial capabilities was a core goal. 
This Section, in turn, discusses formal collective agreements as examples o f the 
management-union coalitions for upgrading.
In the German VW  plants, as in most other German automotive producers, company level 
management-labour production coalitions have become quite wide-spread in the 1990s. In 
Germany, the goal o f these coalitions was to ‘minimise the costs’ o f the economic 
downturn or o f the increased international competition. Also in Central European VW 
production sites, collective agreements have been used in some cases for similar purposes. 
Thus, in 2005, in VW  Slovakia, due to reduced demand, management sought an 
arrangement with unions which was found by reducing the number o f hours worked. The 
trade-off agreement was reached between management and unions mainly by increasing the 
pay. Thus, management used cooperation with unions in cases o f strong demand decreases 
although these cases were rather exceptional. Yet the main purpose o f local production 
coalitions in Central Europe has been different in comparison to Germany. In Central 
European VW  subsidiaries, company collective agreements have been the major examples 
o f enterprise ‘production coalitions’ for upgrading and industrial modernisation. In this 
way, the common goal o f building up o f industrial capabilities was achieved: collectively 
agreed additional, although limited, bonuses and pay benefits for the core labour force are 
traded-off against more working time flexib ility at continuously overall relatively low 
wages. Working time flexib ility includes the variety o f shift systems and overtime 
arrangements. A more flexible use o f these arrangements allowed a more intensive use o f 
machines and other productive investment making Central European subsidiaries highly 
competitive production locations within the VW  Group.
20 Som e other auo m to ive  M N C s  in the region such as Suzuki H ungaria  or K ia  in S lo vak  R epub lic  still do not recognise
unions on th e ir prem ises or build  adversarial relationship w ith  them .
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Local management was the main driver in the industrial modernisation process, while 
unions were the facilitators. Collective agreements cover the issues o f overtime, shift 
organisation and time accounts. Working time and work organisation are two crucial fields, 
in addition to wages, where unions have had legal rights to be consulted and be taken into 
account. The case o f Audi Gyor is the clearest example o f the union-management 
cooperation for upgrading. The cooperation only materialised once management saw an 
advantage in concluding the agreement, as already discussed in Chapter V. It has been 
looking for a ‘win-win situation’ before engaging in a serious collective bargaining. Thus, 
collective negotiations took place for six years without an agreement and only in 2001, 
when the Hungarian employment law was amended, introducing more possibilities for 
negotiating working time flexibility, management became serious about collective 
bargaining and the first deal was struck. The manager explained how introduction o f this 
time flexib ility was fostered by changes in labour law that made such an agreement with 
unions possible and how this allowed the company to save costs:
Before we had to pay overtime, once we had the collective agreement, a longer 
working time periods could be used. [...] This was the most important reason for us 
[management] to have this collective agreement (Radi Interview August 2007).
What these collective agreements also allow is a very high level o f working time flexibility 
and thus a better use o f machines and productive investment. The Audi HR manager stated 
that ‘ there are 70 working time models here. It has been very important for our company to 
be able to be flexible, to play around with working time’ (Radi Interview August 2007). 
Yet also in other subsidiaries the collective agreements have been used by management 
more intensively since the late 1990s-early 2000s to achieve the necessary flexib ility in 
working time, shift structure, etc. Thus, also in Skoda and in VW  Slovakia, management 
used collective agreements as a flexib ility tool. HR director at VW  Slovakia presented 
‘enormous flex ib ility ’ as one o f the key reasons for the success o f VW  Slovakia:
I don’t know i f  there is another firm  in the Group that has such high level o f 
flexibility. [...] The workers work normal number o f hours, but they also work 
Saturdays and Sundays (Holecek Interview March 2007).
The shift system has been changed from a three-shift to a four-shift arrangement, and later 
to a continuous shift system. The latter allows a more intensive use o f machines and people. 
This ‘ flex ib ility ’ that is praised by management has been possible due to company level
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collective agreements between management and trade unions. According to the labour law 
and collective agreements, in Skoda, most working time flexib ility measures need to be 
agreed with unions. Thus, to introduce new working time systems for the period o f one 
year, agreement with trade unions is required. Also working time systems that extend 
working week to the weekend are agreed with trade unions two months in advance (Skoda 
2005: 18-20). Similarly, in VW  Slovakia, all important changes in shift systems are agreed 
with unions. The collective agreements create a lim it o f weekly and annual over-time thus 
effectively allowing for working time accounts21.
Also in VW  Slovakia, the ‘extreme flex ib ility ’ o f the labour force is presented as a crucial 
ingredient for the upgrading success. The management used agreements with unions to 
achieve a level o f very high shift flexibility. A three-shift system was first tested since 1996 
and was fu lly introduced in 1998. In this system, the weekends were free but employees 
could be asked to come to work i f  necessary. In March 2007, the system was ‘ flexibilised’ 
further as the three-shift system was replaced by a ‘continuous shift ’ system with four 
shifts a day. In this system, people work for seven days and then have two-three days free. 
It allows the plant to utilise the equipment and the labour to its extreme: ‘ flexibility is one 
o f the main factors that explain the success o f our plant. [...] we are able to do with our 
employees everything we need’ , explained the director for human resources in VW 
Slovakia (Holecek Interview March 2007). The cooperation with unions was assured even 
i f  after an early stage o f conflict: ‘When we first introduced this working time flexibility, 
we met with resistance from the labour force i.e. the unions’ (Holecek Interview March 
2007), the manager reported.
In addition to flexible shift systems, most collective agreements also cover additional 
agreements between management and unions concerning maximum allowed overtime. 
Thus, for example, while the labour code allows 200 hours overtime per year, the company 
collective agreement in Audi Gyor made it possible to increase this level to up to 300 hours 
overtime per year (Kiss, Nemeth Interview August 2007). Also, in VW  Slovakia, the 
collective agreement allows over-time to go above the national legislation maximum of 
annual overtime. Similarly, in Skoda, the over-time work is regulated by collective 
agreements: it sets an average maximum number o f overtime per week and establishes a 
yearly account for the calculation o f overtime (Skoda 2005).
The overtime is first put on the time account and paid three months later 
Not for workers on the assembly line
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The second pillar o f these production coalitions in form o f collective agreements has been 
important wage moderation. Unions share management’s new economic rationale o f strong 
pressures o f international competition. As already discussed in Chapter V, during most o f 
the 1990s and early 2000s, limited real wage increases have been a substantial part o f these 
enterprise production pacts. Wage restraint and inflation indexation remain the norm, as it 
is seen by both local management and local unions as the safest option to secure additional 
foreign investment inflows -  unions and management both admit that they do not want to 
lose out in international competition and would like to preserve their low-cost location 
advantage. Thus, the HR director at VW  Slovakia states: ‘The main reference point for us 
in wage increases have been the inflation rates. This year because o f tight labour markets 
we decided to implement the planned wage increase earlier then planned because for such 
sophisticated products we need the best people. But we do need to fit within the VW  brand, 
we should not go far beyond, otherwise we won’t be competitive within the brand’ 
(Holecek Interview March 2007).
The tension between wage increases and competitiveness is especially strong for 
metalworking industry as it is hugely internationalised. Trade unions have been very 
sensitive as far as the competitive positions o f their countries were concerned. As already 
mentioned in Chapter V, rather than following the advice o f the European Metalworker 
Federation that since 1998 has been formulating guidelines insisting that wage bargaining 
should cover at least a part o f labour productivity increases, metalworker unions in Central 
Europe have not seriously made participation in labour productivity a part o f their 
bargaining agenda. Their bargaining demands as well as achieved outcomes have been 
much closer focussing on covering inflation. Union official confirmed that it was important 
to preserve the wage gap to Germany as this has been their comparative advantage: thus, 
Czech and Slovak wages are still at about one third o f German wages, while productivity 
differences are substantial but smaller (Jankovic Interview August 2007). This explicit 
union goal o f preserving wage gap to the German wages despite very high productivity 
increases is a clear sign o f competitiveness logic that unions now share with local 
management.
To sum up, during the late 1990s-early 2000s the local management-labour coalitions have 
become stronger in VW subsidiaries. High functional flexib ility and low wage increases 
have been the two central pillars o f these enterprise production coalitions. These were
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traded by unions for company expansion and product and production upgrading. These 
collective agreements represent ‘ local pacts for production’ : their intensification went 
together with industrial upgrading that took place since the late 1990s-early 2000s. 
Management-union cooperation has thus been crucial for upgrading: it is the intensified 
exchange between labour and management since the late 1990s that contributed to the 
success o f industrial upgrading in Eastern VW subsidiaries. Collective agreements have 
been examples o f ‘productionist’ attitudes shared by local management and trade unions. 
The productionist legacy o f state socialist era has thus been preserved even i f  in a very 
different institutional form.
IV. Industrial capabilities as an issue of public concern
Chapter III explained how during state socialism public ownership o f enterprises was not a 
financial ownership as profits could not be re-invested. It was rather ownership that 
represented a control o f productive resource allocation. As abundance o f productive 
resources was mostly linked to high employment figures and all related social provisions, 
large industrial projects were also high prestige projects. Thus, although in state socialism 
there was no free public media or free civil society and thus no role for public to express its 
opinion about industrial policies or similar, large industrial projects still enjoyed high status 
and prestige. Furthermore, even i f  the decisions concerning industrial priorities might have 
served more the particularistic interests o f the Communist Party officials rather than the 
broad goals o f economic development, the official version o f events presented company 
affairs as an issue o f public concern. This Section shows how to a certain extent this 
rationale o f industrial capabilities being an issue o f public concern has been preserved from 
state socialist period to the current day. What has survived is the idea that enterprise is not 
just an issue between employees and management o f a particular enterprise, but an issue o f 
public interest. In other words, public concern has been a further stakeholder in the 
industrial upgrading process that pushed the decision makers to preserve local industrial 
capabilities. Central European VW  subsidiaries are a useful case for assessing the role o f 
public opinion as these companies have enjoyed high coverage in the national media and 
high public interest due to the size o f these industrial projects, early arrival o f the foreign 
investor to the region and the strategic role o f the automotive industry in the region in 
general.
The role o f public opinion in the restructuring and privatisation o f former state-owned 
automotive companies cannot be underestimated. Already during the privatisation process,
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public opinion de-radicalised the intentions o f the Czech government to sell Skoda o ff 
completely:
The fear o f the public that the German investor would completely restructure the 
factory and implement purely German means o f production and employment led the 
Czech government to agree with VW  on a form o f a Joint Venture, where 
government’s share gradually decreased [...] (M ikulikova 2002: 46).
The role o f public opinion also mattered for management training. Public opinion meant 
that the old management structures that were partially considered as obsolete could not be 
completely ignored. Thus, Mikulikova (2002) interprets introduction o f management 
tandems at Skoda as a consequence o f public pressures. Blazejewski, Claasen et al. (2003) 
report a case o f a less known large Polish company where after privatisation the managerial 
structures were completely circumvented by the new German managers as the latter felt 
that it would be too cumbersome to retrain the Polish old-school managers. A  high media 
exposure and media attention to the VW  subsidiaries prevented this from happening in the 
VW subsidiaries.
The logic o f enterprise and industrial capabilities being an issue o f public concern was 
explicitly expressed by company insiders as well as by stakeholders in the automotive 
sector. Thus, in Audi Gyor, the union leader underlined the role o f ‘public ownership’ : ‘On 
paper this company is the property o f Audi but in our heads it is our property because this 
company is based in Hungary’ (Kiss Interview August 2007). The linkage between 
company affairs and regional/ national economic development has also been clearly 
identified. The HR director at VW  Slovakia elaborated on his company’s involvement in 
improving the deteriorating national industrial capabilities o f vocational training:
Before, we had a complete dual system o f vocational training. [W ith the regime 
change] the first thing that enterprises did when they were about to privatise was to 
give these schools back to the state. [..] Today, these schools do not train properly 
for vocational training. [..] No one thought that vocational training would take such 
a turn, and you know, now it w ill take a long time - 1 would say 10 years -  to make 
the system work again. You know, it is much easier to destroy something than to 
build it up. [..] The government needs to take the lead here to improve the system o f 
vocational training. [..] We cooperate with Kia and PSA in these issues, even i f  we 
are competitors. On issues o f labour markets we are partners [...] and we agree on a 
common position about what government activities we need. We need to convince 
the government to cooperate on that. We are developing a pilot project that should 
advance Slovakia (Holecek Interview March 2007).
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Thus, company stakeholders see company affairs and general interest o f national industrial 
capabilities as closely interlinked.
Across the board, representatives o f employer federations, trade unions and national 
chambers o f commerce and industry referred to the importance o f strong local 
manufacturing traditions as relevant for society as a whole rather than only as an enterprise 
relevant issue. The embeddedness o f engineering and manufacturing capabilities in the 
local history and economy is explicitly stated by practitioners. Thus, in Hungary, the 
legacies o f state socialist industrial development are evoked as crucial despite the fact that 
it did not have automotive final producers after the World War II. Yet it is argued, it had 
strong manufacturing capabilities in bus production, engines and other components 
(Bogdanovits Interview July 2008). Similarly in Slovakia, the representative o f the 
Chamber o f commerce said:
You cannot create industrial history on this table. You cannot do that. Either it 
exists or it does not. Czechoslovakia in the past had a tradition o f machinery 
industry [...]. It is not possible just to say: ‘ it is good to make electronics, let’ s start 
producing electronics now (Pal’a Interview March 2007).
The importance o f historical heritage o f machine tools production in the emergence o f a 
strong automotive industry today has been evoked by the stakeholders. It has been pointed 
out that Audi Gyor is located in the area o f the traditional Hungarian engine producer Raba. 
In Slovakia, the region o f Martin has been a stronghold o f arms production (Neumann 
Interview March 2008).
The destiny o f enterprises and industry is closely linked to broader societal changes. 
Industrial modernisation o f enterprises and country’s modernisation are often seen as 
interdependent. Thus, the representative o f the Slovak chamber o f commerce stated:
[After Slovakia’s independence], we did not have a big choice; we were happy i f  
anyone came to us. There was no much choice: it was a new country, new Slovakia, 
new currency, new government, and new problems. You know how it is: political 
ups and downs. This is like when you go to eat: when you are hungry, you eat 
anything, but once you are half full, you w ill choose the better things -  it is normal. 
And it is also like this in business (Pal’a Interview March 2007).
Making business is also associated with a long-term sustainability rather than with short­
term windfall gains. Stakeholders differentiated between good and bad investment. ‘Bad’
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investments are associated with speculation, while ‘good’ investments are associated with 
‘productive investment’ that would develop the company’s capabilities:
The entrepreneurs o f the first wave, they are the so called ‘ gold diggers’ . 
Everybody wanted to own a company, but they were not ready to spend their own 
lives in it; neither to wake up at 6 am, nor to take care o f hundreds o f employees, 
nor to take care o f the sub-suppliers, nor pay attention i f  exports are working fine, i f  
the [Slovak] crown is up or down. Buy cheap, sell expensive. Buy a Lamborghini; 
go on holidays in the Caribbean. This was the first privatisation. They did not know 
much about the industry. Their way o f thinking was: ‘certainly one day someone 
w ill come who w ill want to buy it from me and it is my aim to sell it then’ . So, it 
was all around the speculation motive. [...] After a few years, now it-is  clearer - the 
best way was when the management made a buy-out. It could be a factory 
producing colours, painting. They would say: we have been working here for 20 
years, we know the company well, we shall decide about its future, we continue to 
develop it. This was a positive privatisation (Pal’a Interview March 2007).
Investors are thus clearly differentiated between those with productionst attitudes and the 
rest. There are those who are interested in investing and developing the company and others 
who acquire companies for other reasons: speculation or reducing the competition. Thus, 
‘ real’ businesses are seen as long-term preservers o f industrial capabilities. While VW 
subsidiaries are considered as successful cases o f preserving and developing local industrial 
capabilities, the stakeholders quoted a large number o f unsuccessful privatisations where 
industrial capabilities were destroyed. One such case is the foreign privatisation o f a 
previously internationally renowned Hungarian bus producer Ikarus. Ikarus, one o f the 
biggest Hungarian bus producers o f the state socialist era, was bought by an Italian bus 
producer Iveco in 1999. Its two plants were closed down in 2003 and 2007. A  trade union 
leader wondered: ‘ What was the point for Iveco to buy Ikarus, what was the interest [o f the 
foreign investor]: to buy a competitor or to buy a plant with capacity?’ (Mezei Interview 
September 2008). The implicit argument behind this question is that the Italian bus 
producer bought its Hungarian competitor to reduce competition in the market and not to 
develop regional industrial capabilities -  something the trade union leader would have 
expected as it would have been conform to the ‘productionist logic’ .
Conclusion
This Chapter demonstrated that the enterprise organising logic o f competitive industrial 
capabilities has re-emerged in the Central European VW  subsidiaries. Despite dramatic 
changes in the institutions o f firm performance associated with cost efficiency and short­
term financial profitability, crucial for the international product market competition, the
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local commitment to industrial capabilities that existed in state socialist times has at least 
partially been preserved. The increased financialisation o f firm  performance and the new 
cost-efficiency logic did not completely replace the non-economic old productionist 
enterprise organising logic o f appropriateness. Company collective agreements have been 
good examples o f coalitions o f stakeholders with a productionist organising logic aiming at 
upgrading o f company’s industrial capabilities and advancement within the Group. In 
addition, the commitment to industrial capabilities has been propagated also outside the 
firm: enterprise development and industrial upgrading are considered as an issue o f public 
concern. Preserving and developing local and national industrial capabilities has thus been 
another non-economic, deontological organising logic, an end in itself, for stakeholders 
inside and outside the company. Thus, the societal re-embedding o f institutional 
consequences o f economic liberalism has been non-negligible. It now contributes to 
enterprises functioning as sources o f competitive industrial capabilities, combining 
elements o f both economic and non-economic enterprise organising logics.
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VII. The enterprise as a discretionary bureaucracy
The third enterprise area o f studying the interaction o f the economic and non-economic 
organising logics is the work and skill organisation. The goal o f this Chapter is to 
demonstrate that also in the field o f work organisation and skills, the expansion o f the 
organising logic associated with economic liberalism is somewhat counterbalanced by a 
societal re-embedding driven by non-economic organising logic. The combination o f these 
two logics contributes to the emergence o f enterprise being a discretionary bureaucracy.
Chapter III discussed how discretionary bureaucracy was one o f the non-economic 
enterprise organising logics during the state socialist period. It was based on a high level o f 
autonomy and discretion and was linked to intellectual, negotiating and social skills o f 
managerial staff and intellectual and technical skills o f the shop floor staff. Economic 
liberalism brought an important institutional change in the field o f work organisation and 
skills for both managers and blue collar workers. This Chapter describes how for both 
groups this institutional change meant a de-contextualisation and standardisation o f 
knowledge and skills: for managers, this process has been associated with a 
‘professionalisation’ o f managerial practices and standardisation o f managerial knowledge 
through special training courses and new work practices; for blue-collar workers, these 
institutional changes have been associated with lean production practices and a higher work 
standardisation. The institutional changes linked to economic liberalism such as the 
formalisation o f rules, a certain de-contextualisation o f local knowledge and the 
standardisation o f work organisation contributed to strengthening o f the hierarchical 
structures o f managerial authority in the firm  and thus were expressions o f the logic o f 
consequence and the instrumental rationality linked to the law o f value and cost-efficiency.
The reader might refer to Coase who pointed out that companies are distinct from markets 
because the exchange based on price mechanism is replaced within the firm by vertical 
integration (Coase 1937). However, the variable that matters for this study is the underlying 
organising logic: both activities within the firm and outside o f the firm can follow an 
organising logic o f the law o f value and o f cost-efficiency, on the one hand, or a non­
economic logic, on the other. In this case study, restructuring measures o f 
professionalisation and standardisation o f managerial and blue-collar work had a clear 
instrumental goal o f greater cost-efficiency. Thus, this type o f institutional change within
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the enterprise was an expression o f the expanding economic liberalism. In the post­
communist context, standardisation and de-contextualisation o f skills, professionalisation, 
formalisation and standardisation o f work practices driven by economic liberalism 
represent to a large extent the expansion o f the utilitarian logic o f catching up with ‘best 
practice’ , the means to a higher productivity and profitability, not an end in itself. Local 
stakeholders had not experienced these practices before and thus could not have developed 
deontological values or ‘ logics o f appropriateness’ related to them (March and Olsen 1989).
As elaborated in Chapter III, state socialist firms were characterised by the formal 
centralised power o f the Party nomenklatura, on the one hand, and by informal chaos and 
high work autonomy o f the workforce, on the other. To a certain extent, workers were left 
to their own devices in, what some described as a state socialist ‘ fake bureaucracy’ . 
Reforms o f work organisation associated with the introduction o f clear and explicit rules 
and regulations met with the approval o f local stakeholders, even i f  these reforms also 
meant establishing a stronger hierarchy o f managerial authority.
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However, as a reaction to the expansion o f the new economic organising logic, certain 
deontological organising logics intervened into this de-contextualisation o f skills and
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standardisation o f work processes by underlining the importance o f non-economic 
organising logic that values the locally embedded knowledge o f managers and o f the blue- 
collar workers. Thus, standardisation o f production has not been unlimited: some re­
embedding o f work organisation practices took place because stakeholders adhered to the 
organising logic o f skill autonomy. According to this non-economic enterprise organising 
logic, an enterprise functions as a discretionary bureaucracy based on the locally embedded 
management and skill autonomy. This non-economic enterprise organising logic 
represented a form o f societal re-embedding which prevented a fu ll de-contextualisation 
and standardisation o f local knowledge and skills.
As discussed in Chapter III, although planning was the state socialist answer to the price 
mechanism, the administrative planning machine o f production was associated with a high 
level o f unpredictability and discretion. There were two different but interrelated 
dimensions o f discretion: the political discretion o f Party intervention and the daily 
discretion on the shop floor. The ‘political’ discretion o f the state planning system took the 
form o f direct state intervention in production tasks. The key decisions concerning 
company strategy, production levels and investments were not made within the companies 
but by Party officials thus making decisions unpredictable for the company stakeholders. 
Pavlinek describes the discretionary role o f state bureaucracy in running the companies:
Skoda’s development was determined by state planning machinery. [...] [After 
nationalisation,] Skoda lost its independence in such crucial decision-making areas 
such as what and how many types o f cars it would produce, how often they would 
be modernized, how much and when it would invest in its production, and where 
and for how much it would buy the components for its assembly operations 
(Pavlinek 2008: 67).
The dependence o f production process on the moods and power struggles in the Communist 
Party made the system highly discretionary and difficu lt to predict. It is out o f this rationale 
that the desire for a more professional, apolitical management style emerged among 
company stakeholders. The desire for a withdrawal o f the discretionary influence o f the 
Communist Party nomenklatura was strong and was visible already during the privatisation 
process. At Skoda, one o f the reasons for selection o f VW  rather than Renault was the view 
that emerged during the negotiations that VW  was a more serious partner, as Renault was 
partially state run and had strong Communist trade unions. State ownership o f the company 
and Communist trade unions were associated for the Czech side with political dominance 
and discretion. Thus, Renault’s offer was rejected for the fear o f the political interference.
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The political discretion linked to the Communist Party nomenklatura was overcome 
relatively quickly during the early transition. Already in the first year o f transition, 
Communist Party control over the production process collapsed. Private ownership, 
especially in the form o f a foreign investor further cemented the impossibility o f return to a 
direct intervention by political authorities and ruled out the discretion associated with them. 
However, despite this strong institutional shift in ownership and control, another type o f 
discretion characteristic o f state socialist systems remained intact -  namely, the highly 
discretionary behaviour o f ordinary workers and line managers that was partially a 
consequence o f the political discretion o f state socialist era. In the state socialist production 
system, in the trade-off between rule-bound and discretionary behaviour, ordinary workers 
and line managers had an overwhelmingly high level o f discretion. Despite the fact that 
formal organising logics and regulations existed, discretionary decisions were omnipresent. 
Labour and supply shortages, labour hoarding and unexpected changes in production 
volumes gave a lot o f autonomy to shop floor workers and middle managers. This is why 
centrally planned economies have been described as an anarchical production process 
(Burawoy 1985). Because o f the unpredictability o f the production process the top 
managerial control o f the shop floor was low. Formal rules and regulations were 
circumvented, giving middle and line management greater scope for action: it could reward 
and punish with a high level o f discretion. Chapter III demonstrated this argument for 
various fields o f work such as rewards, social benefits, and production targets. With the 
introduction o f the new work organisation conceptualised around constant optimisation o f 
production processes, Central European work organisation moved away from implicit, 
informal and discretionary work standards towards larger role o f formal, explicit and only 
to a limited extent negotiable work rules.
Taking into account the very high level o f discretion that dominated the state socialist 
production systems helps understand why local stakeholders desired a more formalised and 
rule-bound organisation o f work. The high degree o f explicitness o f organising logics and 
standards in relation to work organisation was referred to as ‘professionalism’ . Professional 
work organisation was thus associated with reduction o f discretion. With the regime 
change, new explicit targets in work organisation were introduced and work organisation 
shifted towards more explicit and standardised rules. The resistance to it was low as less 
discretion was considered as more professional in the eyes o f the local labour force. The 
desire to overcome the previous system o f ‘anarchy’ and high discretion was so large that
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most reforms o f work organisation which were associated with the old production system 
and political intervention were first rejected by the labour force. Thus, certain work 
organisation practices usually associated with greater work autonomy and job control such 
as introduction o f teams were first rejected. Teams were initially rejected as they resembled 
closely state socialist ‘work brigades’ . Similarly, various motivation and continuous 
improvement slogans were rejected as they resembled those o f ‘socialist competition’ (Dorr 
and Kessel 1995: 13). Thus, certain practices were rejected on the grounds o f not being 
‘really new’ and resembling too much features associated with the state socialist era. 
Nevertheless, as w ill be seen, other forms o f discretion turned out to be highly valued by 
local actors, who were able to preserve them despite the strong institutional change in work 
organisation.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section I deals with ‘professionalisation’ o f 
managerial skills and its limitations, while Sections II and III discuss the evolution o f blue- 
collar work practices and skills. Section I shows how for managerial skills, the shift to a 
greater rule-bound behaviour based on financial and administrative targets has been 
counter-balanced by the emphasis on local expertise and local discretion. Section II 
elaborates on the shift in work practices related to greater optimisation on the shop floor. 
Section III, on the other hand, shows that despite this shift in practices a certain level o f 
discretion was preserved with technical skills being at the core o f this new formally granted 
discretion. The enterprise organisation as ‘discretionary bureaucracy’ based on skill 
autonomy has thus been preserved, even i f  in a new institutional form.
I. Managerial skills: professionalisation and local 
knowledge
High levels o f discretion and chaos dominated the state socialist work and production 
system. Labour and material shortages meant that the rhythm o f production was highly 
uneven and demanded a high degree o f expertise and coordination skills from the line 
management. Often this expertise was not available, leaving line managers and workers to 
themselves to sort out problems o f supply shortages or o f high absenteeism. Such a system 
inevitably led to a rejection o f any local managerial knowledge by the local stakeholders 
during the early years o f regime change as they associated it with inefficiency and 
discretion. Especially during the early stages o f transition, managerial skills in state
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socialist enterprises were considered as obsolete and needing overhaul. Local stakeholders 
-  management and unions -  welcomed VW  led training practices for managers.
The implicitness o f local managerial knowledge and local technical skills has been so high 
that local stakeholders were often not aware o f it. Only after a certain period o f time and 
partially due to unsuccessful attempts o f a direct transfer o f practices that met with local 
resistance, a more differentiated approach emerged. The new approach emphasised the 
view that not the whole work organisation system needed an overhaul, but just certain parts 
o f it; one just needed to introduce the missing ‘market-economy’ skills. A union leader at 
Skoda summarised the newly emerged consensus:
We had one enormous weakness. We knew many things better than they [the 
Germans] did and I think that we do even today. We know how to be more 
practical, we can better improvise to achieve a better result. However, during the 
previous [state socialist] regime we completely failed in marketing and advertising 
and all o f this (Pavlinek 2008: 92).
Managerial skills related to the new market economy oriented work organisation such as 
sales, accounting and quality standards were hardly present in the previous production 
regime so that after privatisation a number o f new managers were hired. Skoda alone hired 
around 150 new managers to cover these skills (Hamacek Interview December 2006).
But among the managers already on board, the importance o f local knowledge and 
unspoken ways o f doing things were acknowledged. In the perception o f local 
management, managerial authority is seen as something much more embedded in the 
company’s ‘ labour collective’ than it would usually be the case in a Western firm. Thus, the 
original perceptions o f a manager as a technically qualified specialist with responsibilities 
in decision making, rather than a visionary leader, have been preserved. The former 
perception with its clear roots in state socialist work organisation o f production attributes a 
greater role to the whole ‘ labour collective’ , to general technical and organisational 
capabilities o f production teams, rather than to the individual effort o f a manager. Thus, 
Jung, Klemm et al. (2004: 21) report how Czech managers in Skoda were described as 
more ‘modest’ in relation to the German managerial style.
Also, the discretion o f the production system described as a ‘chaos’ has been re-interpreted 
as ‘ the capacity to improvise and be more flexible’ . Thus, while during the early stage o f 
transition local management skills were rejected, later the role o f local context, local
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experiences and local ‘ways o f making cars’ have been emphasised (Pavlinek 2008: 93). 
When implementing new work organisation practices, local stakeholders identified a large 
number o f features o f their previous work organisation that they did not want to give up 
despite their high desire for modernisation: rules were welcome but to the extent that they 
were useful in the context o f existing practices. Thus, a more moderate approach to 
modernisation that combined the strengths o f both production systems was chosen (Dorr 
and Kessel 1995). Rather than a fu ll transfer o f practices, a professionalisation o f already 
existing skills and expertise was chosen. In Skoda, with its strong engineering tradition, the 
demand for managerial autonomy in relation to the headquarters remained especially high. 
Preservation o f autonomy and certain independence o f local stakeholders in foreign-led 
modernisation process was crucial for the fast industrial modernisation described in 
Chapter IV. The direct involvement o f VW  managers in the daily running o f the company 
was seen as temporal, o f limited duration: ‘ it motivated the demonstration o f competence as 
a means o f achieving autonomy’ (Jung, Klemm et al. 2004: 209).
The old production-related managerial skills were re-evaluated and professionalised. In 
Skoda, the most advanced form o f such professionalisation was chosen. Although 
originally an outright training o f management was planned, this was replaced early on by a 
tandem management and coaching that started half a year after the jo in t venture agreement 
in 1991. Tandem management was justified with a high speed o f change that needed to 
occur at the Skoda plant, the weak managerial competences o f local managers and thus the 
need for a speedy essential know-how transfer in ‘a more practical way than ever possible 
through seminars and other off-the-job activities, far away from everyday life ’ (Gutmann 
1995: 23). The management tandem arrangement was set up in late 1992 for German 
managers in key positions to work together with their Czech colleagues, usually for the 
period o f three years. To the projects counted new organizational structure o f HR, 
management performance appraisal, developing management guidelines and Skoda 
management culture, as well as developing further training programs. In 1995, there were 
40 projects taking place (Gutmann 1995: 22). While in 1991 there were 50 expatriate 
managers working at Skoda, the number increased to 400 at the peak o f the tandem project. 
Yet after the original period o f three-four years, the role o f expatriates was reduced and the 
Czech managers took more and more responsibility. Already in the mid-1990s, the number 
o f expatriates declined: in 1996, there were 140 expatriates still working at the premises, 
while in 2005, there were only 40 left (Nanasi Interview December 2006).
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The tandem practices at Skoda were an example o f a close cooperation between German 
and Czech managers. This strategy followed the view that only certain, missing skills 
needed to be transferred while local know-how and experience o f local managers should be 
preserved. The implemented changes allowed for knowledge and know-how transfer but 
this transfer happened in a highly contextual -  rather than arm’s length -  way. Despite the 
introduction o f more explicit rules and targets the importance o f contextual local 
knowledge was acknowledged. The human resources manager confirmed that: ‘The 
exchange [tandem] program with foreign managers was put in place to secure certain 
processes and know-how transfer’ (Hamacek Interview December 2006). 
Professionalisation o f broad managerial tasks rather than a transfer o f specific sets o f 
practices was at the core o f this cooperation. In line with the valuation o f local knowledge 
and local discretion, the know-how transferred was very general. Rather than being ‘ this is 
how we do things in Germany’ , the management training program had following 
dimensions: information and communication, economic management, innovation 
management, time management, HRM and industrial law, quality management, leadership 
and teamwork (Gutmann 1995: 22).
Despite stricter financial targets having been introduced in the subsidiaries o f the VW  
Group, new financial and productivity goals have been balanced out through the discretion 
on the side o f the middle and line management. A t Skoda, rather than being constrained by 
narrow administrative or financial targets local managers were given a lot o f autonomy:
Expatriates act as know-how partners in the process o f local management 
development [...]. The group manager’s task is to develop the professional and 
managerial skills o f his local partner and thus enable him to manage his department 
independently. He acts, therefore, as a knowledge mediator and, first o f all, a coach 
(Gutmann 1995: 21).
Further evidence o f less ‘ transfer’ but more ‘supportive coaching’ is visible in the 
following statement o f the training manager: *[...] especially the expatriate must be able 
and prepared to lead a ‘ shadow existence’ . Personal profiling is not appropriate’ (Gutmann 
1995: 22). Further she argues that ‘vertical job sharing, which might at least seem useful at 
the beginning o f a tandem partnership, is only to be used when absolutely necessary to 
secure know-how transfer’ (Gutmann 1995: 22).
Local knowledge and local social organisation were preserved despite the introduction o f 
new, market economy conform managerial skills. What made new work organisation
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acceptable for local stakeholders was the relative high level o f subsidiaries’ autonomy in 
human resource issues that has been the norm in the VW  subsidiaries and, arguably, in the 
German MNCs approach to human resource practices abroad more generally. Employment 
and work related issues are usually left to the local stakeholders (Bluhm 2007). German 
managers have showed a high level o f understanding concerning the local practices: they 
did not see it as an institutional vacuum, nor were they unaware o f potential problems o f an 
outright transfer. Dorr and Kessel report how only in the very early stages o f the Czech 
jo in t venture at Skoda the ideas o f direct transfer were dominant and how very soon the 
company came to an ‘ independent modernisation and rationalisation concept’ (Dorr and 
Kessel 1995: 8). German managers realised that organisational and production methods 
long known in the west European automotive production were no guarantee for success, but 
also -  and much more crucial for our argument -  German managers understood that a direct 
transfer o f practices would hinder home-grown modernisation efforts and ‘would destroy 
intact and functioning structures’ (Dorr and Kessel 1995: 9). Thus, German managers seem 
to have had a good awareness o f ‘existing well functioning structures’ so that despite the 
fact that there have not been any evidence o f bigger social conflicts during the early stages 
o f the jo in t venture, German managers were afraid that i f  these existing functioning 
structures and accepted rules would simply be replaced through western concepts it would 
lead to workers’ protest (Dorr and Kessel 1995: 9). German domestic debates on 
transferability o f the Japanese managerial practices to Germany seem to have sensitivised 
German managers to the issue o f local embeddedness. In VW  Slovakia, it was the German 
manager that referred to the concept o f ‘job enrichment’ (Zeller Interview March 2007), 
thus demonstrating that humanisation o f work has become a part o f German managerial 
thinking.
An alternative, more centralised, standardised and formalised human resources control is 
implemented by the Asian automotive MNC investors present in Central Europe. Their 
approach is characterised by providing a high level o f information about the new work 
norms and rules upfront, during the recruitment process. Even more crucial, while VW  
allowed the subsidiaries to adjust their human resource practices to the local organising 
logics by leaving decisions about employment relation issues to local managers, Asian 
producers control the human resource practices in their subsidiaries in a very strict way. 
Thus, in Suzuki Hungary, a high standardisation and formalisation do not only concern the 
recruitment process but also the performance evaluation process (Swain 1998). The 
consequence o f this strategy has been a strong worker resistance when such new forms o f
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work organisation were introduced. The turnover rate was also very high, at 20-30% o f the 
workforce. Thus, in comparison to the VW  subsidiaries, where new forms o f work 
organisation were welcomed as ‘more professional’ , in the case o f Suzuki the employees 
experienced them as ‘controlling’ , as standardisation and professionalisation have gone 
very far, without leaving enough room for local embeddedness and discretion.
In Central European VW  subsidiaries, a relatively high level o f local knowledge and local 
discretion remained, on the other hand, a crucial feature o f managerial practices. Central 
European stakeholders have shown appreciative o f the high level o f embeddedness o f local 
knowledge. Thus, it is appreciated when the necessary discretion is shown by German 
managers. In Skoda, during the introduction o f a new work organisation system and a new 
production line for the ‘VW  quality’ car Octavia, a new ‘ fractal’ just-in-time production 
process was introduced in 1996 with the new labour force and new management team. But 
after a phase o f quality problems the top management team was replaced by experienced 
Czech managers. The ability o f the German investor, i f  necessary, to change the plan and 
adjust to circumstances in a discretionary and contextualised way, was appreciated by the 
local stakeholders: ‘ [After this bringing back o f the Czech managers], the situation 
improved dramatically’ , reported the industrial engineering director at Skoda (Nanasi 
Interview December 2006).
Central European stakeholders have also reviewed their own perceptions o f the state 
socialist legacies and the early rejection o f own traditions and practices gave way to a more 
balanced approach that welcomes new practices but reinterprets the old existing work 
practices in a more positive light. Thus, the Czech stakeholders were reported to have a 
self-perception o f being ‘ flexible with a strong capability o f improvisation and a tendency 
toward spontaneous decisions’ (Jung, Klemm et al. 2004: 211).
There has also been an increased emphasis on the importance o f local knowledge. While 
new managers with new skills in marketing, financial controlling, sales and human resource 
management were hired in the early 1990s, no important firing o f ‘state socialist’ managers 
was reported. In 2006, still 30% o f Skoda’s managers were recruited before V W ’s take 
over (Holecek Interview December 2006). Furthermore, it was emphasised that in mid- 
2000s, most o f Skoda’s managers are recruited from company’s own ranks. The skilled 
blue-collar workers can also become manager; the best are admitted to the appraisal system 
that presupposes two meetings per year with a member o f the human resource department
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during which professional goals and progress are discussed (Bila Interview December 
2006). Local embeddedness in managerial thinking also means having a larger, more 
holistic view o f the company. The manager from the training department reported on 
Skoda’s plans to introduce horizontal rotation among managers, which would allow them to 
have a better overview picture o f the company (Bila Interview December 2006).
The role o f local commitment o f Czech managers has also been raised as an important 
reason for managerial work. The director o f managerial training department reported that 
managerial salaries were 20% lower in Mlada Boleslav than in Prague. He emphasised that:
what attracts managers to Skoda and what makes them loyal to the company is a 
combination o f factors. [...] Among them is a good name o f Skoda in the country 
and abroad. Also, some o f the workers have been here since several generations 
(Holecek Interview December 2006).
To sum up, from the perspective o f the local stakeholders, a higher level o f rule-bound 
behaviour is welcomed, yet the importance o f rules governing work organisation is still 
limited by a high level o f contextualised knowledge. German recognition o f the local 
knowledge and thus indirectly o f local discretion has been crucial in this process. Rather 
than trying to overcome the local system o f production, German managers recognised the 
importance o f local knowledge. The use o f tandems at Skoda in management ‘ re-training’ 
in this context is a telling example o f how this balance between rules and discretion was 
achieved. Thus, despite more rule-bound new management practices, a new equilibrium 
between rule-bound and locally embedded, discretionary behaviour was reached that was 
found acceptable by local stakeholders as it complied with their enterprise organising logic 
o f discretionary bureaucracy.
II. Formalising and standardising work organisation
While the last Section dealt with the changes in managerial attitudes and practices and the 
tension between greater professionalisation and standardisation o f work practices, on the 
one hand, and preserving local managerial knowledge, on the other, this and the next 
Sections look at new work organisation practices introduced on the shop floor. Despite 
important organisational changes, also here, the introduction o f more explicit rules could be 
counter-balanced to a certain extent by the discretionary behaviour o f employees.
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The ‘modem’ work organisation practices leaning on the VW  headquarters’ work practices 
were introduced in all VW  subsidiaries early on. The adopted work organisation has been a 
German form o f lean production with certain local Tayloristic adaptations. In Skoda, the 
modern work organisation was introduced with the production start o f Octavia. The new 
work organisation practices were introduced fairly fast, w ithin two years, between 1996 
and 1998. A t Audi Gyor, the introduction o f the new production system took place at the 
same time (Nanasi Interview Dec. 2006). Similarly, with increases in production numbers 
and models in the mid-1990s, new work organisation practices were introduced in VW  
Poznan and VW  Slovakia. The change in new work organisation on the shop floor in VW  
subsidiary plants has had two dimensions: professionalisation o f work process has taken the 
form o f formalisation o f previously implicit non-codified norms and ‘ways o f doing things* 
on the one hand, and Tayloristic standardisation o f work organisation practices, oh the 
other.
A  high degree o f formalisation was a key dimension o f the new work practices. 
Formalisation refers to organising logics governing the work process becoming more 
explicit. In some subsidiaries, as a reference to the Japanese ‘Toyota production model’ , 
new work organisation practices that were introduced were given their own name. Thus, in 
Skoda, the new work organisation was originally called ‘ the fractal factory’ ; later it started 
to be referred to as ‘the Skoda production model’ (Nanasi Interview December 2006). In 
other subsidiaries, there is no special term for the overall work organisation, but certain 
new sets o f practices were given a name. In VW  Slovakia, the initiation training is referred 
to as a ‘Profiraum’ -  a professional space. But even i f  no own name was given, work 
organisation has become an explicit issue where more explicit rules, targets and codes o f 
conduct were introduced. Various training opportunities were given to workers to 
familiarise themselves with the new rules. Thus, in Skoda, different dimensions o f work 
organisation are explicitly discussed during the training sessions. The functions and 
responsibilities o f team leaders are clearly stated and workers receive training on standard 
principles and soft skills (Nanasi and Bila Interview December 2006). Similarly, in other 
subsidiaries, technical training is now only one dimension o f training, while much greater 
attention is devoted to organisational knowledge and soft skills.
A  good example o f formalisation o f organisational practices is the introduction o f the 
concept o f quality system. Its introduction has brought substantial differences for work 
organisation. The broad concept o f ‘quality system’ encompasses the whole production
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process rather than the quality o f produced goods: it includes such fields as training, 
sourcing etc. A ll those dimensions were also a part o f the previous production process, yet 
now they have received a higher degree o f formalisation. A  VASAS trade union leader 
reported on how the work organisation has changed in the Hungarian component and bus 
producing industry:
Today, the quality system is different. Today, it is a very important part o f the 
company. There is not only quality control, but quality system which means ‘ to 
have every process in a written form -  for the finance, invoices, etc; not just 
production (Mezei Interview September 2008).
Thus, a stronger formalisation o f work processes in the new production system has often 
taken the form o f documentation.
Formalisation o f work practices has meant making rules and regulations more explicit and 
visible. This type o f high degree o f formalisation has been strong in the quality control. The 
previous production system had quality control but its explicitness was lower.
[Before], quality control was very strict. The quality control people came and 
controlled every step. These were high-level engineers; the controls took place all 
the time. Not only final products but also intermediary products were controlled for 
quality (Mezei Interview September 2008).
Today, quality standards are also ensured through the international system o f quality 
accreditation. Thus, in Skoda, external quality o f production audits take place at least twice 
a year but internal, small scale audits take place on a much more frequent basis: every 
second week or twice a month. Similar regular audits related to ISO23 standards take place 
in all other subsidiaries, a standard practice in the VW.
During state socialism, the wage o f individual worker could be reduced as a punishment for 
a production error, yet the pre-emptive measures were lacking. In the new production 
system, pre-emptive measures are much more dominant and formalised. A ll factories have 
a signalling system installed in production halls, with boards showing the number o f 
production related indicators: number o f produced and still to produce units for the shift. 
Also, there is a visualisation o f mistakes in the assembly line production (Nanasi Interview 
December 2006). The formalisation also increased in the field o f skills related to quality 
control. ‘Profiraum’ , a training space for all new employees introduced in 2005 in VW
23 International organisation for standardisation
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Slovakia, is a good example o f such new practices. A ll employees including skilled ones 
need to go through two-week training before starting work. They need to know the order o f 
tasks and be able to elaborate on the quality and product relevant features related to their 
workplace (Zeller Interview March 2007). Also in Skoda, skills related to production 
quality are formalised and trained:
People need to know what the role o f this work position in the overall production 
chain is, what is the responsibility, what quality systems we are using’ [..] Even i f  
the work on the assembly line is manual and not very complex, we need people 
who can explain to the auditors what they are doing, what technologies they are 
using, what are the risks involved. (Vacek Interview December 2006).
Thus, formalisation through documentation and visualisation has been the first type o f new 
work organisation.
Another activity that has now been explicitly formalised is team work. During state 
socialism, teams were mainly administrative units rather than anything else and the work 
organisation within teams was highly informal. In Hungary, usual work organisation in the 
metalworking sector consisted o f large groups o f 20-30 people. The group leaders who also 
worked at the assembly line were appointed by management and had very general 
managerial tasks ‘to organise the job, the people’ (Mezei Interview September 2008). Thus, 
the level o f individual autonomy and discretion was high. With the new work organisation, 
the role o f teams has changed. In the new work organisation, teams were made smaller and 
were expected to become more self-driven. In Skoda, a team covers eight to ten workers 
and they have an important level o f autonomy or, as the manager calls it, ‘ responsibility’ 
(Nanasi Interview December 2006). In VW  Slovakia, teams are also small: ten workers on 
average and within the range from eight to thirteen workers. With the changes in work 
organisation, teams elect their team leader who is freed from work on the assembly line. 
Teams are expected to organise team work autonomously. Thus, in VW  Slovakia, teams 
can decide autonomously about the rhythm o f rotation between the three work posts that 
each worker has (Zeller Interview March 2007).
Yet, overall, the scope o f autonomy and discretion for blue-collar workers has dramatically 
decreased. Standardisation o f previous work practices has been the second crucial feature 
o f the new work organisation; it is associated with a greater Taylorisation o f the production 
process. The ‘classical’ Japanese lean production is a mix o f standardisation o f certain 
work practices, on the one hand, and o f provision o f space for autonomy and discretion for
189
employees, on the other. In comparison to the ‘classical’ lean production in German and 
Central European VW  plants, the level o f discretion is slightly lower, while the level o f 
standardisation is higher. Tayloristic features o f the work organisation are visible in the fact 
that the quality control mechanisms o f the ‘classical’ lean production, such as stopping the 
assembly line in case o f an error, do not exist. Not surprisingly, the responsible manager 
saw the disciplining effect as more important. He argued that assembly line stoppages 
would not work as
in the previous system workers relied on outside rather than self-control so that 
workers do not see stoppages as a chance to resolve the error but rather as a 
break’ (Nanasi Interview December 2006).
Here, standardisation and lack o f discretion is interpreted as a disciplining measure by the 
manager. But, interestingly, a higher level o f Taylorisation is also accepted by trade unions. 
In many fields, higher standardisation o f work organisation has been associated with 
professionalisation. Thus, in product development and R&D departments, it was reported 
that further deficiencies that needed to be overcome lay in the fact that the feedback from 
the assembly line was not standardised and the links to production units and to customers 
were ad-hoc (Nanasi Interview December 2006).
Not stopping the assembly line has been a wide VW  Group-wide practice but still, overall, 
Taylorisation o f Central European practices is higher than in German practices. Important 
standardisation features o f the new work organisation are the low cycle times. In state 
socialist production system, cycle times were high which implies, again, a high autonomy 
o f work organisation. They were especially high in Hungary that was specialising in 
complex component production. The VASAS trade unionist described the process o f the 
production o f auto chassis:
The production process was divided in small steps. [..] It was one group that built 
the chassis -  welders. [..] The usual task duration was lh - lh  10 min. This was for 
the task o f an individual worker (Mezei Interview September 2008).
In the new work organisation, cycle times are much lower. Thus, in the main assembly line, 
cycle times are very low: around one minute in Skoda and up to 2.1 minute in VW  
Bratislava. This type o f standardisation is associated w ith higher Taylorisation and 
monotony o f work. Certain, this high level o f work standardisation is also linked to the 
evolution o f the automotive industry as a whole. The introduction o f system suppliers that
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was already mentioned earlier strongly reduced the technical complexity o f work, as the 
assembly o f technically sophisticated production modules is now done in the supplier 
factories. These modules are then delivered to the assembly line o f the final producers, the 
VW subsidiaries (Zeller Interview March 2007). Work breaks are also strongly 
standardised, to half an hour per shift in VW Bratislava. Work breaks are fixed to a 
specified time window to allow this time to be used for equipment maintenance (Zeller 
Interview March 2007).
Yet although overall work practices have a high degree o f Taylorisation, still a certain 
balance between standardisation and discretion is kept. In most production processes, there 
is a possibility for workers to rotate between tasks. Thus, in VW  Bratislava, workers know 
three different work positions within each team and there is a possibility to rotate for 
avoiding monotony and for ergonomic reasons. For certain difficu lt positions, such as in 
paint shop, workers have to rotate every two hours (Zeller Interview March 2007). In 
Skoda, cycle times are set for teams and for work places but the teams can decide 
themselves during the ‘continuous improvement workshops’ how to structure their time 
(Nanasi Interview December 2006). In this respect, although a shift to greater 
standardisation took place, still a certain balance between rules and discretion was 
preserved.
A  greater standardisation o f work is associated with the expansion o f the economic 
organising logic: it is a mechanism to increase the discipline and to make production more 
cost-efficient and thus profitable. The high productivity goal remains undeniably the main 
factor behind this higher standardisation. ‘High productivity pressures come from the 
headquarters’ benchmarking. Explicit goals o f productivity increases are fixed every year’ 
(Langenfelder Interview March 2007). The high productivity goals provide justification for 
the middle- and line-management to strengthen work discipline and to increase control. It 
has been argued by a Skoda’s middle manager that ‘ the quality o f training and skills was 
high during state socialism; the low quality o f production can be attributed to the missing 
disciplining and controlling factors’ (Vacek Interview December 2006). It was pointed out 
that the effects o f this ‘disciplining’ o f the new work order were significant: during the first 
two years o f jo int venture labour productivity increased without any significant financial 
investment. Pavlinek describes the increased managerial control o f the production process 
as a
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replacement o f the state socialist work organisation and shop-floor practices with 
capitalist ones. The anarchy o f production associated with the state socialism [...] 
has been replaced with the planned organisation o f production (Pavlinek 2002: 
366).
The anarchy and the high degree o f autonomy and job control on the shop floor gave way 
to the authority o f foreman and managerial control (Pavlinek 2002: 366).
Further justifications for the high Taylorisation and for a low level o f discretion have been 
the complexity o f work and a high number o f new employees due to high turn over. At VW 
Slovakia, the industrial engineering manager, a German expatriate, explained:
The optimal cycle times are usually one minute. This is ideal: the content is divided 
into small portions and is better to manage [for the employees]. This is good -  to 
have an assurance about the quality, but also when we take into account the new 
employees. 2.1 minutes are also still manageable, but longer cycle times such as 3-4 
minutes are not possible due to complexity o f the cars produced. [..] The 
complexity o f cars is related to a large number o f parts: even in terms o f logistics, 
longer cycle times would not be possible (Zeller Interview March 2007).
Even i f  these other justifications are valid, the productivity pressures and cost-efficiency 
rationale remain the dominant factor behind high Taylorisation.
The professionalisation o f blue-collar work through formalisation and standardisation has 
been associated with a greater managerial control, as company trade unions and works 
councils have not played any decisive role in designing and implementing the new work 
organisation. Partially, this has been due to national labour codes that do not extent 
consultation and co-decision rights to work organisation issues apart from those discussed 
in Chapter V. But independently o f the existence o f legal co-decision rights, what is 
striking is that trade unions do not see the adoption o f the new organisational practices as 
problematic. Labour has not opposed the introduction o f such Tayloristic work practices: 
rather than seeing this issue through the prism o f decreasing self-control, unions feel that 
the high level o f standardisation is justified despite the increased monotony o f the work 
process. Discretion and autonomy as crucial factors o f job enrichment do not seem to be 
important for unions. The trade union leader at Skoda stated that after the regime change 
that it was not so much the new skills but ‘ the new work organisation and order’ that 
changed and made a difference (Pavlinek 2002: 366).
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This Section described restructuring o f work organisation and managerial practices that 
took place in the VW  subsidiaries. This restructuring had as a goal the establishment as a 
rule-bound, ‘professional’ work organisation, a bureaucracy. The goal was to achieve 
higher cost efficiency and higher productivity as well as to streamline the production 
process. Two work organisation strategies contributed to its creation: standardisation and 
formalisation o f work practices. The chaos and informality o f the previous production 
process with it spontaneous, discretionary and informal interactions was replaced by the 
formal, standardised, rule-bound work organisation that was associated with a higher 
vertical integration, Taylorisation and a greater managerial control.
The next Section deals with the other side o f the coin, the preserved discretion in work 
organisation. Despite the shift to greater optimisation o f work processes that in many 
institutional set-ups was associated with standardisation and formalisation, a certain 
balance between these new economic organising logics, on the one hand, and the non­
economic organising logic o f individual discretion and autonomy at work, on the other, has 
been preserved.
HI. Preserving discretion in work organisation
The last two Sections demonstrated that in line with the economic organising logic o f the 
law o f value, the level o f strategic managerial control has increased through formalised and 
professionalised managerial training as well as through formalisation and standardisation o f 
work practices on the shop floor. Yet at the same time, following the logic o f 
appropriateness, a certain level o f discretion and autonomy o f blue-collar workers have also 
been preserved. They were preserved because the blue-collar vocational skills have 
preserved their high standing in the eyes o f the local stakeholders: this has been the 
deontological dimension behind the societal re-embedding o f the economic logic o f cost- 
efficiency and process optimisation. This Section develops this argument and shows how 
the deontological underpinnings o f work organisation practices had had their roots in state 
socialism, but also in the German more humanistic adaptation o f lean production practices.
As discussed earlier, during state socialism, despite the state administrative planning, the 
production process was highly unpredictable. Labour and material shortages led to an 
uneven rhythm o f production which demanded a high degree o f expertise and good 
coordination skills not only from the management but also from the experienced and skilled 
core workers. As discussed in Chapter III, high intellectual and technical skills among core
193
workers were an important component o f the spontaneous, discretionary, last-minute work 
organisation: rather than being an elaborate managerial strategy, it was rather an ‘enterprise 
survival strategy’ that middle managers and shop floor workers developed, often using 
informal negotiations. This Sections argues that despite large-scale institutional and 
organisational changes towards larger formalisation and Taylorisation o f the production 
process described in the previous Section, a reliance on expertise and discretion o f skilled 
workers remained an important pillar o f the work process in Central European VW 
subsidiaries.
The previous Section presented standardisation and formalisation o f work organisation as 
two parallel and interrelated processes. This Section argues that only allowing for 
individual autonomy and discretion at work, in parallel to standardisation, made the new 
work organisation a success in Central European VW  production locations. Preserving 
work discretion and autonomy on the shop floor has been linked to more autonomous 
middle and line managers whose autonomy was established through simplification and 
flattening o f the previously existing hierarchical structures. During state socialism, the 
hierarchical structures in state owned enterprises were highly developed: the share o f 
white-collar administrative staff was very high. For example, in a leading bus Hungarian 
producer Ikarus, the share o f white collar workers was 40% o f the total labour force (Mezei 
Interview September 2008). Although the extent o f organisational change that followed 
privatisation has differed across subsidiaries, the general trend is shared: the hierarchical 
structures were simplified and flattened. In Skoda, hierarchy was reduced to five levels: 
team leader, Meister, shift supervisor, production unit supervisor, and plant director. This 
increased the degree o f autonomy o f all production units. The degree o f independence and 
managerial responsibility o f individual production units increased to such an extent that the 
plant was referred to as ‘ factory within a factory’ (Dorr and Kessel 1995: 10). A  similar 
trend o f the reduction o f the white-collar staff and improvement in the blue-collar to white- 
collar employment ratio has also been observable in other VW  subsidiaries. The overall 
flatter hierarchical structures contributed to stronger autonomy o f middle and line 
managers: ’As a middle manager, you can do more here, in this mixture o f German and 
local management structures. It is less hierarchical (Zeller Interview March 2007)’ .
What is interesting is that despite an important change in the set-up o f work organisation, 
this ‘new autonomy’ and discretion still rely on the technical and intellectual skills o f the 
shop floor workers. The use o f technical, vocational education skills is still high. As
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described in Chapter III, the level o f technical skills was high during state socialism, or at 
least comparable with the German level. The stakeholders in VW  subsidiaries confirmed 
that the original level o f skills in their plants before privatisation to VW  was very high 
(Zeller Interview March 2007). In VW  Slovakia, in 2006, only 1.85% o f the workforce was 
unskilled, while 45% were in secondary technical school training, and 27% had a secondary 
technical school certificate (VW Slovakia Presentation). In Skoda, in the mid-2000s, 52% 
o f the workforce was in an apprenticeship training and 31% had a completed vocational 
training (Skoda 2004). In Audi Gyor, all blue-collar workers were reported to be skilled 
workers (Radi Interview August 2007). For comparison, the share o f skilled labour in VW 
Germany was 76.6% in 2000. Thus, the overall share o f employees with vocational training 
in Central European VW  subsidiaries was the same or even slightly higher than that in the 
German VW  plants.
Even more important than the formal level o f certified skills, what provides evidence for 
the high use o f the technical and intellectual skills o f the shop floor workers is the intensive 
use o f labour in the car assembly process. The level o f automation is an important indicator 
o f the level o f skills among the blue-collar labour force as only highly qualified blue-collar 
workers can perform the production steps necessary in today’s complex process o f car 
production. In all four Central European VW subsidiaries the level o f automation has been 
much lower than in the VW  headquarters which is estimated at 98%. In Skoda, the overall 
level o f automation is much lower than the level in the headquarters. Thus, in the 
production o f old Octavia and o f the old Superb, the level o f automation was extremely 
low, at 10% and 5%, respectively. In VW Slovakia, at the beginning o f the jo int venture, 
100% o f production was manual work (Interview Holecek March 2007). The production o f 
new Superb was automated to 30-40%, similar to the production lines o f the Roomster. The 
high level o f blue-collar skills has thus been visible as blue-collar workers were able to 
construct modem cars practically without any automated support system.
The levels o f automation are higher for models with higher production numbers: the 
production o f the new Octavia with a production capacity o f 800 vehicles a day has been 
automated to just below 50%. Fabia, the mass production car o f Skoda with 1000 vehicles 
per day, has had an automation level o f approximately 50% (Nanasi Interview December
2006). Thus, a pattern o f automation emerges: on the one hand, there are ‘ small series’ 
productions o f 200-300 cars per day, with a relatively low level o f automation o f 30-40%, 
while, on the other hand, there are more ‘mass’ productions o f 900 vehicles per day that
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have a higher level o f automation o f 50%. But what is interesting is that even the cars with 
a higher production volume have had a relatively low level o f automation. With its level of 
automation that varies between 30-50%, Skoda’s degree o f automation is still less than half 
o f the level o f VW plants in Germany. Similarly, at VW  Bratislava, while there have been 
large differences between the models24, overall, the degree o f automation is substantially 
lower than in the German VW  plants; it is on average 65% (Interview Holecek March
2007). This, again, shows that a high level o f blue-collar skills and their intensive use have 
remained an important feature o f work organisation in the Central European VW 
subsidiaries.
Local management has shown a clear awareness o f blue-collar skills being a highly 
valuable resource. It justified the decision o f a low automation with an increased flexibility 
o f the production process. ‘People, after all, can better learn new production processes than 
machines’ (Nanasi Interview December 2006), was the dominant argument. The company 
followed a strategy o f increased flexib ility as the low automation allows constructing 
assembly lines in a more flexible way. The same awareness is also visible in other VW 
subsidiaries. Furthermore, the high level o f vocational skills is given as one o f the key 
reasons for the fast industrial upgrading that took place since the early 1990s. The human 
resources director at VW  Slovakia explained: ‘One reason [for the successful upgrading] is 
the highly qualified people. Earlier, we had a complete dual system o f vocational training’ 
(Holecek Interview March 2007). The human resources director also made clear that the 
differences between the German and Slovak levels o f skills were not that large despite the 
prejudices on the German side:
A t the beginning when VW  came here, they believed it would be like in a third 
world country [...]. The first training program for the paint shop was planned to last 
one year, yet after three months there was nothing to do because the employees 
were trained. Because the German managers thought they needed to take people 
down from the trees. Nobody knew exactly how people were qualified. They first 
thought that people here needed to be taught to read and write (Holecek Interview 
March 2007).
Blue-collar skills are valued and developed also because they are seen as a source o f 
technical innovation. There is a formalised process o f information sharing and exchange to 
foster technical innovation coming from the shop floor. A t the VW  Slovakia, team leaders 
participate in formal regular meetings with specialists from industrial engineering where
24 Golf was originally 100% manually produced. Polo was at a 40% automation level. Porsche Cayenne and Touareg 
at 60% and Q7 at 50%. respectively.
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they can bring in their ideas about ‘how to make things better’ . And there are also 
workshops for ordinary blue-collar workers where they can ‘adjust and try out different 
things’ (Zeller Interview March 2007) with the goal o f optimising the production process. 
Similarly, ‘continuous improvement workshops’ regularly take place in Skoda. 
Furthermore, white-collar engineers work with the blue-collar workers on the daily basis, 
as the latter represent a crucial source o f expertise. When describing the work process in 
the production unit, the director o f industrial engineering at VW  Slovakia reported that
The process engineers are officially part o f the [white-collar] planning units, but 
physically they work on the shop-floor so that they can define, together with the 
[blue-collar] production unit supervisors, the daily priorities and the work process 
(Zeller Interview March 2007).
Thus, the vocational skills and the expertise related to them represent an important source 
o f work autonomy for the blue collar workers.
Furthermore, management’s commitment to the preservation o f a high level o f technical 
skills is not merely a lip service. Three factors are important in this respect. First, VW 
subsidiaries are among the rare cases o f companies in Central Europe that still train their 
own apprentices. Thus, Audi Gyor and Skoda have large trainee programmes, while VW 
Slovakia trains only few own apprentices -  12 per year -  but has been developing a project 
to support the national vocational training schools in the fields related to the automotive 
industry (Holecek Interview March 2007). Second, due to technological innovation, the 
technical qualifications o f employees are being constantly developed. Thus, regular training 
courses take place on companies’ premises. A t Skoda, regular training takes place every 
two years. Also for technology experts, companies cooperate closely with their technology 
suppliers: in Skoda, when new machines are bought, the company arranges for the training 
courses for its technical specialists (Vacek Interview December 2006). In V W Slovakia, to 
better insure the high level o f vocational training skills, the management mentioned the 
plan to introduce a re-certification o f skills every half a year and, i f  necessary, a re-training 
o f staff (Zeller Interview March 2007).
Finally, during the organisational shifts from one technology platform to another, when 
certain technical skills become obsolete, additional training is provided to employees. In 
Skoda, one such crucial moment was during 2002-2003, when a change o f the 
technological platform from 20 year-old state socialist-era machines to a new, VW
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technology equipment, took place. The director o f Skoda’s component production reported 
how difficu lt the change was and how the company invested in training:
We had 4,500 people, 40 to 60 years old; they spent all their life working on one 
machine. And now, they had to move to another shop floor, new factory that had 
machines that were two-three generations further [...] So people were afraid to go 
into this new production, as work organisation was new; it was a new world. So we 
organised an external training for them: motivation, technical training and training 
on the job. [..] We organised small workshops in small groups, it took about o f 
year, this training. [...] And in this way we could break the resistance [to change] 
(Vacek Interview December 2006).
The high valuation o f the vocational skills is linked to a certain level o f autonomy and 
discretion. Thus, the director o f the engine plant in Skoda argued that in the new work 
organisation imported from the VW  system and characterised by a high quality o f 
production apart from quality checks, responsibility on the shop floor and giving feedback 
was crucial (Vacek Interview December 2006). The industrial engineer at Skoda also 
believed that with time, with increasing responsibility on the shop floor it would be 
possible to stop the assembly line in case o f a faulty product (Nanasi Interview December 
2006). These examples demonstrate that, despite the increased standardisation and 
professionalisation o f work process, a certain level o f discretion and autonomy based on 
local expertise and vocational training has been introduced and was expected to be 
extended.
Thus, the vocational skills and the discretion linked to them continue to be valued. 
Certainly, the local non-economic organising logic o f skill valuation and work autonomy 
have not been the only factors that have contributed to the modernisation o f work practices; 
they interacted with a number o f other factors. The practices o f lean production association 
with economic liberalism that were implemented in the VW  subsidiaries aimed at 
increasing productivity and cost-efficiency at work, but they were ‘ softer’ in comparison to 
the lean production practices o f subsidiaries o f the Asian car producers. The VW lean 
production practices did not ‘go all the way’ in introducing optimising work organisation 
techniques. This made it easier for local actors to adopt the new work practices as the 
balance between rules and discretion was not severely disturbed. The restructuring and 
introduction o f rules related to optimisation rationale were seen as disciplining and 
professional rather than controlling. Despite the shift towards less discretion and more rule- 
bound behaviour, certain features o f discretion and autonomy have been preserved. What 
made it easier for local stakeholders to adopt new, more rule-bound and standardised work
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organisation was the fact that the source o f the new discretion was legitimised by the 
technical expertise as valuation o f the vocational training has been preserved. Thus, in the 
new institutional set-up, the new discretion was still founded on technical and engineering 
expertise, as during state socialism.
The valuation o f technical vocational skills in work organisation has its roots in state 
socialist production practices that we discussed in Chapter III, but also in the German 
influence, as work organisation practices implemented in the VW  subsidiaries have been 
strongly influenced by the practices in the VW  headquarters. Two elements o f German 
automotive industry development were important in this respect. First, the experience o f 
German managers and works councillors with the adoption o f lean production practices 
back at home has been to a certain extent similar to that o f their Central European 
subsidiaries: the informal level o f individual autonomy in German production sites has 
been high.
As industrial development has proceeded in Germany, companies have [...] 
preserved elements o f craft methods. Sectors with small product runs and client- 
oriented, individualized production have met the need for high quality and a high 
level o f flexib ility with self-regulation o f integrated processes. Hence, in many 
sectors, semiautonomous groups are crucial elements in the way work is organized. 
In many companies, there was no need to define and institute such groups, since 
they often grew quite naturally out o f the way in which skilled workers were 
trained. In the automotive industry, for example, some companies have group work 
structures that date back to the immediate post-war period; these structures have 
proved stable and resilient, although the label ‘group work’ was a later addition 
(Roth 1997: 118).
Thus, also in Germany this high level o f skill autonomy was linked to the high level o f 
vocational training that workers had long before the introduction o f more optimising lean 
production.
Second, the VW  version o f ‘ lean production’ that was implemented in Central European 
subsidiaries was informed by the German public debate between employers and industrial 
trade unions on the ‘humanisation o f work’ that had a high public exposure. Roth describes 
how demand for humanization o f work understood as ‘broadening the scope o f worker’s 
initiative [...] but also the scope o f decision making’ (Roth 1997: 119) have been on the 
table since the 1970s but the practices that would mirror these demands did not go beyond 
the experimental stage because in the 1980s German management chose to give a greater 
weight to automation in the hope to catch up with the Japanese competition. It is only with
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the international U-turn in managerial practices that followed the publication o f Womack's 
et al. (1990) ‘The Machine that changed the world’ , the role o f worker’s autonomy and 
motivation became a common knowledge and the earlier trade union demands o f 
humanisation o f work could resurge and at least to some, even i f  limited, extent influence 
the adoption o f the new popular lean production practices. The German humanisation o f 
work debate has had a certain influence on the preservation o f discretion in work 
organisation o f Central European production sites discussed in this study. While the early 
demands o f German metalworker unions were influenced by ‘Volvoism’ i.e. the 
experiences in high level o f work autonomy in Volvo and Saab in Sweden, the path that 
German mangers decided to go in the 1990s was that o f ‘Toyotaism’ i.e. work practices that 
mirrored more closely Japanese experience or even that o f a third model -  American 
influenced lean production practices that negated the importance o f autonomous and skilled 
workers and built on a set o f narrowly defined common skills, standardised and Taylorised 
work practices as well as a high level o f pressures linked to ‘continuous improvement’ 
paradigm (Roth 1997). In other words, when the VW  Group implemented its lean 
production practices in its Central European subsidiaries, the zenith o f the ‘humanisation o f 
work’ debate was long time passed. However, even i f  work organisation practices 
implemented in the Central European VW subsidiaries in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
stand in a strong contrast to the practices o f ‘Volvoism’ characterised by a high level o f 
autonomy, it would be wrong to assume that the ‘humanisation o f work’ debate did not 
influenced the new work organisation practices in the VW  subsidiaries at all. Even i f  this 
influence should not be overstated, the ‘humanisation o f work’ debate certainly informed 
the ways o f thinking o f the German managers at home and also when designing work 
processes in the Central European VW  subsidiaries. Consequently, it has been a supporting 
factor behind the local organising logics o f skill-based autonomy and discretion described 
in this Section.
To sum up the argument o f the Section, despite a shift from highly discretionary to a much 
more formalised and standardised organisation o f work, the Central European VW  
subsidiaries evolved a lot but did not completely break with the previous non-economic 
organising logic. On the contrary, the Section referred to certain continuities with the 
earlier state socialist work organisation. A certain degree o f work autonomy based on the 
valuation o f vocational training and skills still exists, even i f  it is not comparable to the 
previous system. Formalised and standardised work processes and human resources 
strategies o f work organisation that were introduced with the German investment were
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combined with a certain degree o f autonomy and discretion at work, with valuation of 
vocational technical skills being at the core o f the ‘new discretion’ . Although the source of 
discretion has changed: before it was a ‘by-product’ o f the system, while in the new system 
it was granted by the management; in both cases it is the expertise related to the vocational 
skills that has been valued and has constituted a logic o f appropriateness, a value in itself. 
The enterprise organising logic o f ‘discretionary bureaucracy’ thus survived into the post­
communist era, even i f  in quite a different institutional form. Thus, in this Section, again, I 
presented some evidence o f how the instrumental organising logic o f economic liberalism 
has not become completely dominant but has been at least partially re-embedded by means 
o f a pre-existing non-economic organising logic.
Conclusion
In the early days o f transition, the importance o f contextualised knowledge o f managerial 
staff and the significance o f work discretion for blue-collar workers were recognised 
neither by the foreign investor, nor by local stakeholders themselves. Yet they have been an 
important legacy o f state socialist production system: the discretion based on technical 
expertise contributed to making the new work organisation in the post-communist period a 
success and contributed to the industrial modernisation o f the plants. This happened despite 
a strong institutional change that shifted the source and the justification o f discretion and 
strongly limited its role. Despite the introduction o f a high degree o f standardisation and 
formalisation o f work, the firm remained for local actors a discretionary bureaucracy, a 
place where formalised and standardised behaviour dominates but where it is partially 
counter-balanced by a certain level o f discretion based on skill autonomy.
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Conclusion for Part 2
To recapitulate, the Weberian distinction between instrumental and value rationality 
introduced in Part 1 was used to ‘translate’ the distinction between the two philosophical 
schools o f utilitarism and Kantian idealism into the language o f social sciences. Using this 
‘ translation’ , I was able to f ill the Polanyian concept o f the double-movement with new life 
as it proved to be relevant for the company level research. I identified three organising 
logics that have been examples o f the struggle between instrumental rationality, on the one 
hand, and moral commitment and mutual obligation, on the other. Part 2 demonstrated how 
three non-economic enterprise organising logics with their strong legacies in state socialism 
have continued to be important enterprise organising logics during the 1990s and early 
2000s, even i f  their institutional underpinnings have dramatically changed.
The concluding Chapter that now follows takes stock o f the main research findings and o f 
what the emphasis on non-economic organising logics means for the study o f societal re­
embedding and for the neo-institutionalist theory.
202
Lessons of transition: the normative dimension of 
business and work
The central research goal o f this study has been to identify the forms o f economic 
liberalism and societal embeddedness in post-communist Central Europe. The title o f the 
World Bank report ‘From Plan to Market’ (1996) summarises the socio-economic reforms 
that the Central European countries have embarked upon since the early 1990s. In many 
aspects these reforms have been associated with more individual freedoms so that 
economic and political liberalisation did indeed represent a larger liberation o f Central 
European societies from the control o f the Communist Party (Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994). 
Yet when the oppressive controls were abolished and the Party state system collapsed, 
economic liberalism was taken to another level; it started to present itself as the dominant 
organising logic that negated other organising logics o f business and work. However, 
Polanyi had already pointed out that by imposing economic logic on the different spheres 
o f work and production, economic liberalism becomes a potentially destructive force, a 
force that threatens to destroy the societal fabric and the respective reciprocal societal 
commitments (Polanyi 1957). The research goal o f this study has been to operationalise - 
theoretically and empirically - the organising logic o f economic liberalism and o f societal 
embeddedness in post-communism. This concluding Chapter is organised as follows. 
Section I summarises the main findings o f the study. Section II assesses the contribution o f 
this study to the neo-institutional literature on social embeddedness and academic debates 
led in this literature. Section III considers the role o f the neglected normative dimension for 
neo-institutional literature more broadly.
I. Main findings
Using the conceptual framework o f the Polanyian double-movement this study aimed at 
identifying the forces o f economic liberalism and societal embeddedness and the dynamic 
tension between these two organising logics in the context o f the post-communist 
transformation. The research approach is characterised by an interactive relationship 
between the theoretical and the empirical inquiry. Preserving a balance between ‘discipline 
and imagination’ , to use Weick’s metaphor, aimed to produce empirically informed 
theorising. This is why the two constitutive Parts o f the study - the theoretical (Part 1) and 
the empirical (Part 2) - have been given equal space and attention. Theory generation has 
been an important goal even i f  ‘ theory’ in this case was a modest mix o f categorising
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organising logics and bringing together the Polanyian concept o f double-movement with 
the micro-level focus on enterprise organising logics.
For Polanyi, capitalist society is organised around two opposed organising principles: 
economic liberalism and the embeddedness o f societal relations. The tension that inhabits 
this space is a creative one as long as the two principles remain in a relative balance 
(Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994). Polanyi underlines the communal reaction that emerges as a 
response to the expansion o f the market logic and tries to preserve the social fabric o f 
society. Building on Weber’s study o f rationality, and using concepts o f economic 
sociology (Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986; Boltanski and Thevenot 2006) and political science 
(March and Olsen 2004), the present study has applied the Polanyian counter-movement 
and a re-embedding o f societal relations to the post-communist context. The three identified 
non-economic enterprise organising logics set limits on the new economic logic o f 
managerial dominance, cost-efficiency and financial optimisation as well as on the 
standardisation o f work practices that entered the scene with the political regime change. 
The study has introduced the non-economic organising logics o f the firm in state socialism 
that were discussed as important factors behind the Polanyian societal re-embedding in 
post-communism.
The case studies discussed in Part II provide empirical evidence o f the normative 
dimension o f business and work (for an overview, see Table 10). They deal with three 
enterprise organising logics o f the automotive VW  subsidiaries in Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Economic liberalism and firm modernisation have been 
associated with a large number o f political reforms and institutional changes. I have divided 
them into three categories that are relevant for company-level institutional analysis: (i) the 
expansion o f managerial authority, (ii) the financialisation o f firm ’s performance and, 
finally, (iii) the de-contextualisation o f managerial knowledge and increased 
standardisation o f work organisation. In relation to these institutional changes, a number o f 
deontological, non-economic organising logics have been mobilised by the stakeholders so 
that the three dimensions: i) corporate governance and welfare provisions, ii) enterprise 
performance and, finally, iii)  work organisation, are not completely subsumed by the cost- 
benefit utilitarian logic.
The three non-economic organising logics are: (i) welfare protection o f employees by the 
firm, (ii) valuation o f industrial capabilities expressed in a ‘productionist’ attitude and (iii)
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valuation o f skill autonomy and contextualised knowledge and the discretion associated 
with them. These three enterprise organising logics have been translated into three mutual 
commitments between the firm and the employees, whereby the firm is perceived as i) an 
authoritarian paternalist, ii) a source o f competitive industrial capabilities and iii)  a 
discretionary bureaucracy based on skill autonomy. These three non-economic enterprise 
organising logics have not abolished the logic o f economic liberalism but have restrained 
and moderated its expansion. Thus, the organising logic associated with economic 
liberalism in the post-communist context has evolved to a more complex enterprise logic 
that combines both instrumental and value rationality and thus exemplifies the inherently 
contradictory nature o f modem capitalism. Thus, local stakeholders have not opposed new 
market-based institutions, yet they have displayed certain non-economic enterprise 
organising logics, societal commitments and mutual obligations, that have constrained and 
moderated the expansion o f economic liberalism.
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Finally, although this study is guided by an interest in the forces and forms o f societal re­
embedding, an important finding is also related to what constitutes economic liberalism or, 
as Weber (2002) calls it, the ‘ spirit o f capitalism’ . Rather than referring to economic 
liberalism characterised by the ideal-typical features o f dominating market forces in 
general, this study has attempted to qualify and specify the concept o f economic liberalism 
describing it as instrumental, utilitarian and purposive nature o f economic activity. Yet it 
has also tried to be more specific by describing the exact forms that economic liberalism 
has taken in the context o f post-communist enterprises. As societal embeddedness is a 
general term for the variety o f non-economic organising logics, so economic liberalism is a
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general term which encompasses the varieties o f meanings and institutional forms that the 
economic organising logic can take.
//. Re-introducing the normative dimension in neo­
institutionalism
Many authors since Polanyi have dealt with the issue o f societal re-embedding o f economic 
liberalism and have considered different instances o f its appearance. As discussed in 
Chapter I, for scholars o f capitalism in ’developed countries’ , societal embeddedness was 
expressed by the organised interests that preserved their function o f ‘beneficial constraints’ 
(Streeck 1997; Hyman 2001; Hyman 2005). In the neo-institutional literature that studies 
the ‘developed' countries, the notion o f organising logics as a driving force o f societal re­
embedding has remained neglected. Even i f  literature on institutional arrangements that 
point towards common perceptions and values exists in abundance (Zagelmeyer 2000), 
only very few strands o f neo-institutionalism address the issue o f normative frameworks, 
and often they do it in a very implicit way. The neo-institutionalist literature on post-war 
Japan is most relevant for this study as for Dore (1992) and other scholars o f post-war 
Japan, the long-time horizons and the notion o f firm as community represent the forces o f 
societal re-embedding in the Japanese context (Yamamura and Streeck 2003).
Yet overall, the normative dimension remains largely under-theorised in neo­
institutionalism. Often, it has been subsumed by the more general and vague concept o f 
politics and culture. Thus, Burawoy writes in relation to the post-communist transition:
In the imagination o f policymakers, the economic is a series o f purely economic 
interventions -  privatisation, price liberalization or levers controlling inflation, 
interest rates, budget deficits, and the like. When these interventions meet everyday 
life, however, the resistance they encounter is not just economic but cultural and 
political (Burawoy and Verdery 1998: 14).
Culture and politics are useful concepts but they are very general and need fine-tuning i f  
the nature o f societal re-embedding in Central Europe is to be better understood. Building 
on Kant’s reflections on morality this study has made a distinction between deontological 
and utilitarian organising logics that has shown to be helpful in explaining the dynamics o f 
post-communist company organising logics. Deontological organising logics that interpret 
social relationships as a final goal valuable in itself have opposed the expansion of 
instrumental organising logics that interpret social relationships as means o f reaching some
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other goal. Based on this distinction this study has argued that the organising logics of 
economic efficiency have expanded but that they have been constrained and moderated by 
the non-economic organising logics.
Building on the neo-institutionalist literature, the authors o f industrial relations and political 
economy come to the conclusion that no societal re-embedding has taken place in Central 
and Eastern Europe in response to economic liberalism (Ashwin 1999a; Ost and Crowley 
2001; Bohle and Greskovits 2006b). This study has attempted to go beyond the conceptual 
frameworks that are currently used in the neo-institutionalist literature. It has used a more 
sociological approach, which has engaged with those strands o f the neo-institutionalist 
literature that explicitly or implicitly deal with the concept o f societal embeddedness. I 
have operationalised Polanyi’s (1957) concept o f the double-movement in a different 
societal context and time by underlining the importance o f non-economic enterprise 
organising logics and the normative dimension o f business and work. Thus, in contrast to 
the industrial relations literature, this study identifies a counter-movement in Central 
Europe arguing that despite a shift towards economic liberalisation o f institutions o f work 
and production, a certain societal re-embedding and preservation o f the societal fabric has 
taken place.
The literature on non-liberal capitalism has already pointed out that societal embeddedness 
is never automatic, but always ‘at peril and its emergence uncertain’ (Streeck 2007: 12). 
Similarly, Clark and Soulsby argue that ‘ |a]s in all social structures, the continuities o f 
’’institutional embeddedness”  [...] are precarious, subject to the refutations and adjustments 
that emerge in the everyday processes o f interaction’ (Clark and Soulsby 1998: 32). It has 
also been pointed out that it is only due to the objectification that actors are usually 
unaware o f societal embeddedness:
Over time, the social reproduction o f concrete relationships becomes regularised, 
and stable patterns o f embeddedness become institutionalized. [.. .][S]ocioeconomic 
structures o f relations take on characteristics o f historical “ naturalness” , become 
imbued with cultural and customary significance [...] and become resistant to 
change under normal circumstances (Clark and Soulsby 1998: 32).
This case study o f state socialist organising logics in post-communist Central European 
automotive plants has confirmed both arguments. First, it has confirmed that societal 
embeddedness, when conceptualised at the level o f organising logics, is a process full o f 
tensions between different organising logics, where the existing organising logics evolve
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and sometimes re-emerge in new forms. Second, the study has also confirmed a strong 
continuity o f societal embeddedness, as the three non-economic enterprise organising 
logics have been preserved despite important institutional changes.'
Emphasising the normative dimension o f societal embeddedness has proven to be 
especially useful for the neo-institutional literature that studies rapid institutional change. 
Institutional change is a complex process and it is only recently that neo-institutionalism 
have begun to address the difficulty o f conceptualising institutional change (Thelen 2004; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005). This study has suggested a further variable that needs to be 
considered more seriously in order to overcome this inherent difficulty. When institutions 
such as firm  governance or work organisation are transforming in such a fast and profound 
way that actors are rule-takers and rule-makers at the same time, it is inherently difficult to 
disentangle the causal link between these institutional changes and the actors’ behaviour. 
This is why recourse to more continuous and stable organising logics can be useful. This 
study has attempted to show that at least for periods o f rapid institutional change, as have 
been seen in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s, it is sometimes more useful 
to consider more profound organising societal logics rather than focus solely on 
institutions.
This study has also confirmed the role o f the ‘host country’ effect addressed in business 
studies literature. When discussing the transfer o f managerial practices from the 
headquarters to subsidiaries this literature underlines the role o f local actors (Kristensen 
and Zeitlin 2005; Meardi 2006). It questions the possibility o f an unambiguous transfer and 
underlines the role o f ‘host-country effects’ in the adoption o f new work practices and in 
labour responses to broader managerial strategies (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). Similarly, 
this study has relativised the concept o f a ‘ transfer’ . The general point confirmed by this 
case study o f the VW subsidiaries in Central Europe is that the transfer o f institutional 
practices is always at best only partial. I have shown that Central European post-communist 
production and work practices have not been a tabula rasa where West European practices 
could be imposed or copied without restraint, but that the adoption o f new organising logics 
in business, work and production has been a process strongly influenced by local actors and 
local institutional and normative factors.
Although societal re-embedding is by definition always specific and context-dependent, 
certain commonalities could be identified in the relationship between enterprise organising
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logics and institutions. Thus, in the four automotive plants studied, a strong industrial 
upgrading took place showing that, among other factors, non-economic enterprise 
organising logics have been an important driver for industrial modernisation. However, the 
findings o f a similar research project conducted by Morisson (2007) who assessed the 
transformation o f a Russian enterprise during post-communist transition are quite different 
to those identified in this study. Morisson reports discipline violations, absenteeism, 
stealing and similar practices that hinder enterprise modernisation. In this context it is 
important to consider Streeck’s argument that points out the importance o f institutional 
legitimacy, a ‘normative fit*. Streeck argues that normative discourses that provide 
legitimacy to institutions ‘ represent not an alternative to the institutional regulation o f 
capitalism, but a vital pre-condition’ (Streeck 2007: 14). Thus, the organising logics in 
themselves do not ‘produce’ certain institutional outcomes. What rather matters is the 
extent to which the reality is perceived by actors as deviating from their organising logics, 
their logics o f appropriateness, and their moral postulates. I f  what is considered to be 
appropriate and valuable, on the one hand, and the perceived reality, on the other, 
significantly diverge from each other and no legitimising discourse is able to bridge the 
gap, then similar sets o f enterprise organising logics can produce different institutional 
outcomes. This observation helps to explain the findings o f Morisson’s study (2007). In 
other words, when enterprise organising logics and mutual obligations between the firm 
and the workers are violated, the institutional consequences for modernisation and 
upgrading can be less accommodating. In this study, on the other hand, even i f  the complex 
causality o f industrial modernisation was not explored in greater detail, the evidence 
allowed to assume that non-economic organising logics o f local actors have been conducive 
to industrial modernisation o f the four VW subsidiaries.
III. State socialist legacies reconsidered
As discussed in the introductory Chapter o f this study, state socialist legacies are often 
perceived as profoundly inappropriate for the newly established modem market economies 
in Central Europe. When seen through the prism o f the Polanyian double-movement, the 
experience o f the post-communist transition and the legacy o f state socialism provide a 
different picture. I have identified a number o f non-economic organising logics allowing 
me to introduce the normative dimension o f business and work into the study o f societal re­
embedding. Deontological ethics and value rationality have remained relevant in post­
communist societies despite a strong drive towards economic liberalism and utilitarianism.
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The case studies demonstrate how deontological organising logics have been at the heart o f 
societal re-embedding limiting and moderating the expansion o f economic liberalism, its 
institutions and the utilitarian organising logics that these institutions embody. In other 
words, some state socialist legacies have been conducive to preserving the societal fabric 
and re-embedding reciprocal social obligations as well as to preventing the logic o f 
economic liberalism from becoming the only dominant logic. Thus, the concept and the 
evidence o f the normative dimension o f business and work that this study provides call for 
a re-consideration o f the role o f state socialist legacies for contemporary political economy 
and neo-institutionalism.
State socialist legacies have had a strong impact on both the emergence o f economic 
liberalism, on the one hand, and the societal re-embedding, on the other. The fact that this 
study has focussed on the latter should not be seen as my desire to glorify state socialism in 
any way. This focus was motivated rather by the desire to re-balance the public and 
academic debate that largely sees state socialist legacies as negative and as obstructing 
modernisation in post-communist societies. The three enterprise organising logics 
considered with in this study certainly do not represent all the organising logics that have 
been important to local enterprise stakeholders. As discussed in Chapter I, nationalism can 
be another non-economic organising logic. In the field o f work and production, it takes the 
form o f ‘economic nationalism’ i.e. a mutual obligation to act in the national interest, but 
sometimes it simply becomes an anti-foreigner sentiment -  depending on whether it adopts 
the civic or an ethnic orientation (Greenfeld 2003). This study has focused on those three 
logics that hav e constituted a puzzle o f surprising continuity: despite the dramatic 
institutional changes that took place in many areas - firm governance and welfare benefits, 
firm  performance measures, as well as in work organisation and managerial practices - 
enterprises continue to function as authoritarian paternalists, as sources o f competitive 
industrial capabilities and as discretionary bureaucracies, although in a reconfigured form.
Yet there is one further, more general reason that the study o f the Central European 
transition countries is a fascinating field not only for area study scholars but also for those 
interested in the nature o f modem capitalism, economic modernisation and the modernity 
o f Western liberal democracy at large. Value rationality is an important variable that the 
study o f post-communist transition helps re-discover. The understanding o f Western 
modernity is driven by the concepts o f pluralism and rationality that do not explicitly deal
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with the questions o f ethics or normative frameworks. The start o f the Western modernity is 
usually situated in the French Revolution and the age o f the Enlightenment.
[T]he threshold o f modernity may be marked precisely at the moment when the 
unquestioned legitimacy o f a divinely, preordained social order began its 
decline’(Eisenstadt 2000: 4).
Modernity is conceptualised as the autonomy o f men that implies reflexivity and the active 
construction o f social life:
This project o f modernity entailed a very strong emphasis on the autonomous 
participation o f members o f society in the constitution o f the social and political 
order, on the autonomous access o f all members o f the society to these orders’ 
(Eisenstadt 2000: 5).
Yet Western modernity has been characterised by a rationality that is increasingly 
consequentialist i.e. in which the behaviour is oriented towards calculated expected utility 
rather than an identity-based logic o f appropriateness (March and Olsen 2004). As 
discussed in Chapter II, the term ‘the logic o f appropriateness’ introduced by March and 
Olsen comes close to the concept o f social embeddedness that this study uses. The societies 
and governance systems in liberal democracies have came to see themselves as 'a 
community o f shared objectives rather than a community o f shared rules, principles and 
procedures' (March and Olsen 2004: 18). Even i f  Western European intellectual tradition 
has included great thinkers from Kant to Foucault who have dealt extensively with issues of 
morality and ethics, more recently this tradition seems to have become less popular as 
‘ rationalistic’ arguments seem to prevail (Norris 1993) in modem social sciences.
The normative dimension o f intellectual activity in the East was disregarded by Western 
social sciences scholars not only before the regime change in Central Europe but also after; 
conflicts concerning truth and authenticity seemed old-fashioned and unsuitable for modem 
political programs (Auer 2004). Yet different ethical motives and logics o f rationality co­
exist creating a tension between different motives for individual and collective action. In 
the re-united Europe today social scientists can learn from state socialist legacies and the 
post-communist transformation. First, they can learn from state socialist legacies. The state 
socialist system was characterised by an ‘ intrusion’ o f politics and ideology into the system 
o f production and work. As a consequence, totalitarian and semi-totalitarian regimes made 
individuals in state socialist societies more sensitive to the issues o f self-analysis and
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normative appropriateness (Kharkhordin 1999). Bryant and Mokrzycki argue that ‘ [t]he 
feeling o f living in a sham society was overwhelming in Eastern Europe before 1989’ 
(Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994: 7). Auer introduces the notion o f anti-politics. As the sphere 
o f production was subordinated to the system o f administrative control, the attitude o f anti­
politics emerged out o f suspicion o f the communist state and o f the official ideology; it was 
cautious towards all types o f dogmatic political ideologies, any teleological set o f values 
(Auer 2004). Auer explains that anti-politics did not mean to be apolitical, quite the 
contrary -  the ‘personal became political’ :
by liberating individual from the constraints o f institutional politics and the 
schematic thinking imposed by abstract ideological frameworks, individual were 
empowered to endow their actions with authentic meaning (Auer 2004: 8).
The experience o f state socialism also teaches us that i f  there is a strong imbalance towards 
the utilitarian logic or instrumental rationality in one sphere o f life, another sphere w ill tend 
to be dominated by value rationality or deontological ethics. Thus, during the totalitarian 
and semi-totalitarian rule o f state socialism that prescribed the teleological goal o f the 
future communist regime, ethical questions still mattered, but they were ‘banned’ into the 
sphere o f personal life. Concepts such as truth, deceit and authenticity were central to the 
dissident movements in the Soviet Union’s field o f influence (Thaa 1996). Auer argues 
that:
The likes o f Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik in Poland and 
Gyorgy Konrad in Hungary saw their struggle against the omnipotent communist 
state as an ‘anti-political’ struggle for authenticity, not a fight for political power. In 
line with this, they were reluctant to ally themselves with clearly defined 
ideological positions. Instead, they appealed to a set o f basic human values, 
assuming that a regime built on hypocrisy, greed and conformism could be defeated 
by truthfulness and a sense o f basic human decency (Auer 2004: 2).
And even recently, issues o f morality still attract the interest o f researchers with the 
experience o f state socialism and post-communist transition. Thus, a recent contribution to 
this topic has been a book by the East German author Wolfgang Engler (2009) who 
explores the historical emergence o f concepts o f authenticity and truth in capitalist 
societies.
Second, the post-communist transformation represents a period when stakeholders are 
especially sensitive to the underlying values and organising logics inhabiting their business 
and work practices. The post-communist era has been the period when established and
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objectified values and organising logics were questioned and sometimes reconsidered by 
the stakeholders.
In post-communist societies undergoing fundamental institutional changes, the 
relative stability, legitimacy and coherence o f prior management practices have lost 
their taken-for-grantedness, posing fundamental questions about the nature o f 
management and managers -  regarding the adequacy o f the values and ideas which 
give rationality and legitimacy to managerial work [...] (Soulsby and Clark 1996: 
235).
The capitalist liberal democracy o f the late 20th - early 21st centuries is characterised by 
strong ideological allegiances disappearing and party political delineations becoming less 
and less clear. As far as intellectual traditions in social sciences are concerned, this 
concluding Chapter has argued that ethical behavioural motives and normative frameworks 
should be given a greater consideration as they have been neglected in the current neo­
institutionalist literature. In other words, sensitivity to the normative dimension o f 
individual and collective action could possibly be another legacy o f state socialism that 
neo-institutionalism should better not ignore. The old Weberian distinction between 
different rationalities - different organising logics o f business and work - may be ‘ re­
discovered’ not only in the neo-institutionalist literature but also in other related disciplines 
such as organisational studies and economic sociology. Furthermore, studying the variety 
o f context-dependent behavioural motives may also be relevant for other socio-economic 
contexts, industries and dimensions o f work life. I f  acknowledged, the inherent tension 
between the professional ethics and deontological organising logics, on the one hand, and 
instrumental calculative organising logic, on the other, may be a source o f creativity and 
progress. After all, already Weber had pointed out that there is always a part o f our life that 
does not conform to instrumental rationality and to cost-benefit calculations and it is on the 
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Interviews Czech Republic December 2006
Date Person Position Affiliation
11.12.06 Lenka Bila CoachingDepartment
Skoda Auto, Mlada 
Boleslav
11.12.06 Mr. Hamacek HR Director, management issues
Skoda Auto, Mlada 
Boleslav
12.12.06 Mr. Nanasi Industrialengineering
Skoda Auto, Mlada 
Boleslav
12.12.06
Mr. Vacek Director of motor production
Skoda Auto, Mlada 
Boleslav
12.12.06 Pavel Radda Director of the car production










Institute of Sociology, 
Academy of Sciences, 
Prague
14.12.06 Mr. Dolezal International affairs
Czech Automotive 
Association, Prague





15.12.06 Ivan Voles Deputy Secretary
Economic Chamber of 
the Czech Republic, 
Prague
18.12.06 Mrs. Shramova 
Zdenek Halir
Finance Division and 
Controlling
Skoda Auto, Mlada 
Boleslav
19.12.06 Josef Stredula Bretislav Witwer 
Lucie Studnicna
President Chairman 












20.12.06 Mrs. Erbenova Board member, 
labour economist
Czech Central Bank, 
Prague








Interviews Poland March 2007
Date Person Position Affiliation
06.03.07 Bogdan Szozda President of national automobile section





President of the plant 
trade union in 
DAEWOO-FSO









Metalworker Section of 
Solidarnosc trade 
union, Warsaw




Interviews Slovakia March 2007
Date Person Position Affiliation
13.03.07
Eva




American Chamber of 
commerce, Slovakia, 
Bratislava
13.03.07 Jur Pal'a Director of European Union Department








15.03.07 Mr. Wojnar Finance Director, Sup. Board VW Slovakia
15.03.07 Mr. Kern Executive director German-Slovak 
Chamber of Commerce
16.03.07 Maria Petrova Vice-president Trade union OZ KOVO 
in VW Slovakia
16.03.07 Mr. Jasicek Director Purchasing Department VW Slovakia
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Employers of Transport 
Post Offices and 
Telecommunications of 
the Slovak Republic
19.03.07 Mr. Zeller Director, Industrial Engineering
VW Slovakia, Devinska 
Nova Ves
19.03.07
Mr. Langfelder Director, New Projects SUV
VW Slovakia, Devinska 
Nova Ves
19.03.07 Mr. Holecek Supervisory Board Member, HR
VW Slovakia, Devinska 
Nova Ves
20.03.07 Anton Mifka Vice President 
Int. Affairs
OZ KOVO Metalworker 
union, Bratislava









Association Of Slovak 
Republic Secretariat, 
Bratislava
21.03.07 JUDr. Maria Buchtova
Director of Labour 
Legislation Department
Ministry of Labour, 
Bratislava
21.03.07 VI. Kalina Secretary General
Association of the 
Electro Technical 
Industry of Slovakia, 
Bratislava









22.03.07 LadislavUncovsky Executive Director
Slovak Banking 
Association, Bratislava
23.03.07 Maria Petrova Vice-president
Trade union OZ KOVO 
in VW Slovakia, 
Devinska Nova Ves
Interviews Poland April 2007
Date Person Position Affiliation
10.04.07 Jan Rafalowski Advisor to Deputy Secretary General Mr. 
Jerzy Wezyk
Polish Chamber of 
Commerce, Warsaw
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11.04.07 Marco Walde Responsible Services for Investors
Polish-German 
chamber of industry 
and commerce, 
Warsaw





























Coordinator for Labour 







16.04.07 Mr. Malinowski Mr. XXX
President 
Desk officer
Confederation of Polish 
Employers KPP
19.04.07 Adam Ditmer President Solidarnosc Metalowcy, Katowice
19.04.07 Slawomir Cibiera Union leader GM Poland
Solidarnosc Opel GM, 
Poland
Interviews France June 2007
Date Person Position Affiliation






Interviews Slovakia August 2007
Date Person Position Affiliation
16.08.07 Anton Mifka Vice President OZ KOVO Slovakia, Bratislava
16.08.07 Zuzana
Mikulasova
Head of Project 
Development Departm 
ent, SARIO





OZ KOVO, VW 
Bratislava, Devinska 
Nova Ves
Interviews Hungary August 2007





Audi Gyor Betriebsrat 
Betriebsratvorsitzender






28.08.07 Lujza Radi Human resources, Director for work issues
AUDI HUNGARIA 
MOTOR Kft., Gyor
Interviews Belgium October 2007
Date Person Position Affiliation
18.10.07 Gerald Audaz Policy Adviser European Metalworker 
Federation, Brussels
18.10.07 Peter Scherrer General Secretary European Metalworker 
Federation, Brussels
Interviews Hungary June 2008
Date Person Position Affiliation
19.07.08 Mr. Bogdanovits Director






19.07.08 Dirk Wolfer CorporateCommunications
German-Hungarian 
chamber of industry 
and commerce, 
Budapest
20.07.08 Sandor Csurgo Zoltan Szoke
International affairs 
Responsible for the 
automotive sector
Vasas trade union 
International relations, 
Budapest
20.07.08 Laslo Naumann Researcher
The Institute for Social 
Policy and Labour, 
Budapest
Interviews Hungary September 2008
Date Person Position Affiliation
24.08.08 Erika Mezei Trade union official Vasas trade union, Budapest
24.08.08 Laslo Naumann Researcher
The Institute for 
Social Policy and 
Labour, Budapest
Interviews Hungary December 2008
Date Person Position Affiliation
11.12.08 Sandor Csurgo 
Mr. Mezo
Trade union official; 
international affairs 
Trade union official
Vasas trade union, 
Budapest
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